Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when determining net sysctl permissions
Quoting Tyler Hicks (tyhi...@canonical.com): > The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used > to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a > violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit > message was being generated. > > The denial audit message caused confusion for some application authors > because root-running Go applications always triggered the denial. To > prevent this confusion, the capability check in net_ctl_permissions() is > switched to the noaudit variant. > > BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1465724 > > Signed-off-by: Tyler HicksAcked-by: Serge E. Hallyn > --- > net/sysctl_net.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/net/sysctl_net.c b/net/sysctl_net.c > index ed98c1f..46a71c7 100644 > --- a/net/sysctl_net.c > +++ b/net/sysctl_net.c > @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header > *head, > kgid_t root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0); > > /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ > - if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || > + if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || > uid_eq(root_uid, current_euid())) { > int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; > return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; > -- > 2.7.4 >
Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when determining net sysctl permissions
Quoting Tyler Hicks (tyhi...@canonical.com): > The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used > to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a > violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit > message was being generated. > > The denial audit message caused confusion for some application authors > because root-running Go applications always triggered the denial. To > prevent this confusion, the capability check in net_ctl_permissions() is > switched to the noaudit variant. > > BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1465724 > > Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn > --- > net/sysctl_net.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/net/sysctl_net.c b/net/sysctl_net.c > index ed98c1f..46a71c7 100644 > --- a/net/sysctl_net.c > +++ b/net/sysctl_net.c > @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header > *head, > kgid_t root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0); > > /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ > - if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || > + if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || > uid_eq(root_uid, current_euid())) { > int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; > return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; > -- > 2.7.4 >
[PATCH 2/2] net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when determining net sysctl permissions
The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit message was being generated. The denial audit message caused confusion for some application authors because root-running Go applications always triggered the denial. To prevent this confusion, the capability check in net_ctl_permissions() is switched to the noaudit variant. BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1465724 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks--- net/sysctl_net.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sysctl_net.c b/net/sysctl_net.c index ed98c1f..46a71c7 100644 --- a/net/sysctl_net.c +++ b/net/sysctl_net.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head, kgid_t root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0); /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ - if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || + if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || uid_eq(root_uid, current_euid())) { int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; -- 2.7.4
[PATCH 2/2] net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when determining net sysctl permissions
The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit message was being generated. The denial audit message caused confusion for some application authors because root-running Go applications always triggered the denial. To prevent this confusion, the capability check in net_ctl_permissions() is switched to the noaudit variant. BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1465724 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks --- net/sysctl_net.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sysctl_net.c b/net/sysctl_net.c index ed98c1f..46a71c7 100644 --- a/net/sysctl_net.c +++ b/net/sysctl_net.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head, kgid_t root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0); /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ - if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || + if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || uid_eq(root_uid, current_euid())) { int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; -- 2.7.4