Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Rafael J. Wysocki wrote: > Hi, > > On Monday, 11 of April 2005 19:02, Andreas Steinmetz wrote: > >>Rafael J. Wysocki wrote: >> >>>Hi, >>> >>>On Monday, 11 of April 2005 12:37, Oliver Neukum wrote: >>> >>> Am Sonntag, 10. April 2005 22:14 schrieb Pavel Machek: >Hi! > > >>

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Hi, On Monday, 11 of April 2005 19:02, Andreas Steinmetz wrote: > Rafael J. Wysocki wrote: > > Hi, > > > > On Monday, 11 of April 2005 12:37, Oliver Neukum wrote: > > > >>Am Sonntag, 10. April 2005 22:14 schrieb Pavel Machek: > >> > >>>Hi! > >>> > >>> > >Oliver Neukum wrote: > > > >>

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Rafael J. Wysocki wrote: > Hi, > > On Monday, 11 of April 2005 12:37, Oliver Neukum wrote: > >>Am Sonntag, 10. April 2005 22:14 schrieb Pavel Machek: >> >>>Hi! >>> >>> >Oliver Neukum wrote: > >>What is the point in doing so after they've rested on the disk for ages? > >The poi

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Hi, On Monday, 11 of April 2005 12:37, Oliver Neukum wrote: > Am Sonntag, 10. April 2005 22:14 schrieb Pavel Machek: > > Hi! > > > > > > Oliver Neukum wrote: > > > > > What is the point in doing so after they've rested on the disk for > > > > > ages? > > > > > > > > The point is not physical ac

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

> Andreas is right, his patches are needed. > > Currently, if your laptop is stolen after resume, they can still data > in swsusp image. Which shows that swsusp is a security risk if you have sensitive data in RAM. A thief stealing a running computer can get access to memory contents much more ea

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Am Sonntag, 10. April 2005 22:14 schrieb Pavel Machek: > Hi! > > > > Oliver Neukum wrote: > > > > What is the point in doing so after they've rested on the disk for ages? > > > > > > The point is not physical access to the disk but data gathering after > > > resume or reboot. > > > > After resum

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Hi! > > Encrypting swsusp image is of course even better, because you don't > > have to write large ammounts of zeros to your disks during resume ;-). > > How does zeroing help if they steal the laptop? The data is there, they > can just pull the hard disk out and mirror it before they boot. >

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Pavel Machek wrote: > Encrypting swsusp image is of course even better, because you don't > have to write large ammounts of zeros to your disks during resume ;-). and while we are at it: compressing before encryption will also reduce the amount of data you have to write during suspend... ;-) >

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

On Sun, Apr 10, 2005 at 10:14:55PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote: > Hi! > > > > Oliver Neukum wrote: > > > > What is the point in doing so after they've rested on the disk for ages? > > > > > > The point is not physical access to the disk but data gathering after > > > resume or reboot. > > > > Afte

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Hi! > > Oliver Neukum wrote: > > > What is the point in doing so after they've rested on the disk for ages? > > > > The point is not physical access to the disk but data gathering after > > resume or reboot. > > After resume or reboot normal access control mechanisms will work > again. Those who

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Am Sonntag, 10. April 2005 21:29 schrieb Andreas Steinmetz: > Oliver Neukum wrote: > > What is the point in doing so after they've rested on the disk for ages? > > The point is not physical access to the disk but data gathering after > resume or reboot. After resume or reboot normal access contro

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Pavel Machek wrote: > Hi! > > >>>Hi! What about doing it right? Encrypt it with symmetric cypher >>>and store key in suspend header. That way key is removed automagically >>>while fixing signatures. No need to clear anythink. >> >>Good idea. I'll have a look though it will take a while (busy with

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Oliver Neukum wrote: > What is the point in doing so after they've rested on the disk for ages? The point is not physical access to the disk but data gathering after resume or reboot. -- Andreas Steinmetz SPAMmers use [EMAIL PROTECTED] - To unsubscribe from this list: send t

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Hi! > > > > Hi! What about doing it right? Encrypt it with symmetric cypher > > > > and store key in suspend header. That way key is removed automagically > > > > while fixing signatures. No need to clear anythink. > > You might want to leave the key in the kernel image. You need to boot the > sa

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

> > > Hi! What about doing it right? Encrypt it with symmetric cypher > > > and store key in suspend header. That way key is removed automagically > > > while fixing signatures. No need to clear anythink. You might want to leave the key in the kernel image. You need to boot the same image anyway.

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Am Sonntag, 10. April 2005 15:13 schrieb Andreas Steinmetz: > It may not be desireable to leave swsusp saved pages on disk after > resume as they may contain sensitive data that was never intended to be > stored on disk in an way (e.g. in-kernel dm-crypt keys, mlocked pages). > > The attached simp

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Hi! > > Hi! What about doing it right? Encrypt it with symmetric cypher > > and store key in suspend header. That way key is removed automagically > > while fixing signatures. No need to clear anythink. > > Good idea. I'll have a look though it will take a while (busy with my job). > > > OTOH we

Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

[reformatted] Pavel Machek wrote: > Hi! What about doing it right? Encrypt it with symmetric cypher > and store key in suspend header. That way key is removed automagically > while fixing signatures. No need to clear anythink. Good idea. I'll have a look though it will take a while (busy with my

Re:[PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume

Hi! What about doing it right? Encrypt it with symmetric cypher and store key in suspend header. That way key is removed automagically while fixing signatures. No need to clear anythink. OTOH we may want to dm-crypt whole swap partition. You could still store key in header... --p -- pavel. Sent