Re: [PATCH 1/3] mmap: protect from stack expantion into low vm addresses

2007-11-26 Thread James Morris
On Mon, 26 Nov 2007, Eric Paris wrote: > Add security checks to make sure we are not attempting to expand the > stack into memory protected by mmap_min_addr > > Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Please include the LSMs list in the CC line (added again) for posts relating to

[PATCH 1/3] mmap: protect from stack expantion into low vm addresses

2007-11-26 Thread Eric Paris
Add security checks to make sure we are not attempting to expand the stack into memory protected by mmap_min_addr Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> --- ** Be very careful applying/rediffing this patch. Standard 3 lines of context from git diff will misapply the first hunk to

[PATCH 1/3] mmap: protect from stack expantion into low vm addresses

2007-11-26 Thread Eric Paris
Add security checks to make sure we are not attempting to expand the stack into memory protected by mmap_min_addr Signed-off-by: Eric Paris [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- ** Be very careful applying/rediffing this patch. Standard 3 lines of context from git diff will misapply the first hunk to

Re: [PATCH 1/3] mmap: protect from stack expantion into low vm addresses

2007-11-26 Thread James Morris
On Mon, 26 Nov 2007, Eric Paris wrote: Add security checks to make sure we are not attempting to expand the stack into memory protected by mmap_min_addr Signed-off-by: Eric Paris [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please include the LSMs list in the CC line (added again) for posts relating to security.

[PATCH 1/3] mmap: protect from stack expantion into low vm addresses

2007-11-16 Thread Eric Paris
When adding the new security hooks into mmap to enhance protection against NULL pointers in the kernel I overlooked that a user may be able to expand the stack all the way down to low addresses. This flaw was pointed out by a PaX/grsecurity developer and this patch should provide protection

[PATCH 1/3] mmap: protect from stack expantion into low vm addresses

2007-11-16 Thread Eric Paris
When adding the new security hooks into mmap to enhance protection against NULL pointers in the kernel I overlooked that a user may be able to expand the stack all the way down to low addresses. This flaw was pointed out by a PaX/grsecurity developer and this patch should provide protection