Re: [PATCH] KVM: vmx: print more APICv fields in dump_vmcs
On 04/15/2019 06:35 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
The SVI, RVI, virtual-APIC page address and APIC-access page address fields
were left out of dump_vmcs. Add them.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index ab432a930ae8..f8054dc1de65 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5723,8 +5723,17 @@ static void dump_vmcs(void)
if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));
- if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
- pr_err("TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
+ if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
+ if (secondary_exec_control &
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
+ u16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+ pr_err("SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x ", status >> 8, status &
0xff);
+ }
+ pr_err(KERN_CONT "TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n",
vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
+ if (secondary_exec_control &
(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE))
+ pr_err("APIC-access addr = 0x%016llx ",
vmcs_read64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR));
+ pr_err(KERN_CONT "virt-APIC addr=0x%016llx\n",
vmcs_read64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR));
+ }
if (pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR)
pr_err("PostedIntrVec = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read16(POSTED_INTR_NV));
if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT))
Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan
Re: [PATCH] KVM: vmx: print more APICv fields in dump_vmcs
On 15/04/19 20:39, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 03:35:32PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> The SVI, RVI, virtual-APIC page address and APIC-access page address fields
>> were left out of dump_vmcs. Add them.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++--
>> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> index ab432a930ae8..f8054dc1de65 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> @@ -5723,8 +5723,17 @@ static void dump_vmcs(void)
>> if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
>> pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
>> vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));
>> -if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
>> -pr_err("TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
>> +if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
>> +if (secondary_exec_control &
>> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
>> +u16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
>> +pr_err("SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x ", status >> 8, status &
>> 0xff);
>> +}
>> +pr_err(KERN_CONT "TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n",
>> vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
>
> Might be worth adding a blurb in the changelog stating it's ok to use
> KERN_CONT even though it's technically not SMP safe, as the whole
> dump_vmcs() flow isn't exactly SMP safe.
>
>> +if (secondary_exec_control &
>> (SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
>> +
>> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE))
>
> Do we really want to dump the APIC access page address for x2APIC? I
> assume your intent is to show the value that *could* be used if the guest
> were to disable x2APIC, but that might be misleading since APIC_ACCESS_ADDR
> is checked if and only if VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES=1, e.g. someone might
> think a VM-Enter failed because APIC_ACCESS_ADDR has a "bad" value even
> though it's ignored.
Indeed, brain fart. It's the virtual-APIC page that matters for virtual
x2APIC mode, and that one indeed is printed below (because virtual
x2APIC requires TPR shadow).
Paolo
Re: [PATCH] KVM: vmx: print more APICv fields in dump_vmcs
On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 03:35:32PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> The SVI, RVI, virtual-APIC page address and APIC-access page address fields
> were left out of dump_vmcs. Add them.
>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++--
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index ab432a930ae8..f8054dc1de65 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -5723,8 +5723,17 @@ static void dump_vmcs(void)
> if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
> pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
> vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));
> - if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
> - pr_err("TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
> + if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
> + if (secondary_exec_control &
> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
> + u16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
> + pr_err("SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x ", status >> 8, status &
> 0xff);
> + }
> + pr_err(KERN_CONT "TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n",
> vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
Might be worth adding a blurb in the changelog stating it's ok to use
KERN_CONT even though it's technically not SMP safe, as the whole
dump_vmcs() flow isn't exactly SMP safe.
> + if (secondary_exec_control &
> (SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
> +
> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE))
Do we really want to dump the APIC access page address for x2APIC? I
assume your intent is to show the value that *could* be used if the guest
were to disable x2APIC, but that might be misleading since APIC_ACCESS_ADDR
is checked if and only if VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES=1, e.g. someone might
think a VM-Enter failed because APIC_ACCESS_ADDR has a "bad" value even
though it's ignored.
> + pr_err("APIC-access addr = 0x%016llx ",
> vmcs_read64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR));
> + pr_err(KERN_CONT "virt-APIC addr=0x%016llx\n",
> vmcs_read64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR));
> + }
> if (pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR)
> pr_err("PostedIntrVec = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read16(POSTED_INTR_NV));
> if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT))
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
[PATCH] KVM: vmx: print more APICv fields in dump_vmcs
The SVI, RVI, virtual-APIC page address and APIC-access page address fields
were left out of dump_vmcs. Add them.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index ab432a930ae8..f8054dc1de65 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5723,8 +5723,17 @@ static void dump_vmcs(void)
if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));
- if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
- pr_err("TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
+ if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
+ if (secondary_exec_control &
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
+ u16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+ pr_err("SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x ", status >> 8, status &
0xff);
+ }
+ pr_err(KERN_CONT "TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n",
vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
+ if (secondary_exec_control &
(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE))
+ pr_err("APIC-access addr = 0x%016llx ",
vmcs_read64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR));
+ pr_err(KERN_CONT "virt-APIC addr=0x%016llx\n",
vmcs_read64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR));
+ }
if (pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR)
pr_err("PostedIntrVec = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read16(POSTED_INTR_NV));
if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT))
--
1.8.3.1
