On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 09:16:18PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett
>
> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
> order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
> allowing them to circumvent
On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 09:16:18PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett
>
> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
> order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
> allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or
From: Matthew Garrett
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future
From: Matthew Garrett
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax
From: Matthew Garrett
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future
From: Matthew Garrett
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax
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