On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 11:39:17AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> On 07/17/2014 11:38 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> > If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
> > /dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
> > /dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy
On 07/17/2014 11:38 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
obtained from environmental noise, so if there
On 07/17/2014 11:38 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
obtained from environmental noise, so if there
On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 11:39:17AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
On 07/17/2014 11:38 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can
This is just an update to the commit description (and so I've only
included it_. A few more minor typos fixedup, and it includes Zach's
reviewed-by.
- Ted
random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by
On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 05:38:20PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
> developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
> OpenBSD.
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
> +
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file
On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 05:38:20PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
+ unsigned
This is just an update to the commit description (and so I've only
included it_. A few more minor typos fixedup, and it includes Zach's
reviewed-by.
- Ted
random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by
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