On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 05:09:10PM -0500, George Spelvin wrote:
> Well, /dev/urandom is documented as being *deliberately* slow. It's meant
> only to produce 128 to 256 bits of seed material for CPRNG. I don't
> know if Ted considers speeding it up to be goal or an antigoal. :-)
Hmm, I don't
On Sat, Dec 14, 2013 at 02:23:07PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> I'm much more inclined to think about changing how we generate random
> numbers from the output pool by switching from using SHA to AES in
> some one-way random function mode (i.e., such as the Davies-Meyer
> construction), since
On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 05:09:10PM -0500, George Spelvin wrote:
Well, /dev/urandom is documented as being *deliberately* slow. It's meant
only to produce 128 to 256 bits of seed material for CPRNG. I don't
know if Ted considers speeding it up to be goal or an antigoal. :-)
Hmm, I don't think
On Sat, Dec 14, 2013 at 02:23:07PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
I'm much more inclined to think about changing how we generate random
numbers from the output pool by switching from using SHA to AES in
some one-way random function mode (i.e., such as the Davies-Meyer
construction), since that is
particularly helpful in the next commit, where we add
another parameter to account() and extract_entropy().
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 61 ---
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/cha
and the kernel's general use, on
the other hand, should be at least 128 for good commercial security
and users may want it higher.
Make a new parameter for the minimum size of a reseed, and make it
128 by default.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 46
rrent code, as we
don't make repeated small reseeds anyway, but it's best to be clear.
Rename entropy_total to seed_entropy_bits to reflect its new function.
While touching the not-yet-initialized warnings, checkpatch complains
about printk(KERN_NOTICE, ...), so switch to pr_notice etc.
Signed-of
e glimpses the internal state --
which is largely an academic question, given what an attacker who can
read kernel memory is usually able to do. We still take a
regular-sized seed up front so as not to delay getting initialized.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/ran
Until then, we need all the entropy we can get. The "min_bytes"
logic takes care of making these reseeds catastrophic, and
reserving entropy for /dev/random isn't a priority in early boot.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+),
is seeded is no big deal. This logic still
ensures that /dev/random readers won't starve indefinitely.
At present most input goes directly to the nonblocking pool early on
anyway, but this helps put us in a position to change that.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 12
are
interchangeable, but the next commit will make them differ.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 24 ++--
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index a624262e8..c11281551 100644
reseed while producing
output from virtually no entropy.
At present most input goes directly to the nonblocking pool early on
anyway, but this helps put us in a position to change that.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 17 +
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4
that.
This adds a wrinkle to determining when we're ready for someone to
read from /dev/random, so factor that out.
At present most input goes directly to the nonblocking pool early
on anyway, but this puts us in a position to change that.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 25
the computation on nonblocking_pool.
Also compute 'initialized' only for nonblocking_pool, which is the
only place where the concept really makes sense.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 17 +
include/trace/events/random.h | 24 ++--
2
complished by
sending the input straight to the nonblocking pool early on.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 19 ++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 58e3e81d4..ea389723f 100644
--- a/dr
. The credit_bits output
parameter takes care of that.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 7 +++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index c11281551..c2428ecb2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
andom: simplify accounting code"
a few commits ago. Before that, for a long time we would compare
have_bytes - reserved (or equivalent) to ibytes or store it into ibytes,
but only inside a condition that guaranteed it wasn't negative.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 3 +
it clear that overflow
isn't an issue. Also we might be less likely to make mistakes like
the one fixed in the previous commit.
As a bonus, give a name to the minimum number of bytes to pull,
which we use twice.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 11 +--
1 file changed, 5
the target (by default 512b estimated.)
Until we first reach the minimum reseed size (128b by default), all
input collected is exclusively for the nonblocking pool and
/dev/random readers must wait.
Cheers,
Greg
Greg Price (14):
random: fix signedness bug
random: fix a (harmless) overflow
rando
it clear that overflow
isn't an issue. Also we might be less likely to make mistakes like
the one fixed in the previous commit.
As a bonus, give a name to the minimum number of bytes to pull,
which we use twice.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 11 +--
1
(by default 512b estimated.)
Until we first reach the minimum reseed size (128b by default), all
input collected is exclusively for the nonblocking pool and
/dev/random readers must wait.
Cheers,
Greg
Greg Price (14):
random: fix signedness bug
random: fix a (harmless) overflow
random: reserve
: simplify accounting code
a few commits ago. Before that, for a long time we would compare
have_bytes - reserved (or equivalent) to ibytes or store it into ibytes,
but only inside a condition that guaranteed it wasn't negative.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 3 ++-
1
reseed while producing
output from virtually no entropy.
At present most input goes directly to the nonblocking pool early on
anyway, but this helps put us in a position to change that.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 17 +
1 file changed, 13
that.
This adds a wrinkle to determining when we're ready for someone to
read from /dev/random, so factor that out.
At present most input goes directly to the nonblocking pool early
on anyway, but this puts us in a position to change that.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c
the computation on nonblocking_pool.
Also compute 'initialized' only for nonblocking_pool, which is the
only place where the concept really makes sense.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 17 +
include/trace/events/random.h | 24
by
sending the input straight to the nonblocking pool early on.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 19 ++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 58e3e81d4..ea389723f 100644
. The credit_bits output
parameter takes care of that.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 7 +++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index c11281551..c2428ecb2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char
Until then, we need all the entropy we can get. The min_bytes
logic takes care of making these reseeds catastrophic, and
reserving entropy for /dev/random isn't a priority in early boot.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1
is seeded is no big deal. This logic still
ensures that /dev/random readers won't starve indefinitely.
At present most input goes directly to the nonblocking pool early on
anyway, but this helps put us in a position to change that.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 12
are
interchangeable, but the next commit will make them differ.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 24 ++--
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index a624262e8..c11281551 100644
and the kernel's general use, on
the other hand, should be at least 128 for good commercial security
and users may want it higher.
Make a new parameter for the minimum size of a reseed, and make it
128 by default.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 46
, as we
don't make repeated small reseeds anyway, but it's best to be clear.
Rename entropy_total to seed_entropy_bits to reflect its new function.
While touching the not-yet-initialized warnings, checkpatch complains
about printk(KERN_NOTICE, ...), so switch to pr_notice etc.
Signed-off-by: Greg
the internal state --
which is largely an academic question, given what an attacker who can
read kernel memory is usually able to do. We still take a
regular-sized seed up front so as not to delay getting initialized.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 38
add
another parameter to account() and extract_entropy().
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 61 ---
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index
These are a recurring cause of confusion, so rename them to
hopefully be clearer.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 34 +-
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index
The variable 'entropy_bytes' is set from an expression that actually
counts bits. Fortunately it's also only compared to values that also
count bits. Rename it accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff
es should be
clarified too.) This may as well be post-3.13.
Cheers,
Greg
Greg Price (2):
random: entropy_bytes is actually bits
random: clarify bits/bytes in wakeup thresholds
drivers/char/random.c | 36 ++--
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18
On Thu, Dec 05, 2013 at 08:13:47PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 03:08:41AM -0500, Greg Price wrote:
> > + if (ibytes && cmpxchg(>entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
> > + goto retry;
>
> I wonder if we would be better d
On Thu, Dec 05, 2013 at 08:13:47PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 03:08:41AM -0500, Greg Price wrote:
+ if (ibytes cmpxchg(r-entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
+ goto retry;
I wonder if we would be better dropping the test for ibytes here, so
These are a recurring cause of confusion, so rename them to
hopefully be clearer.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 34 +-
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char
The variable 'entropy_bytes' is set from an expression that actually
counts bits. Fortunately it's also only compared to values that also
count bits. Rename it accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3
.) This may as well be post-3.13.
Cheers,
Greg
Greg Price (2):
random: entropy_bytes is actually bits
random: clarify bits/bytes in wakeup thresholds
drivers/char/random.c | 36 ++--
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.2
--
To unsubscribe from
On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 03:09:05PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> Applied, although I slightly edited the commit description the the
> debug message mentioned in the description was removed since the first
> version of your patch series, and it wasn't updated as part of the
> rebase.
Ah, good
On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 03:09:05PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
Applied, although I slightly edited the commit description the the
debug message mentioned in the description was removed since the first
version of your patch series, and it wasn't updated as part of the
rebase.
Ah, good catch.
On Sun, Nov 17, 2013 at 06:15:32PM -0800, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Sun, 2013-11-17 at 21:07 -0500, Greg Price wrote:
> > Perhaps the following tweak to the error message would make this
> > subtlety clearer?
>
> Maybe, but this case isn't a macro. It's a function.
> Dunno
emantics for that gets real ugly real fast.
> sparse matches gcc behaviour (I hope), but it warns about such abuses.
> It's a defect, all right - one being reported by sparse.
Perhaps the following tweak to the error message would make this
subtlety clearer?
Cheers,
Greg
From: Greg Price
Date:
behaviour (I hope), but it warns about such abuses.
It's a defect, all right - one being reported by sparse.
Perhaps the following tweak to the error message would make this
subtlety clearer?
Cheers,
Greg
From: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2013 17:57:41 -0800
Subject: [PATCH
On Sun, Nov 17, 2013 at 06:15:32PM -0800, Joe Perches wrote:
On Sun, 2013-11-17 at 21:07 -0500, Greg Price wrote:
Perhaps the following tweak to the error message would make this
subtlety clearer?
Maybe, but this case isn't a macro. It's a function.
Dunno if differentiating when it's
e had enough
bits, even though we don't apply it to actually limit how many we
take. The callers of account() never exercise either of these cases.
Before the previous commit, it was possible for "nbytes" to be less
than "min" if userspace chose a pathological configuration, but no
longe
o for now just limit them both.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 1f43f9e..865c8db 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/dr
sses to ->entropy_count here. Drop the use of the lock.
Cc: Jiri Kosina
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 4
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 5dffca8..1f43f9e 100644
--- a
This comment didn't quite keep up as extract_entropy() was split into
four functions. Put each bit by the function it describes.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 31 +--
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 10
ore Ts'o"
Cc: Jiri Kosina
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 12
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index fe7ecdd..5dffca8 100644
--- a/drivers/char/rand
After this remark was written, commit d2e7c96af added a use of
arch_get_random_long() inside the get_random_bytes codepath.
The main point stands, but it needs to be reworded.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insert
Some other simplifications.
The behavior should be identical except that I've changed a debug
message.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 57 ---
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff
There's only one function here now, as uuid_strategy is long gone.
Also make the bit about "If accesses via ..." clearer.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 8
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dri
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index cdf4cfb..ed72be5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -30
tightens slightly a bound on a sysctl value to avoid a
pathological case.
The bugfix that was in v1 was taken care of by Peter in a283b5c45
("random: allow fractional bits to be tracked").
Cheers,
Greg
Greg Price (9):
random: fix typos / spelling errors in comments
random: f
tightens slightly a bound on a sysctl value to avoid a
pathological case.
The bugfix that was in v1 was taken care of by Peter in a283b5c45
(random: allow fractional bits to be tracked).
Cheers,
Greg
Greg Price (9):
random: fix typos / spelling errors in comments
random: fix comment
There's only one function here now, as uuid_strategy is long gone.
Also make the bit about If accesses via ... clearer.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 8
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index cdf4cfb..ed72be5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char
After this remark was written, commit d2e7c96af added a use of
arch_get_random_long() inside the get_random_bytes codepath.
The main point stands, but it needs to be reworded.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++--
1 file
simplifications.
The behavior should be identical except that I've changed a debug
message.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 57 ---
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff
...@mit.edu
Cc: Jiri Kosina jkos...@suse.cz
Cc: H. Peter Anvin h...@zytor.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 12
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index fe7ecdd..5dffca8
. Drop the use of the lock.
Cc: Jiri Kosina jkos...@suse.cz
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 4
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 5dffca8..1f43f9e 100644
both.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 1f43f9e..865c8db 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char
This comment didn't quite keep up as extract_entropy() was split into
four functions. Put each bit by the function it describes.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 31 +--
1 file changed, 21 insertions
() never exercise either of these cases.
Before the previous commit, it was possible for nbytes to be less
than min if userspace chose a pathological configuration, but no
longer.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Cc: Jiri Kosina jkos...@suse.cz
Cc: H. Peter Anvin h...@zytor.com
Signed-off-by: Greg
On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 01:08:07AM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 11:23:03PM -0500, Greg Price wrote:
> > That's a good idea. I've worried about the same thing, but hadn't
> > thought of that solution.
>
> I think the key is that we set a default
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 08:51:18PM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 11/12/2013 08:37 PM, Greg Price wrote:
> > I'm thinking only of boot-time blocking. The idea is that once
> > /dev/urandom is seeded with, say, 128 bits of min-entropy in the
> > absolute, information-th
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 08:02:09PM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> One thing, too, if we are talking about anything other than
> boot-time-only blocking: going from a nonblocking to a blocking
> condition means being able to accept a short read, and right now *many*
> users of /dev/urandom are not
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 10:32:05PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> One of the things I've been thinking about with respect to making
> /dev/urandom block is being able to configure (via a module parameter
> which could be specified on the boot command line) which allows us to
> set a limit for how
On Mon, Nov 11, 2013 at 11:24:44PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> My apologies for not being able to get to this patch series before the
> patch window opened --- this week has been crazy. None of the changes
> seem to be especially critical, and a number of the patches don't
> apply cleanly to
On Mon, Nov 11, 2013 at 11:24:44PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
My apologies for not being able to get to this patch series before the
patch window opened --- this week has been crazy. None of the changes
seem to be especially critical, and a number of the patches don't
apply cleanly to the
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 10:32:05PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
One of the things I've been thinking about with respect to making
/dev/urandom block is being able to configure (via a module parameter
which could be specified on the boot command line) which allows us to
set a limit for how long
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 08:02:09PM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
One thing, too, if we are talking about anything other than
boot-time-only blocking: going from a nonblocking to a blocking
condition means being able to accept a short read, and right now *many*
users of /dev/urandom are not
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 08:51:18PM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
On 11/12/2013 08:37 PM, Greg Price wrote:
I'm thinking only of boot-time blocking. The idea is that once
/dev/urandom is seeded with, say, 128 bits of min-entropy in the
absolute, information-theoretic sense, it can produce
On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 01:08:07AM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 11:23:03PM -0500, Greg Price wrote:
That's a good idea. I've worried about the same thing, but hadn't
thought of that solution.
I think the key is that we set a default of requiring 128 bits, or 5
Hi Ted,
After reading through the RNG code, I'm curious about one aspect and I
wonder if you can shed light on it. Since v3.6-rc1~26^2~30 ("random:
use lockless techniques in the interrupt path"), we mix bytes into the
pool without taking the lock, when inside add_interrupt_randomness().
This
Hi Ted,
After reading through the RNG code, I'm curious about one aspect and I
wonder if you can shed light on it. Since v3.6-rc1~26^2~30 (random:
use lockless techniques in the interrupt path), we mix bytes into the
pool without taking the lock, when inside add_interrupt_randomness().
This
c: Jiri Kosina
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 7 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 8824e8d..9e4645e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -860,12 +860,7 @@ retry:
This commit makes the very boring simplifications so that the next
commit, which is a little trickier, is isolated and easy to review.
No change in behavior here at all.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Cc: Jiri Kosina
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 10 --
1 file
e had enough
bits, even though we don't apply it to actually limit how many we
take. The callers of account() never exercise either of these cases.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Cc: Jiri Kosina
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 23 ---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(
Some other simplifications.
The behavior should be identical except that I've changed a debug
message.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 68 +--
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff
After this remark was written, commit d2e7c96af added a use of
arch_get_random_long() inside the get_random_bytes codepath.
The main point stands, but it needs to be reworded.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insert
This comment didn't quite keep up as extract_entropy() was split into
four functions. Put each bit by the function it describes.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 31 +--
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 10
We cheerfully overflow these variables (at least where "int"
is 32 bits wide), so pedantically they should be unsigned.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/cha
erved bytes from the pool,
even though this is less than min.
Move the "min" check inside the ACCESS_ONCE/cmpxchg loop to
prevent the race.
Cc: Jiri Kosina
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 9 -
1 file changed, 4 insertion
sses to ->entropy_count here. Drop the use of the lock.
Cc: Jiri Kosina
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 5 -
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 9e4645e..1bf6bf8 100644
--- a
There's only one function here now, as uuid_strategy is long gone.
Also make the bit about "If accesses via ..." clearer.
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 8
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dri
signedness fix. Two patches change the locking
and lockless concurrency control in account(), including one bugfix.
The bug is related to the one Jiri found and fixed in May.
Cheers,
Greg
Greg Price (11):
random: fix typos / spelling errors in comments
random: fix comment on proc_do_uuid
random
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o"
Signed-off-by: Greg Price
---
drivers/char/random.c | 8
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 7a744d3..ef3e15b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 8
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 7a744d3..ef3e15b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char
signedness fix. Two patches change the locking
and lockless concurrency control in account(), including one bugfix.
The bug is related to the one Jiri found and fixed in May.
Cheers,
Greg
Greg Price (11):
random: fix typos / spelling errors in comments
random: fix comment on proc_do_uuid
random
There's only one function here now, as uuid_strategy is long gone.
Also make the bit about If accesses via ... clearer.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 8
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git
After this remark was written, commit d2e7c96af added a use of
arch_get_random_long() inside the get_random_bytes codepath.
The main point stands, but it needs to be reworded.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++--
1 file
This comment didn't quite keep up as extract_entropy() was split into
four functions. Put each bit by the function it describes.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 31 +--
1 file changed, 21 insertions
We cheerfully overflow these variables (at least where int
is 32 bits wide), so pedantically they should be unsigned.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char
the min check inside the ACCESS_ONCE/cmpxchg loop to
prevent the race.
Cc: Jiri Kosina jkos...@suse.cz
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 9 -
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char
() never exercise either of these cases.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o ty...@mit.edu
Cc: Jiri Kosina jkos...@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Price pr...@mit.edu
---
drivers/char/random.c | 23 ---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char
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