Andreas Schwab wrote:
Tom Horsley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
If I exec a setuid program under ptrace, I can read the image via
PEEKDATA requests.
Only CAP_SYS_PTRACE capable processes get suid/sgid semantics under
ptrace, or can attach to a privileged processes.
Andreas.
I realize the p
Tom Horsley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> If I exec a setuid program under ptrace, I can read the image via
> PEEKDATA requests.
Only CAP_SYS_PTRACE capable processes get suid/sgid semantics under
ptrace, or can attach to a privileged processes.
Andreas.
--
Andreas Schwab, SuSE Labs, [EMAIL PR
No, not a new security hole (exactly), more of a philosophy
question:
If I exec a setuid program under ptrace, I can read the image via
PEEKDATA requests. Could (or should) that be considered a security
hole? Come to think of it, should any executable with no read
access (setuid or not) be debugga
3 matches
Mail list logo