Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space

2020-08-03 Thread Alexander Graf




On 03.08.20 13:27, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:

Alexander Graf  writes:


MSRs are weird. Some of them are normal control registers, such as EFER.
Some however are registers that really are model specific, not very
interesting to virtualization workloads, and not performance critical.
Others again are really just windows into package configuration.

Out of these MSRs, only the first category is necessary to implement in
kernel space. Rarely accessed MSRs, MSRs that should be fine tunes against
certain CPU models and MSRs that contain information on the package level
are much better suited for user space to process. However, over time we have
accumulated a lot of MSRs that are not the first category, but still handled
by in-kernel KVM code.

This patch adds a generic interface to handle WRMSR and RDMSR from user
space. With this, any future MSR that is part of the latter categories can
be handled in user space.

Furthermore, it allows us to replace the existing "ignore_msrs" logic with
something that applies per-VM rather than on the full system. That way you
can run productive VMs in parallel to experimental ones where you don't care
about proper MSR handling.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf 

---

v1 -> v2:

   - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g
   - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs.
 That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later
   - fix emulator case

v2 -> v3:

   - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
   - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g
   - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g
   - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field
   - Simplify trapping code
---
  Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst  |  62 +++
  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   6 ++
  arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c  |  18 +-
  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c  | 106 ++--
  include/trace/events/kvm.h  |   2 +-
  include/uapi/linux/kvm.h|  10 +++
  6 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 320788f81a05..79c3e2fdfae4 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -5155,6 +5155,35 @@ Note that KVM does not skip the faulting instruction as 
it does for
  KVM_EXIT_MMIO, but userspace has to emulate any change to the processing state
  if it decides to decode and emulate the instruction.

+::
+
+ /* KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR / KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR */
+ struct {
+ __u8 error;
+ __u8 pad[3];
+ __u32 index;
+ __u64 data;
+ } msr;
+
+Used on x86 systems. When the VM capability KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR is
+enabled, MSR accesses to registers that would invoke a #GP by KVM kernel code
+will instead trigger a KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR exit for reads and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR
+exit for writes.
+
+For KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the guest
+wants to read. To respond to this request with a successful read, user space
+writes the respective data into the "data" field and must continue guest
+execution to ensure the read data is transferred into guest register state.
+
+If the RDMSR request was unsuccessful, user space indicates that with a "1" in
+the "error" field. This will inject a #GP into the guest when the VCPU is
+executed again.
+
+For KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the guest
+wants to write. Once finished processing the event, user space must continue
+vCPU execution. If the MSR write was unsuccessful, user space also sets the
+"error" field to "1".
+
  ::

   /* Fix the size of the union. */
@@ -5844,6 +5873,28 @@ controlled by the kvm module parameter halt_poll_ns. 
This capability allows
  the maximum halt time to specified on a per-VM basis, effectively overriding
  the module parameter for the target VM.

+7.21 KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR
+---
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is 1 if user space MSR handling is enabled, 0 otherwise
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This capability enables trapping of #GP invoking RDMSR and WRMSR instructions
+into user space.
+
+When a guest requests to read or write an MSR, KVM may not implement all MSRs
+that are relevant to a respective system. It also does not differentiate by
+CPU type.
+
+To allow more fine grained control over MSR handling, user space may enable
+this capability. With it enabled, MSR accesses that would usually trigger
+a #GP event inside the guest by KVM will instead trigger KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR
+and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications which user space can then handle to
+implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications to inform
+a user that an MSR was not handled.
+
  8. Other capabilities.
  ==

@@ -6151,3 +6202,14 @@ KVM can therefore start protected VMs.
  This 

Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space

2020-08-03 Thread Vitaly Kuznetsov
Alexander Graf  writes:

> MSRs are weird. Some of them are normal control registers, such as EFER.
> Some however are registers that really are model specific, not very
> interesting to virtualization workloads, and not performance critical.
> Others again are really just windows into package configuration.
>
> Out of these MSRs, only the first category is necessary to implement in
> kernel space. Rarely accessed MSRs, MSRs that should be fine tunes against
> certain CPU models and MSRs that contain information on the package level
> are much better suited for user space to process. However, over time we have
> accumulated a lot of MSRs that are not the first category, but still handled
> by in-kernel KVM code.
>
> This patch adds a generic interface to handle WRMSR and RDMSR from user
> space. With this, any future MSR that is part of the latter categories can
> be handled in user space.
>
> Furthermore, it allows us to replace the existing "ignore_msrs" logic with
> something that applies per-VM rather than on the full system. That way you
> can run productive VMs in parallel to experimental ones where you don't care
> about proper MSR handling.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf 
>
> ---
>
> v1 -> v2:
>
>   - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g
>   - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs.
> That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later
>   - fix emulator case
>
> v2 -> v3:
>
>   - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
>   - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g
>   - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g
>   - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field
>   - Simplify trapping code
> ---
>  Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst  |  62 +++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   6 ++
>  arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c  |  18 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c  | 106 ++--
>  include/trace/events/kvm.h  |   2 +-
>  include/uapi/linux/kvm.h|  10 +++
>  6 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> index 320788f81a05..79c3e2fdfae4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> @@ -5155,6 +5155,35 @@ Note that KVM does not skip the faulting instruction 
> as it does for
>  KVM_EXIT_MMIO, but userspace has to emulate any change to the processing 
> state
>  if it decides to decode and emulate the instruction.
>  
> +::
> +
> + /* KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR / KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR */
> + struct {
> + __u8 error;
> + __u8 pad[3];
> + __u32 index;
> + __u64 data;
> + } msr;
> +
> +Used on x86 systems. When the VM capability KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR is
> +enabled, MSR accesses to registers that would invoke a #GP by KVM kernel code
> +will instead trigger a KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR exit for reads and 
> KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR
> +exit for writes.
> +
> +For KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the 
> guest
> +wants to read. To respond to this request with a successful read, user space
> +writes the respective data into the "data" field and must continue guest
> +execution to ensure the read data is transferred into guest register state.
> +
> +If the RDMSR request was unsuccessful, user space indicates that with a "1" 
> in
> +the "error" field. This will inject a #GP into the guest when the VCPU is
> +executed again.
> +
> +For KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the 
> guest
> +wants to write. Once finished processing the event, user space must continue
> +vCPU execution. If the MSR write was unsuccessful, user space also sets the
> +"error" field to "1".
> +
>  ::
>  
>   /* Fix the size of the union. */
> @@ -5844,6 +5873,28 @@ controlled by the kvm module parameter halt_poll_ns. 
> This capability allows
>  the maximum halt time to specified on a per-VM basis, effectively overriding
>  the module parameter for the target VM.
>  
> +7.21 KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR
> +---
> +
> +:Architectures: x86
> +:Target: VM
> +:Parameters: args[0] is 1 if user space MSR handling is enabled, 0 otherwise
> +:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
> +
> +This capability enables trapping of #GP invoking RDMSR and WRMSR instructions
> +into user space.
> +
> +When a guest requests to read or write an MSR, KVM may not implement all MSRs
> +that are relevant to a respective system. It also does not differentiate by
> +CPU type.
> +
> +To allow more fine grained control over MSR handling, user space may enable
> +this capability. With it enabled, MSR accesses that would usually trigger
> +a #GP event inside the guest by KVM will instead trigger KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR
> +and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications which user space can then handle to
> +implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications to inform
> 

Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space

2020-08-03 Thread Alexander Graf



On 01.08.20 01:36, Jim Mattson wrote:


On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 2:50 PM Alexander Graf  wrote:


MSRs are weird. Some of them are normal control registers, such as EFER.
Some however are registers that really are model specific, not very
interesting to virtualization workloads, and not performance critical.
Others again are really just windows into package configuration.

Out of these MSRs, only the first category is necessary to implement in
kernel space. Rarely accessed MSRs, MSRs that should be fine tunes against
certain CPU models and MSRs that contain information on the package level
are much better suited for user space to process. However, over time we have
accumulated a lot of MSRs that are not the first category, but still handled
by in-kernel KVM code.

This patch adds a generic interface to handle WRMSR and RDMSR from user
space. With this, any future MSR that is part of the latter categories can
be handled in user space.

Furthermore, it allows us to replace the existing "ignore_msrs" logic with
something that applies per-VM rather than on the full system. That way you
can run productive VMs in parallel to experimental ones where you don't care
about proper MSR handling.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf 

---

v1 -> v2:

   - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g
   - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs.
 That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later
   - fix emulator case

v2 -> v3:

   - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
   - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g
   - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g
   - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field
   - Simplify trapping code
---
  Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst  |  62 +++
  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   6 ++
  arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c  |  18 +-
  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c  | 106 ++--
  include/trace/events/kvm.h  |   2 +-
  include/uapi/linux/kvm.h|  10 +++
  6 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 320788f81a05..79c3e2fdfae4 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst


The new exit reasons should probably be mentioned here (around line 4866):

.. note::

   For KVM_EXIT_IO, KVM_EXIT_MMIO, KVM_EXIT_OSI, KVM_EXIT_PAPR and
   KVM_EXIT_EPR the corresponding

operations are complete (and guest state is consistent) only after userspace
has re-entered the kernel with KVM_RUN.  The kernel side will first finish
incomplete operations and then check for pending signals.  Userspace
can re-enter the guest with an unmasked signal pending to complete
pending operations.


Great catch, thanks! Updated to also include the two new exit reasons.



Other than that, my remaining comments are all nits. Feel free to ignore them.


+static int kvm_get_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index)


Return bool rather than int?


I'm not a big fan of bool returning APIs unless they have an "is" in 
their name. In this case, the most readable path forward would probably 
be an enum:


enum kvm_msr_user_space_retval {
KVM_MSR_IN_KERNEL,
KVM_MSR_BOUNCE_TO_USER_SPACE,
};

and then use that in the checks. But that adds a lot of boiler plate for 
a fully internal, only a few dozen LOC big API. I don't think it's worth it.





+{
+   if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.user_space_msr_enabled)
+   return 0;
+
+   vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR;
+   vcpu->run->msr.error = 0;


Should we clear 'pad' in case anyone can think of a reason to use this
space to extend the API in the future?


It can't hurt I guess.




+   vcpu->run->msr.index = index;
+   vcpu->arch.pending_user_msr = true;
+   vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_rdmsr;


complete_userspace_io could perhaps be renamed to
complete_userspace_emulation (in a separate commit).


I think the complicated part of complete_userspace_io is to know it 
exists and understand how it works. Once you grasp these two bits, the 
name is just an artifact and IMHO easy enough to apply "beyond I/O".





+
+   return 1;
+}
+
+static int kvm_set_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data)


Return bool rather than int?


Same replies as above :). I did get fed up with the amount of 
duplication though and created a generalized function in v4 that gets 
called by kvm_get/set_msr_user_space() to ensure that all fields are 
always set.





+{
+   if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.user_space_msr_enabled)
+   return 0;
+
+   vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR;
+   vcpu->run->msr.error = 0;


Same question about 'pad' as above.


+   vcpu->run->msr.index = index;
+   vcpu->run->msr.data = data;
+   vcpu->arch.pending_user_msr = true;
+   vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_wrmsr;
+
+   return 1;
+}
+


Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson 



Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space

2020-07-31 Thread Jim Mattson
On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 2:50 PM Alexander Graf  wrote:
>
> MSRs are weird. Some of them are normal control registers, such as EFER.
> Some however are registers that really are model specific, not very
> interesting to virtualization workloads, and not performance critical.
> Others again are really just windows into package configuration.
>
> Out of these MSRs, only the first category is necessary to implement in
> kernel space. Rarely accessed MSRs, MSRs that should be fine tunes against
> certain CPU models and MSRs that contain information on the package level
> are much better suited for user space to process. However, over time we have
> accumulated a lot of MSRs that are not the first category, but still handled
> by in-kernel KVM code.
>
> This patch adds a generic interface to handle WRMSR and RDMSR from user
> space. With this, any future MSR that is part of the latter categories can
> be handled in user space.
>
> Furthermore, it allows us to replace the existing "ignore_msrs" logic with
> something that applies per-VM rather than on the full system. That way you
> can run productive VMs in parallel to experimental ones where you don't care
> about proper MSR handling.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf 
>
> ---
>
> v1 -> v2:
>
>   - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g
>   - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs.
> That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later
>   - fix emulator case
>
> v2 -> v3:
>
>   - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
>   - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g
>   - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g
>   - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field
>   - Simplify trapping code
> ---
>  Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst  |  62 +++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   6 ++
>  arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c  |  18 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c  | 106 ++--
>  include/trace/events/kvm.h  |   2 +-
>  include/uapi/linux/kvm.h|  10 +++
>  6 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> index 320788f81a05..79c3e2fdfae4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst

The new exit reasons should probably be mentioned here (around line 4866):

.. note::

  For KVM_EXIT_IO, KVM_EXIT_MMIO, KVM_EXIT_OSI, KVM_EXIT_PAPR and
  KVM_EXIT_EPR the corresponding

operations are complete (and guest state is consistent) only after userspace
has re-entered the kernel with KVM_RUN.  The kernel side will first finish
incomplete operations and then check for pending signals.  Userspace
can re-enter the guest with an unmasked signal pending to complete
pending operations.

Other than that, my remaining comments are all nits. Feel free to ignore them.

> +static int kvm_get_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index)

Return bool rather than int?

> +{
> +   if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.user_space_msr_enabled)
> +   return 0;
> +
> +   vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR;
> +   vcpu->run->msr.error = 0;

Should we clear 'pad' in case anyone can think of a reason to use this
space to extend the API in the future?

> +   vcpu->run->msr.index = index;
> +   vcpu->arch.pending_user_msr = true;
> +   vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_rdmsr;

complete_userspace_io could perhaps be renamed to
complete_userspace_emulation (in a separate commit).

> +
> +   return 1;
> +}
> +
> +static int kvm_set_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data)

Return bool rather than int?

> +{
> +   if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.user_space_msr_enabled)
> +   return 0;
> +
> +   vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR;
> +   vcpu->run->msr.error = 0;

Same question about 'pad' as above.

> +   vcpu->run->msr.index = index;
> +   vcpu->run->msr.data = data;
> +   vcpu->arch.pending_user_msr = true;
> +   vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_wrmsr;
> +
> +   return 1;
> +}
> +

Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson 


[PATCH v3 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space

2020-07-31 Thread Alexander Graf
MSRs are weird. Some of them are normal control registers, such as EFER.
Some however are registers that really are model specific, not very
interesting to virtualization workloads, and not performance critical.
Others again are really just windows into package configuration.

Out of these MSRs, only the first category is necessary to implement in
kernel space. Rarely accessed MSRs, MSRs that should be fine tunes against
certain CPU models and MSRs that contain information on the package level
are much better suited for user space to process. However, over time we have
accumulated a lot of MSRs that are not the first category, but still handled
by in-kernel KVM code.

This patch adds a generic interface to handle WRMSR and RDMSR from user
space. With this, any future MSR that is part of the latter categories can
be handled in user space.

Furthermore, it allows us to replace the existing "ignore_msrs" logic with
something that applies per-VM rather than on the full system. That way you
can run productive VMs in parallel to experimental ones where you don't care
about proper MSR handling.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf 

---

v1 -> v2:

  - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g
  - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs.
That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later
  - fix emulator case

v2 -> v3:

  - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
  - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g
  - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g
  - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field
  - Simplify trapping code
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst  |  62 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   6 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c  |  18 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c  | 106 ++--
 include/trace/events/kvm.h  |   2 +-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h|  10 +++
 6 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 320788f81a05..79c3e2fdfae4 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -5155,6 +5155,35 @@ Note that KVM does not skip the faulting instruction as 
it does for
 KVM_EXIT_MMIO, but userspace has to emulate any change to the processing state
 if it decides to decode and emulate the instruction.
 
+::
+
+   /* KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR / KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR */
+   struct {
+   __u8 error;
+   __u8 pad[3];
+   __u32 index;
+   __u64 data;
+   } msr;
+
+Used on x86 systems. When the VM capability KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR is
+enabled, MSR accesses to registers that would invoke a #GP by KVM kernel code
+will instead trigger a KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR exit for reads and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR
+exit for writes.
+
+For KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the guest
+wants to read. To respond to this request with a successful read, user space
+writes the respective data into the "data" field and must continue guest
+execution to ensure the read data is transferred into guest register state.
+
+If the RDMSR request was unsuccessful, user space indicates that with a "1" in
+the "error" field. This will inject a #GP into the guest when the VCPU is
+executed again.
+
+For KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the guest
+wants to write. Once finished processing the event, user space must continue
+vCPU execution. If the MSR write was unsuccessful, user space also sets the
+"error" field to "1".
+
 ::
 
/* Fix the size of the union. */
@@ -5844,6 +5873,28 @@ controlled by the kvm module parameter halt_poll_ns. 
This capability allows
 the maximum halt time to specified on a per-VM basis, effectively overriding
 the module parameter for the target VM.
 
+7.21 KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR
+---
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is 1 if user space MSR handling is enabled, 0 otherwise
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This capability enables trapping of #GP invoking RDMSR and WRMSR instructions
+into user space.
+
+When a guest requests to read or write an MSR, KVM may not implement all MSRs
+that are relevant to a respective system. It also does not differentiate by
+CPU type.
+
+To allow more fine grained control over MSR handling, user space may enable
+this capability. With it enabled, MSR accesses that would usually trigger
+a #GP event inside the guest by KVM will instead trigger KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR
+and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications which user space can then handle to
+implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications to inform
+a user that an MSR was not handled.
+
 8. Other capabilities.
 ==
 
@@ -6151,3 +6202,14 @@ KVM can therefore start protected VMs.
 This capability governs the KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND ioctl and the
 KVM_MP_STATE_LOAD MP_STATE.