Re: [PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message

2013-08-25 Thread Pavel Machek
On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:46, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote: > Per PKCS1 spec, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoded message is leading by 0x00 0x01 in > its first 2 bytes. The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI so we pass a > pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify() in original code, but it has > risk for

Re: [PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message

2013-08-25 Thread Pavel Machek
On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:46, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote: Per PKCS1 spec, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoded message is leading by 0x00 0x01 in its first 2 bytes. The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI so we pass a pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify() in original code, but it has risk for the

[PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message

2013-08-22 Thread Lee, Chun-Yi
Per PKCS1 spec, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoded message is leading by 0x00 0x01 in its first 2 bytes. The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI so we pass a pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify() in original code, but it has risk for the byte is not zero because it's not in EM buffer's

[PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message

2013-08-22 Thread Lee, Chun-Yi
Per PKCS1 spec, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoded message is leading by 0x00 0x01 in its first 2 bytes. The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI so we pass a pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify() in original code, but it has risk for the byte is not zero because it's not in EM buffer's