RE: [PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space
Hi Eric,
> From: Auger Eric
> Sent: Sunday, August 16, 2020 12:30 AM
>
> Hi Yi,
>
> On 7/28/20 8:27 AM, Liu Yi L wrote:
> > When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a
> > system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain.
> > For security reason, we need to check the PASID passed from user-space.
> > e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation.
> >
> > Cc: Kevin Tian
> > CC: Jacob Pan
> > Cc: Alex Williamson
> > Cc: Eric Auger
> > Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker
> > Cc: Joerg Roedel
> > Cc: Lu Baolu
> > Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L
> > Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan
> > ---
> > drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++
> > drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +--
> > 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> > index b2fe54e..88f4647 100644
> > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> > @@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain
> *domain, struct device *dev,
> > int granu = 0;
> > u64 pasid = 0;
> > u64 addr = 0;
> > + void *pdata;
> >
> > granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity);
> > if (granu == -EINVAL) {
> > @@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain
> *domain, struct device *dev,
> > (inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags &
> IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID))
> > pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid;
> >
> > + pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
> > + if (!pdata) {
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + goto out_unlock;
> > + } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) {
> > + ret = PTR_ERR(pdata);
> > + goto out_unlock;
> > + }
> > +
> > switch (BIT(cache_type)) {
> > case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB:
> > /* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */
> > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> > index c85b8d5..b9b29ad 100644
> > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> > @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> struct device *dev,
> > dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
> >
> > mutex_lock(_mutex);
> > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL);
> > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL);
> A question about the locking strategy. We don't take the
> device_domain_lock here. Could you clarify whether it is safe?
I guess it is better to take the same lock as what iommu_domain_set_attr()
takes. thanks for catching it. :-)
>
> > if (IS_ERR(svm)) {
> > ret = PTR_ERR(svm);
> > goto out;
> > @@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain
> *domain,
> > struct device *dev, u32 pasid)
> > {
> > struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev);
> > + struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain;
> > struct intel_svm_dev *sdev;
> > struct intel_svm *svm;
> > int ret = -EINVAL;
> > @@ -447,8 +448,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain
> *domain,
> > if (WARN_ON(!iommu))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > + dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
> > +
> > mutex_lock(_mutex);
> > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL);
> > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
> same here.
same.
Regards,
Yi Liu
> > if (!svm) {
> > ret = -EINVAL;
> > goto out;
> >
> Thanks
>
> Eric
Re: [PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space
Hi Yi,
On 7/28/20 8:27 AM, Liu Yi L wrote:
> When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a
> system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain.
> For security reason, we need to check the PASID passed from user-space.
> e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation.
>
> Cc: Kevin Tian
> CC: Jacob Pan
> Cc: Alex Williamson
> Cc: Eric Auger
> Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker
> Cc: Joerg Roedel
> Cc: Lu Baolu
> Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L
> Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan
> ---
> drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++
> drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +--
> 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> index b2fe54e..88f4647 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> @@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> struct device *dev,
> int granu = 0;
> u64 pasid = 0;
> u64 addr = 0;
> + void *pdata;
>
> granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity);
> if (granu == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain
> *domain, struct device *dev,
>(inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags &
> IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID))
> pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid;
>
> + pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
> + if (!pdata) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out_unlock;
> + } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(pdata);
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> switch (BIT(cache_type)) {
> case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB:
> /* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> index c85b8d5..b9b29ad 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> struct device *dev,
> dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
>
> mutex_lock(_mutex);
> - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL);
> + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL);
A question about the locking strategy. We don't take the
device_domain_lock here. Could you clarify whether it is safe?
> if (IS_ERR(svm)) {
> ret = PTR_ERR(svm);
> goto out;
> @@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> struct device *dev, u32 pasid)
> {
> struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev);
> + struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain;
> struct intel_svm_dev *sdev;
> struct intel_svm *svm;
> int ret = -EINVAL;
> @@ -447,8 +448,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> if (WARN_ON(!iommu))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
> +
> mutex_lock(_mutex);
> - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL);
> + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
same here.
> if (!svm) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
>
Thanks
Eric
[PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space
When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a
system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain.
For security reason, we need to check the PASID passed from user-space.
e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation.
Cc: Kevin Tian
CC: Jacob Pan
Cc: Alex Williamson
Cc: Eric Auger
Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker
Cc: Joerg Roedel
Cc: Lu Baolu
Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan
---
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++
drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +--
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
index b2fe54e..88f4647 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
@@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain,
struct device *dev,
int granu = 0;
u64 pasid = 0;
u64 addr = 0;
+ void *pdata;
granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity);
if (granu == -EINVAL) {
@@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain,
struct device *dev,
(inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags &
IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID))
pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid;
+ pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
+ if (!pdata) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(pdata);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
switch (BIT(cache_type)) {
case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB:
/* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
index c85b8d5..b9b29ad 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
struct device *dev,
dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
mutex_lock(_mutex);
- svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL);
+ svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(svm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(svm);
goto out;
@@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
struct device *dev, u32 pasid)
{
struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev);
+ struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain;
struct intel_svm_dev *sdev;
struct intel_svm *svm;
int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -447,8 +448,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
if (WARN_ON(!iommu))
return -EINVAL;
+ dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
+
mutex_lock(_mutex);
- svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL);
+ svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
if (!svm) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
--
2.7.4
