Re: [PATCH] f2fs: Remove BUG_ON in dec_valid_node_count
Hi,
Abandon my patch in favor of Jaegeuk's recovery accounting fix (mine
has a copy paste error anyway)
[f2fs-dev] [PATCH 1/2] f2fs: fix inconsistency of block count during recovery
This patch solves the issue completely.
-Chris
On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 2:26 PM, Russell Knize wrote:
>
> The node accounting errors seem to be creeping in during recovery.
> Once the error is introduced in the total counts, it gets recorded in
> the next checkpoint and is carried forward. Often times the error
> crops-up after a failed recovery attempt, such as when recovery
> attempts to recover an inode belonging to a subdirectory that was
> previously removed.
>
> We've also seen accounting errors elsewhere, such as the block bitmap
> management in update_sit_entry(). In one case, we bug-out on some
> random unlink operation because truncate_data_blocks_range() tries to
> invalidate a block whose bit is not set in the bitmap:
>
> kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/fs/f2fs/segment.c:199!
> ...
> do_unlinkat()
> evict()
> f2fs_evict_inode()
> f2fs_truncate()
> truncate_data_blocks_range()
> invalidate_blocks()
> update_sit_entry()
>
> In another case, we bug-out during recovery while trying to allocate
> the dummy page for an fsync. In this case, the page is already
> allocated:
>
> kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/fs/f2fs/segment.c:211!
> ...
> vfs_kern_mount()
> mount_fs()
> f2fs_mount()
> mount_bdev()
> f2fs_fill_super()
> recover_fsync_data()
> recover_data_page()
> update_sit_entry()
>
>
> I've experimented with some changes to deal with the bug-outs in
> update_sit_entry() and regenerate the block counts that are maintained
> by the seg_entry and sec_entry structures, but I am not confident that
> there still won't exist a disparity between block allocations and
> their respective nodes.
>
> Some sort of consistency checker would be handy. ;)
>
> We're going to run these torture tests with disable_roll_forward to
> try to at least confirm that we should be focused on the recovery
> process.
>
> Russ W. Knize
> Mobile Devices Android Platform
> Desk: 847-523-9381
> Mobile: 224-622-1391
>
>
> On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Chris Fries wrote:
> > Yes, your observations are correct, total_valid_node_count is 0, and the
> > caller is truncate_node. It could be a bug in recovery accounting
> > somewhere, but I haven't been able to save a copy of the disk image just
> > before the recovery or rmdir failure, which is the best place to start
> > investigating the bug. It could also be some bad state of the disk
> > during
> > panic restart rather than a straight recovery bug.
> >
> > Adding some traces or logs into recovery might give clues too.
> >
> > The panics I've seen are both during mount and during rmdir.
> >
> > -- truncate_node
> > -- remove_inode_page
> > -- f2fs_evict_inode
> > -- evict
> > -- recover_orphan_inodes
> > -- f2fs_fill_super
> > -- mount_bdev
> >
> > or
> >
> > -- truncate_node
> > -- remove_inode_page
> > -- f2fs_evict_inode
> > -- evict
> > -- d_delete
> > -- vfs_rmdir
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 2:05 AM, Haicheng Li
> >
> > wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 10:46:27PM -0500, Chris Fries wrote:
> >> > From: Chris Fries
> >> >
> >> > Panic loops while running LTP fsstress has been able to get
> >> > a disk into two different panic loops from dec_valid_node_count.
> >> > f2fs.h:714 BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_node_count < count);
> >>
> >> This is interesting catch.
> >> from the code, dec_valid_node_count() is only called by
> >> truncate_node():
> >> dec_valid_node_count(sbi, dn->inode, 1);
> >>
> >> So the failure in your test means that sbi->total_valid_node_count < 1,
> >> i.e. equal to 0. This should be an unexpected status.
> >>
> >> I think a better solution should be to avoid such over truncate_node
> >> situation.
> >>
> >> How do you think?
> >>
> >> > Once, it happens during recovery itself, and the disk would cause
> >> > a panic every time it mounted.
> >> >
> >> > Another time, it would happen during garbage collection, so the disk
> >> > would cause a panic within 200 seconds of mounting.
> >> >
> >> > Removing this BUG_ON hasn't shown any side effects, so let's take it
> >> > out and monitor.
> >> >
> >> > Signed-off-by: Chris Fries
> >> >
> >> > ---
> >> > fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 18 +++---
> >> > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >> >
> >> > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> >> > index e80a87c..b8e9679 100644
> >> > --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> >> > +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> >> > @@ -722,9 +722,21 @@ static inline void dec_valid_node_count(struct
> >> > f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
> >> > {
> >> > spin_lock(>stat_lock);
> >> >
> >> > -
Re: [PATCH] f2fs: Remove BUG_ON in dec_valid_node_count
Hi,
Abandon my patch in favor of Jaegeuk's recovery accounting fix (mine
has a copy paste error anyway)
[f2fs-dev] [PATCH 1/2] f2fs: fix inconsistency of block count during recovery
This patch solves the issue completely.
-Chris
On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 2:26 PM, Russell Knize rkni...@motorola.com wrote:
The node accounting errors seem to be creeping in during recovery.
Once the error is introduced in the total counts, it gets recorded in
the next checkpoint and is carried forward. Often times the error
crops-up after a failed recovery attempt, such as when recovery
attempts to recover an inode belonging to a subdirectory that was
previously removed.
We've also seen accounting errors elsewhere, such as the block bitmap
management in update_sit_entry(). In one case, we bug-out on some
random unlink operation because truncate_data_blocks_range() tries to
invalidate a block whose bit is not set in the bitmap:
kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/fs/f2fs/segment.c:199!
...
do_unlinkat()
evict()
f2fs_evict_inode()
f2fs_truncate()
truncate_data_blocks_range()
invalidate_blocks()
update_sit_entry()
In another case, we bug-out during recovery while trying to allocate
the dummy page for an fsync. In this case, the page is already
allocated:
kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/fs/f2fs/segment.c:211!
...
vfs_kern_mount()
mount_fs()
f2fs_mount()
mount_bdev()
f2fs_fill_super()
recover_fsync_data()
recover_data_page()
update_sit_entry()
I've experimented with some changes to deal with the bug-outs in
update_sit_entry() and regenerate the block counts that are maintained
by the seg_entry and sec_entry structures, but I am not confident that
there still won't exist a disparity between block allocations and
their respective nodes.
Some sort of consistency checker would be handy. ;)
We're going to run these torture tests with disable_roll_forward to
try to at least confirm that we should be focused on the recovery
process.
Russ W. Knize
Mobile Devices Android Platform
Desk: 847-523-9381
Mobile: 224-622-1391
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Chris Fries ccfr...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes, your observations are correct, total_valid_node_count is 0, and the
caller is truncate_node. It could be a bug in recovery accounting
somewhere, but I haven't been able to save a copy of the disk image just
before the recovery or rmdir failure, which is the best place to start
investigating the bug. It could also be some bad state of the disk
during
panic restart rather than a straight recovery bug.
Adding some traces or logs into recovery might give clues too.
The panics I've seen are both during mount and during rmdir.
-- truncate_node
-- remove_inode_page
-- f2fs_evict_inode
-- evict
-- recover_orphan_inodes
-- f2fs_fill_super
-- mount_bdev
or
-- truncate_node
-- remove_inode_page
-- f2fs_evict_inode
-- evict
-- d_delete
-- vfs_rmdir
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 2:05 AM, Haicheng Li
haicheng...@linux.intel.com
wrote:
On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 10:46:27PM -0500, Chris Fries wrote:
From: Chris Fries c.fr...@motorola.com
Panic loops while running LTP fsstress has been able to get
a disk into two different panic loops from dec_valid_node_count.
f2fs.h:714 BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_node_count count);
This is interesting catch.
from the code, dec_valid_node_count() is only called by
truncate_node():
dec_valid_node_count(sbi, dn-inode, 1);
So the failure in your test means that sbi-total_valid_node_count 1,
i.e. equal to 0. This should be an unexpected status.
I think a better solution should be to avoid such over truncate_node
situation.
How do you think?
Once, it happens during recovery itself, and the disk would cause
a panic every time it mounted.
Another time, it would happen during garbage collection, so the disk
would cause a panic within 200 seconds of mounting.
Removing this BUG_ON hasn't shown any side effects, so let's take it
out and monitor.
Signed-off-by: Chris Fries c.fr...@motorola.com
---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 18 +++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index e80a87c..b8e9679 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -722,9 +722,21 @@ static inline void dec_valid_node_count(struct
f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
{
spin_lock(sbi-stat_lock);
- BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_block_count count);
- BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_node_count count);
- BUG_ON(inode-i_blocks count);
+ if (sbi-total_valid_block_count count) {
+
Re: [PATCH] f2fs: Remove BUG_ON in dec_valid_node_count
The node accounting errors seem to be creeping in during recovery.
Once the error is introduced in the total counts, it gets recorded in
the next checkpoint and is carried forward. Often times the error
crops-up after a failed recovery attempt, such as when recovery
attempts to recover an inode belonging to a subdirectory that was
previously removed.
We've also seen accounting errors elsewhere, such as the block bitmap
management in update_sit_entry(). In one case, we bug-out on some
random unlink operation because truncate_data_blocks_range() tries to
invalidate a block whose bit is not set in the bitmap:
kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/fs/f2fs/segment.c:199!
...
do_unlinkat()
evict()
f2fs_evict_inode()
f2fs_truncate()
truncate_data_blocks_range()
invalidate_blocks()
update_sit_entry()
In another case, we bug-out during recovery while trying to allocate
the dummy page for an fsync. In this case, the page is already
allocated:
kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/fs/f2fs/segment.c:211!
...
vfs_kern_mount()
mount_fs()
f2fs_mount()
mount_bdev()
f2fs_fill_super()
recover_fsync_data()
recover_data_page()
update_sit_entry()
I've experimented with some changes to deal with the bug-outs in
update_sit_entry() and regenerate the block counts that are maintained
by the seg_entry and sec_entry structures, but I am not confident that
there still won't exist a disparity between block allocations and
their respective nodes.
Some sort of consistency checker would be handy. ;)
We're going to run these torture tests with disable_roll_forward to
try to at least confirm that we should be focused on the recovery
process.
Russ W. Knize
Mobile Devices Android Platform
Desk: 847-523-9381
Mobile: 224-622-1391
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Chris Fries wrote:
> Yes, your observations are correct, total_valid_node_count is 0, and the
> caller is truncate_node. It could be a bug in recovery accounting
> somewhere, but I haven't been able to save a copy of the disk image just
> before the recovery or rmdir failure, which is the best place to start
> investigating the bug. It could also be some bad state of the disk during
> panic restart rather than a straight recovery bug.
>
> Adding some traces or logs into recovery might give clues too.
>
> The panics I've seen are both during mount and during rmdir.
>
> -- truncate_node
> -- remove_inode_page
> -- f2fs_evict_inode
> -- evict
> -- recover_orphan_inodes
> -- f2fs_fill_super
> -- mount_bdev
>
> or
>
> -- truncate_node
> -- remove_inode_page
> -- f2fs_evict_inode
> -- evict
> -- d_delete
> -- vfs_rmdir
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 2:05 AM, Haicheng Li
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 10:46:27PM -0500, Chris Fries wrote:
>> > From: Chris Fries
>> >
>> > Panic loops while running LTP fsstress has been able to get
>> > a disk into two different panic loops from dec_valid_node_count.
>> > f2fs.h:714 BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_node_count < count);
>>
>> This is interesting catch.
>> from the code, dec_valid_node_count() is only called by truncate_node():
>> dec_valid_node_count(sbi, dn->inode, 1);
>>
>> So the failure in your test means that sbi->total_valid_node_count < 1,
>> i.e. equal to 0. This should be an unexpected status.
>>
>> I think a better solution should be to avoid such over truncate_node
>> situation.
>>
>> How do you think?
>>
>> > Once, it happens during recovery itself, and the disk would cause
>> > a panic every time it mounted.
>> >
>> > Another time, it would happen during garbage collection, so the disk
>> > would cause a panic within 200 seconds of mounting.
>> >
>> > Removing this BUG_ON hasn't shown any side effects, so let's take it
>> > out and monitor.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Chris Fries
>> >
>> > ---
>> > fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 18 +++---
>> > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
>> > index e80a87c..b8e9679 100644
>> > --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
>> > +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
>> > @@ -722,9 +722,21 @@ static inline void dec_valid_node_count(struct
>> > f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
>> > {
>> > spin_lock(>stat_lock);
>> >
>> > - BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_block_count < count);
>> > - BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_node_count < count);
>> > - BUG_ON(inode->i_blocks < count);
>> > + if (sbi->total_valid_block_count < count) {
>> > + WARN(1, "F2FS: total_valid_block_count too small- %d vs
>> > %d\n",
>> > + (unsigned int)sbi->total_valid_block_count,
>> > count);
>> > + count = sbi->total_valid_block_count;
>> > + }
>> > + if (sbi->total_valid_node_count < count) {
>> > + WARN(1, "F2FS: total_valid_node_count too small-
Re: [PATCH] f2fs: Remove BUG_ON in dec_valid_node_count
The node accounting errors seem to be creeping in during recovery.
Once the error is introduced in the total counts, it gets recorded in
the next checkpoint and is carried forward. Often times the error
crops-up after a failed recovery attempt, such as when recovery
attempts to recover an inode belonging to a subdirectory that was
previously removed.
We've also seen accounting errors elsewhere, such as the block bitmap
management in update_sit_entry(). In one case, we bug-out on some
random unlink operation because truncate_data_blocks_range() tries to
invalidate a block whose bit is not set in the bitmap:
kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/fs/f2fs/segment.c:199!
...
do_unlinkat()
evict()
f2fs_evict_inode()
f2fs_truncate()
truncate_data_blocks_range()
invalidate_blocks()
update_sit_entry()
In another case, we bug-out during recovery while trying to allocate
the dummy page for an fsync. In this case, the page is already
allocated:
kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/fs/f2fs/segment.c:211!
...
vfs_kern_mount()
mount_fs()
f2fs_mount()
mount_bdev()
f2fs_fill_super()
recover_fsync_data()
recover_data_page()
update_sit_entry()
I've experimented with some changes to deal with the bug-outs in
update_sit_entry() and regenerate the block counts that are maintained
by the seg_entry and sec_entry structures, but I am not confident that
there still won't exist a disparity between block allocations and
their respective nodes.
Some sort of consistency checker would be handy. ;)
We're going to run these torture tests with disable_roll_forward to
try to at least confirm that we should be focused on the recovery
process.
Russ W. Knize
Mobile Devices Android Platform
Desk: 847-523-9381
Mobile: 224-622-1391
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Chris Fries ccfr...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes, your observations are correct, total_valid_node_count is 0, and the
caller is truncate_node. It could be a bug in recovery accounting
somewhere, but I haven't been able to save a copy of the disk image just
before the recovery or rmdir failure, which is the best place to start
investigating the bug. It could also be some bad state of the disk during
panic restart rather than a straight recovery bug.
Adding some traces or logs into recovery might give clues too.
The panics I've seen are both during mount and during rmdir.
-- truncate_node
-- remove_inode_page
-- f2fs_evict_inode
-- evict
-- recover_orphan_inodes
-- f2fs_fill_super
-- mount_bdev
or
-- truncate_node
-- remove_inode_page
-- f2fs_evict_inode
-- evict
-- d_delete
-- vfs_rmdir
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 2:05 AM, Haicheng Li haicheng...@linux.intel.com
wrote:
On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 10:46:27PM -0500, Chris Fries wrote:
From: Chris Fries c.fr...@motorola.com
Panic loops while running LTP fsstress has been able to get
a disk into two different panic loops from dec_valid_node_count.
f2fs.h:714 BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_node_count count);
This is interesting catch.
from the code, dec_valid_node_count() is only called by truncate_node():
dec_valid_node_count(sbi, dn-inode, 1);
So the failure in your test means that sbi-total_valid_node_count 1,
i.e. equal to 0. This should be an unexpected status.
I think a better solution should be to avoid such over truncate_node
situation.
How do you think?
Once, it happens during recovery itself, and the disk would cause
a panic every time it mounted.
Another time, it would happen during garbage collection, so the disk
would cause a panic within 200 seconds of mounting.
Removing this BUG_ON hasn't shown any side effects, so let's take it
out and monitor.
Signed-off-by: Chris Fries c.fr...@motorola.com
---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 18 +++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index e80a87c..b8e9679 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -722,9 +722,21 @@ static inline void dec_valid_node_count(struct
f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
{
spin_lock(sbi-stat_lock);
- BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_block_count count);
- BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_node_count count);
- BUG_ON(inode-i_blocks count);
+ if (sbi-total_valid_block_count count) {
+ WARN(1, F2FS: total_valid_block_count too small- %d vs
%d\n,
+ (unsigned int)sbi-total_valid_block_count,
count);
+ count = sbi-total_valid_block_count;
+ }
+ if (sbi-total_valid_node_count count) {
+ WARN(1, F2FS: total_valid_node_count too small- %d vs
%d\n,
+ sbi-total_valid_node_count, count);
+ count =
Re: [PATCH] f2fs: Remove BUG_ON in dec_valid_node_count
On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 10:46:27PM -0500, Chris Fries wrote:
> From: Chris Fries
>
> Panic loops while running LTP fsstress has been able to get
> a disk into two different panic loops from dec_valid_node_count.
> f2fs.h:714 BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_node_count < count);
This is interesting catch.
from the code, dec_valid_node_count() is only called by truncate_node():
dec_valid_node_count(sbi, dn->inode, 1);
So the failure in your test means that sbi->total_valid_node_count < 1,
i.e. equal to 0. This should be an unexpected status.
I think a better solution should be to avoid such over truncate_node situation.
How do you think?
> Once, it happens during recovery itself, and the disk would cause
> a panic every time it mounted.
>
> Another time, it would happen during garbage collection, so the disk
> would cause a panic within 200 seconds of mounting.
>
> Removing this BUG_ON hasn't shown any side effects, so let's take it
> out and monitor.
>
> Signed-off-by: Chris Fries
>
> ---
> fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 18 +++---
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> index e80a87c..b8e9679 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
> @@ -722,9 +722,21 @@ static inline void dec_valid_node_count(struct
> f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
> {
> spin_lock(>stat_lock);
>
> - BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_block_count < count);
> - BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_node_count < count);
> - BUG_ON(inode->i_blocks < count);
> + if (sbi->total_valid_block_count < count) {
> + WARN(1, "F2FS: total_valid_block_count too small- %d vs %d\n",
> + (unsigned int)sbi->total_valid_block_count, count);
> + count = sbi->total_valid_block_count;
> + }
> + if (sbi->total_valid_node_count < count) {
> + WARN(1, "F2FS: total_valid_node_count too small- %d vs %d\n",
> + sbi->total_valid_node_count, count);
> + count = sbi->total_valid_node_count;
> + }
> + if (inode->i_blocks < count) {
> + WARN(1, "F2FS: inode->i_blocks too small - %d vs %d\n",
> + (unsigned int)inode->i_blocks, count);
> + count = sbi->total_valid_node_count;
> + }
>
> inode->i_blocks -= count;
> sbi->total_valid_node_count -= count;
> --
> 1.8.0
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH] f2fs: Remove BUG_ON in dec_valid_node_count
On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 10:46:27PM -0500, Chris Fries wrote:
From: Chris Fries c.fr...@motorola.com
Panic loops while running LTP fsstress has been able to get
a disk into two different panic loops from dec_valid_node_count.
f2fs.h:714 BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_node_count count);
This is interesting catch.
from the code, dec_valid_node_count() is only called by truncate_node():
dec_valid_node_count(sbi, dn-inode, 1);
So the failure in your test means that sbi-total_valid_node_count 1,
i.e. equal to 0. This should be an unexpected status.
I think a better solution should be to avoid such over truncate_node situation.
How do you think?
Once, it happens during recovery itself, and the disk would cause
a panic every time it mounted.
Another time, it would happen during garbage collection, so the disk
would cause a panic within 200 seconds of mounting.
Removing this BUG_ON hasn't shown any side effects, so let's take it
out and monitor.
Signed-off-by: Chris Fries c.fr...@motorola.com
---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 18 +++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index e80a87c..b8e9679 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -722,9 +722,21 @@ static inline void dec_valid_node_count(struct
f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
{
spin_lock(sbi-stat_lock);
- BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_block_count count);
- BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_node_count count);
- BUG_ON(inode-i_blocks count);
+ if (sbi-total_valid_block_count count) {
+ WARN(1, F2FS: total_valid_block_count too small- %d vs %d\n,
+ (unsigned int)sbi-total_valid_block_count, count);
+ count = sbi-total_valid_block_count;
+ }
+ if (sbi-total_valid_node_count count) {
+ WARN(1, F2FS: total_valid_node_count too small- %d vs %d\n,
+ sbi-total_valid_node_count, count);
+ count = sbi-total_valid_node_count;
+ }
+ if (inode-i_blocks count) {
+ WARN(1, F2FS: inode-i_blocks too small - %d vs %d\n,
+ (unsigned int)inode-i_blocks, count);
+ count = sbi-total_valid_node_count;
+ }
inode-i_blocks -= count;
sbi-total_valid_node_count -= count;
--
1.8.0
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[PATCH] f2fs: Remove BUG_ON in dec_valid_node_count
From: Chris Fries
Panic loops while running LTP fsstress has been able to get
a disk into two different panic loops from dec_valid_node_count.
f2fs.h:714 BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_node_count < count);
Once, it happens during recovery itself, and the disk would cause
a panic every time it mounted.
Another time, it would happen during garbage collection, so the disk
would cause a panic within 200 seconds of mounting.
Removing this BUG_ON hasn't shown any side effects, so let's take it
out and monitor.
Signed-off-by: Chris Fries
---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 18 +++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index e80a87c..b8e9679 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -722,9 +722,21 @@ static inline void dec_valid_node_count(struct
f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
{
spin_lock(>stat_lock);
- BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_block_count < count);
- BUG_ON(sbi->total_valid_node_count < count);
- BUG_ON(inode->i_blocks < count);
+ if (sbi->total_valid_block_count < count) {
+ WARN(1, "F2FS: total_valid_block_count too small- %d vs %d\n",
+ (unsigned int)sbi->total_valid_block_count, count);
+ count = sbi->total_valid_block_count;
+ }
+ if (sbi->total_valid_node_count < count) {
+ WARN(1, "F2FS: total_valid_node_count too small- %d vs %d\n",
+ sbi->total_valid_node_count, count);
+ count = sbi->total_valid_node_count;
+ }
+ if (inode->i_blocks < count) {
+ WARN(1, "F2FS: inode->i_blocks too small - %d vs %d\n",
+ (unsigned int)inode->i_blocks, count);
+ count = sbi->total_valid_node_count;
+ }
inode->i_blocks -= count;
sbi->total_valid_node_count -= count;
--
1.8.0
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[PATCH] f2fs: Remove BUG_ON in dec_valid_node_count
From: Chris Fries c.fr...@motorola.com
Panic loops while running LTP fsstress has been able to get
a disk into two different panic loops from dec_valid_node_count.
f2fs.h:714 BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_node_count count);
Once, it happens during recovery itself, and the disk would cause
a panic every time it mounted.
Another time, it would happen during garbage collection, so the disk
would cause a panic within 200 seconds of mounting.
Removing this BUG_ON hasn't shown any side effects, so let's take it
out and monitor.
Signed-off-by: Chris Fries c.fr...@motorola.com
---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 18 +++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index e80a87c..b8e9679 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -722,9 +722,21 @@ static inline void dec_valid_node_count(struct
f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
{
spin_lock(sbi-stat_lock);
- BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_block_count count);
- BUG_ON(sbi-total_valid_node_count count);
- BUG_ON(inode-i_blocks count);
+ if (sbi-total_valid_block_count count) {
+ WARN(1, F2FS: total_valid_block_count too small- %d vs %d\n,
+ (unsigned int)sbi-total_valid_block_count, count);
+ count = sbi-total_valid_block_count;
+ }
+ if (sbi-total_valid_node_count count) {
+ WARN(1, F2FS: total_valid_node_count too small- %d vs %d\n,
+ sbi-total_valid_node_count, count);
+ count = sbi-total_valid_node_count;
+ }
+ if (inode-i_blocks count) {
+ WARN(1, F2FS: inode-i_blocks too small - %d vs %d\n,
+ (unsigned int)inode-i_blocks, count);
+ count = sbi-total_valid_node_count;
+ }
inode-i_blocks -= count;
sbi-total_valid_node_count -= count;
--
1.8.0
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line unsubscribe linux-kernel in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
