On Sun, 2012-10-07 at 21:24 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> I've looked at his message, I didn't see any justification for his
> concern/assertion. So I can't really comment on it since he didn't
> give any reason for his belief.
I asked him again[0] to be sure and he replied to have no reason to
On Sun, 2012-10-07 at 21:24 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
I've looked at his message, I didn't see any justification for his
concern/assertion. So I can't really comment on it since he didn't
give any reason for his belief.
I asked him again[0] to be sure and he replied to have no reason to
On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 02:41:31AM +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote:
> I just wondered because I remembered David Shaw (one of the main
> developers from gpg) to imply[0] some time ago, that an "evil" entropy
> source would actually be a problem:
I've looked at his message, I didn't see any
Hi Ted.
Thanks for your prompt reply.
On Thu, 2012-10-04 at 18:49 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> It is impossible by design. Or specifically, /dev/random was designed
> so that it can be world-writeable, and an attacker can feed in any
> kind of input he or she wants, and it will not allow the
Hi Ted.
Thanks for your prompt reply.
On Thu, 2012-10-04 at 18:49 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
It is impossible by design. Or specifically, /dev/random was designed
so that it can be world-writeable, and an attacker can feed in any
kind of input he or she wants, and it will not allow the
On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 02:41:31AM +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote:
I just wondered because I remembered David Shaw (one of the main
developers from gpg) to imply[0] some time ago, that an evil entropy
source would actually be a problem:
I've looked at his message, I didn't see any
On Thu, Oct 04, 2012 at 03:32:35PM +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote:
>
> When seeding the kernels entropy cache (which is then ultimately used
> for /dev/random), e.g. by (semi-)TRNGs like haveged[0],
> audio-entropyd[1], Simtec’s Entropy Key[2] or friends... can one spoil
> the randomness
Hi.
This is a question towards the crypto/entropy experts.
When seeding the kernels entropy cache (which is then ultimately used
for /dev/random), e.g. by (semi-)TRNGs like haveged[0],
audio-entropyd[1], Simtec’s Entropy Key[2] or friends... can one spoil
the randomness by that or is this
Hi.
This is a question towards the crypto/entropy experts.
When seeding the kernels entropy cache (which is then ultimately used
for /dev/random), e.g. by (semi-)TRNGs like haveged[0],
audio-entropyd[1], Simtec’s Entropy Key[2] or friends... can one spoil
the randomness by that or is this
On Thu, Oct 04, 2012 at 03:32:35PM +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote:
When seeding the kernels entropy cache (which is then ultimately used
for /dev/random), e.g. by (semi-)TRNGs like haveged[0],
audio-entropyd[1], Simtec’s Entropy Key[2] or friends... can one spoil
the randomness by
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