[PATCH 4.9 67/92] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

--

From: Dan Williams 


(cherry picked from commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360)

Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby 
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: linux-a...@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-harden...@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gre...@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torva...@linux-foundation.org
Cc: a...@linux.intel.com
Link: 
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.st...@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic
 {
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-   return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+   return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 }
 
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,

[PATCH 4.9 67/92] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

--

From: Dan Williams 


(cherry picked from commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360)

Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby 
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: linux-a...@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-harden...@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gre...@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torva...@linux-foundation.org
Cc: a...@linux.intel.com
Link: 
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.st...@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic
 {
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-   return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+   return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 }
 
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,