Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates

* Paolo Bonzini wrote: > On 11/02/2018 00:39, David Woodhouse wrote: > > Using retpoline ensures the kernel is safe because it doesn't contain > > any indirect branches, but firmware still can — and we make calls into > > firmware at runtime. Where the IBRS microcode

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates

* Paolo Bonzini wrote: > On 11/02/2018 00:39, David Woodhouse wrote: > > Using retpoline ensures the kernel is safe because it doesn't contain > > any indirect branches, but firmware still can — and we make calls into > > firmware at runtime. Where the IBRS microcode support is available, use >

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates

On 11/02/2018 00:39, David Woodhouse wrote: > Using retpoline ensures the kernel is safe because it doesn't contain > any indirect branches, but firmware still can — and we make calls into > firmware at runtime. Where the IBRS microcode support is available, use > that before calling into

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates

On 11/02/2018 00:39, David Woodhouse wrote: > Using retpoline ensures the kernel is safe because it doesn't contain > any indirect branches, but firmware still can — and we make calls into > firmware at runtime. Where the IBRS microcode support is available, use > that before calling into

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates

Paolo, Radim, * David Woodhouse wrote: > David Woodhouse (4): > KVM: x86: Reduce retpoline performance impact in slot_handle_level_range() > KarimAllah Ahmed (2): > X86/nVMX: Properly set spec_ctrl and pred_cmd before merging MSRs > KVM/nVMX: Set the

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates

Paolo, Radim, * David Woodhouse wrote: > David Woodhouse (4): > KVM: x86: Reduce retpoline performance impact in slot_handle_level_range() > KarimAllah Ahmed (2): > X86/nVMX: Properly set spec_ctrl and pred_cmd before merging MSRs > KVM/nVMX: Set the CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS if we have