Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
Oh, I see you'd changed it inline :) Thanks On Sat, Dec 05, 2020 at 11:40:00AM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > How odd - where did that come from? > > James, I force-pushed that with corrected bugzilla link to > 2020-11-29/fix-nscaps. Sorry about that. > > On Fri, Dec 04, 2020 at 07:58:14AM -0800, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > > The correct bug reference for this patch is: > > > > https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689 > > > > Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan > > > > On Mon, Nov 30, 2020 at 6:58 PM James Morris wrote: > > > > > > On Sun, 29 Nov 2020, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > > > > Hi James, > > > > > > > > would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick > > > > from > > > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps > > > > ) > > > > > > Sure. > > > > > > > > > > > thanks, > > > > -serge > > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 08:09:59AM -0800, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > > > > > Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 7:09 AM Serge E. Hallyn > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . > > > > > > When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a > > > > > > virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is > > > > > > in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. > > > > > > The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked > > > > > > up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original > > > > > > xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. > > > > > > > > > > > > To test this using libcap-bin (*1), > > > > > > > > > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > > > > > /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK > > > > > > > > > > > > "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and > > > > > > will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with > > > > > > this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will > > > > > > fail: > > > > > > > > > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > > > > > nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] > > > > > > > > > > > > Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in > > > > > > security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning > > > > > > -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. > > > > > > > > > > > > *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' > > > > > > option, then use verify-caps instead. > > > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > > > > > > Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 > > > > > > Cc: Hervé Guillemet > > > > > > Cc: Andrew G. Morgan > > > > > > Cc: Casey Schaufler > > > > > > --- > > > > > > include/linux/security.h | 2 +- > > > > > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > > > > > > index bc2725491560..39642626a707 100644 > > > > > > --- a/include/linux/security.h > > > > > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > > > > > > @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct > > > > > > dentry *dentry) > > > > > > > > > > > > static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, > > > > > > const > > > > > > char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) > > > > > > { > > > > > > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > > > > > + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); > > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > > > static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, > > > > > > const > > > > > > char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > > > > > > -- > > > > > > 2.25.1 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > James Morris > > >
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
How odd - where did that come from? James, I force-pushed that with corrected bugzilla link to 2020-11-29/fix-nscaps. Sorry about that. On Fri, Dec 04, 2020 at 07:58:14AM -0800, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > The correct bug reference for this patch is: > > https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689 > > Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan > > On Mon, Nov 30, 2020 at 6:58 PM James Morris wrote: > > > > On Sun, 29 Nov 2020, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > > Hi James, > > > > > > would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick > > > from > > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps > > > ) > > > > Sure. > > > > > > > > thanks, > > > -serge > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 08:09:59AM -0800, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > > > > Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 7:09 AM Serge E. Hallyn > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . > > > > > When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a > > > > > virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is > > > > > in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. > > > > > The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked > > > > > up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original > > > > > xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. > > > > > > > > > > To test this using libcap-bin (*1), > > > > > > > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > > > > /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK > > > > > > > > > > "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and > > > > > will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with > > > > > this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will > > > > > fail: > > > > > > > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > > > > nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] > > > > > > > > > > Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in > > > > > security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning > > > > > -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. > > > > > > > > > > *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' > > > > > option, then use verify-caps instead. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > > > > > Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 > > > > > Cc: Hervé Guillemet > > > > > Cc: Andrew G. Morgan > > > > > Cc: Casey Schaufler > > > > > --- > > > > > include/linux/security.h | 2 +- > > > > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > > > > > index bc2725491560..39642626a707 100644 > > > > > --- a/include/linux/security.h > > > > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > > > > > @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct > > > > > dentry *dentry) > > > > > > > > > > static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, > > > > > const > > > > > char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) > > > > > { > > > > > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > > > > + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, > > > > > const > > > > > char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > > > > > -- > > > > > 2.25.1 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > James Morris > >
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
On Fri, 4 Dec 2020, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > The correct bug reference for this patch is: > > https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689 > > Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan Thanks. Applied to git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git fixes-5.10 and next-testing -- James Morris
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
The correct bug reference for this patch is: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689 Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan On Mon, Nov 30, 2020 at 6:58 PM James Morris wrote: > > On Sun, 29 Nov 2020, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > Hi James, > > > > would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick > > from > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps > > ) > > Sure. > > > > > thanks, > > -serge > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 08:09:59AM -0800, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > > > Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 7:09 AM Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > > > > Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . > > > > When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a > > > > virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is > > > > in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. > > > > The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked > > > > up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original > > > > xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. > > > > > > > > To test this using libcap-bin (*1), > > > > > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > > > /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK > > > > > > > > "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and > > > > will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with > > > > this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will > > > > fail: > > > > > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > > > nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] > > > > > > > > Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in > > > > security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning > > > > -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. > > > > > > > > *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' > > > > option, then use verify-caps instead. > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > > > > Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 > > > > Cc: Hervé Guillemet > > > > Cc: Andrew G. Morgan > > > > Cc: Casey Schaufler > > > > --- > > > > include/linux/security.h | 2 +- > > > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > > > > index bc2725491560..39642626a707 100644 > > > > --- a/include/linux/security.h > > > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > > > > @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct > > > > dentry *dentry) > > > > > > > > static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const > > > > char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) > > > > { > > > > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > > > + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); > > > > } > > > > > > > > static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const > > > > char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > > > > -- > > > > 2.25.1 > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > James Morris >
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
On Sun, 29 Nov 2020, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Hi James, > > would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick > from > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps > ) Sure. > > thanks, > -serge > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 08:09:59AM -0800, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > > Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 7:09 AM Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > > Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . > > > When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a > > > virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is > > > in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. > > > The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked > > > up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original > > > xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. > > > > > > To test this using libcap-bin (*1), > > > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > > /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK > > > > > > "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and > > > will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with > > > this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will > > > fail: > > > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > > nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] > > > > > > Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in > > > security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning > > > -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. > > > > > > *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' > > > option, then use verify-caps instead. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > > > Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 > > > Cc: Hervé Guillemet > > > Cc: Andrew G. Morgan > > > Cc: Casey Schaufler > > > --- > > > include/linux/security.h | 2 +- > > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > > > index bc2725491560..39642626a707 100644 > > > --- a/include/linux/security.h > > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > > > @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct > > > dentry *dentry) > > > > > > static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const > > > char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) > > > { > > > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > > + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); > > > } > > > > > > static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const > > > char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > > > -- > > > 2.25.1 > > > > > > > -- James Morris
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
Hi James, would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick from https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps ) thanks, -serge On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 08:09:59AM -0800, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 7:09 AM Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . > > When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a > > virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is > > in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. > > The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked > > up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original > > xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. > > > > To test this using libcap-bin (*1), > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v > > /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK > > > > "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and > > will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with > > this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will > > fail: > > > > $ v=$(mktemp) > > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v > > nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] > > > > Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in > > security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning > > -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. > > > > *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' > > option, then use verify-caps instead. > > > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > > Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 > > Cc: Hervé Guillemet > > Cc: Andrew G. Morgan > > Cc: Casey Schaufler > > --- > > include/linux/security.h | 2 +- > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > > index bc2725491560..39642626a707 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/security.h > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > > @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct > > dentry *dentry) > > > > static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const > > char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) > > { > > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); > > } > > > > static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const > > char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > > -- > > 2.25.1 > > > >
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan Works for me too. On Thu, Nov 19, 2020 at 7:20 PM James Morris wrote: > > On Tue, 17 Nov 2020, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > > > Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan > > This should be Acked-by or Reviewed-by, unless this is your patch, or it > came via your tree. > > > -- > James Morris > >
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
On Tue, 17 Nov 2020, Andrew G. Morgan wrote: > Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan This should be Acked-by or Reviewed-by, unless this is your patch, or it came via your tree. -- James Morris
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
On Tue, 17 Nov 2020, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' > option, then use verify-caps instead. > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 "Perf fails to compile with python 3.7" Wrong bug ID? -- James Morris
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
[Adding LSM list] On Tue, 17 Nov 2020, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . > When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a > virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is > in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. > The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked > up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original > xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. > > To test this using libcap-bin (*1), > > $ v=$(mktemp) > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v > /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK > > "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and > will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with > this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will > fail: > > $ v=$(mktemp) > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v > nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] > > Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in > security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning > -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. > > *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' > option, then use verify-caps instead. > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 > Cc: Hervé Guillemet > Cc: Andrew G. Morgan > Cc: Casey Schaufler > --- > include/linux/security.h | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index bc2725491560..39642626a707 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry > *dentry) > > static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char > *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) > { > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); > } > > static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char > *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > -- James Morris
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
On 11/17/2020 7:08 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . > When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a > virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is > in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. > The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked > up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original > xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. > > To test this using libcap-bin (*1), > > $ v=$(mktemp) > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v > /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK > > "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and > will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with > this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will > fail: > > $ v=$(mktemp) > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v > nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] > > Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in > security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning > -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. > > *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' > option, then use verify-caps instead. > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 > Cc: Hervé Guillemet > Cc: Andrew G. Morgan > Cc: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Casey Schaufler > --- > include/linux/security.h | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index bc2725491560..39642626a707 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry > *dentry) > > static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char > *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) > { > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); > } > > static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char > *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
Re: [PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 7:09 AM Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . > When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a > virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is > in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. > The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked > up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original > xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. > > To test this using libcap-bin (*1), > > $ v=$(mktemp) > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v > /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK > > "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and > will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with > this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will > fail: > > $ v=$(mktemp) > $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v > $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v > nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] > > Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in > security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning > -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. > > *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' > option, then use verify-caps instead. > > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn > Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 > Cc: Hervé Guillemet > Cc: Andrew G. Morgan > Cc: Casey Schaufler > --- > include/linux/security.h | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index bc2725491560..39642626a707 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry > *dentry) > > static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char > *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) > { > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); > } > > static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char > *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > -- > 2.25.1 >
[PATCH] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. To test this using libcap-bin (*1), $ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail: $ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431 Cc: Hervé Guillemet Cc: Andrew G. Morgan Cc: Casey Schaufler --- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index bc2725491560..39642626a707 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); } static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -- 2.25.1