On 12/14/2015 10:58 AM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 12/11/15 09:52, Daniel Cashman wrote:
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
>> index 844b06d..647fecf 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
>> @@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
>> {
On 12/11/15 09:52, Daniel Cashman wrote:
> From: dcashman
>
> x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for
> 64-bit, to generate the random offset for the mmap base address.
> This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR
> effectiveness and avoiding
On 12/11/15 09:52, Daniel Cashman wrote:
> From: dcashman
>
> x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for
> 64-bit, to generate the random offset for the mmap base address.
> This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR
> effectiveness
On 12/14/2015 10:58 AM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 12/11/15 09:52, Daniel Cashman wrote:
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
>> index 844b06d..647fecf 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
>> @@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
>> {
From: dcashman
x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for
64-bit, to generate the random offset for the mmap base address.
This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR
effectiveness and avoiding address-space fragmentation. Replace it
with a Kconfig option,
From: dcashman
x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for
64-bit, to generate the random offset for the mmap base address.
This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR
effectiveness and avoiding address-space fragmentation. Replace it
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