Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

2014-07-03 Thread Stephan Mueller
Am Donnerstag, 3. Juli 2014, 07:18:06 schrieb Neil Horman: >On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: >> Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state >> that >> we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature >> checks for crypto

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

2014-07-03 Thread Herbert Xu
On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: > Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that > we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks > for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module > signature check

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

2014-07-03 Thread Neil Horman
On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: > Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that > we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks > for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module > signature check

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

2014-07-03 Thread Neil Horman
On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module signature check out

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

2014-07-03 Thread Herbert Xu
On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module signature check out

Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

2014-07-03 Thread Stephan Mueller
Am Donnerstag, 3. Juli 2014, 07:18:06 schrieb Neil Horman: On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem

[PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

2014-07-02 Thread Jarod Wilson
Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto subsystem, at

[PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

2014-07-02 Thread Jarod Wilson
Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto subsystem, at