Re: [patch V2 05/28] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

2018-11-29 Thread Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 07:33:33PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2 > user space exploits from hyperthread sibling. > > Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used. Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Thank you! > >

Re: [patch V2 05/28] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

2018-11-29 Thread Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 07:33:33PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2 > user space exploits from hyperthread sibling. > > Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used. Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Thank you! > >

[patch V2 05/28] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

2018-11-25 Thread Thomas Gleixner
If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2 user space exploits from hyperthread sibling. Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |7 +++ 1 file changed, 7

[patch V2 05/28] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

2018-11-25 Thread Thomas Gleixner
If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2 user space exploits from hyperthread sibling. Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |7 +++ 1 file changed, 7