Re: [PATCH net-next v11 19/23] ovpn: implement key add/get/del/swap via netlink

2024-11-12 Thread Antonio Quartulli

On 05/11/2024 11:16, Sabrina Dubroca wrote:

2024-10-29, 11:47:32 +0100, Antonio Quartulli wrote:

This change introduces the netlink commands needed to add, get, delete
and swap keys for a specific peer.

Userspace is expected to use these commands to create, inspect (non
sensible data only), destroy and rotate session keys for a specific


nit: s/sensible/sensitive/


+int ovpn_crypto_config_get(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs,
+  enum ovpn_key_slot slot,
+  struct ovpn_key_config *keyconf)
+{

[...]

+
+   rcu_read_lock();
+   ks = rcu_dereference(cs->slots[idx]);
+   if (!ks || (ks && !ovpn_crypto_key_slot_hold(ks))) {
+   rcu_read_unlock();
+   return -ENOENT;
+   }
+   rcu_read_unlock();


You could stay under rcu_read_lock a little bit longer and avoid
taking a reference just to release it immediately.


ACK.




+   keyconf->cipher_alg = ovpn_aead_crypto_alg(ks);
+   keyconf->key_id = ks->key_id;
+
+   ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks);
+
+   return 0;
+}



[...]

  int ovpn_nl_key_get_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
  {

[...]

+   if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+ OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
+   return -EINVAL;
+
+   peer_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID]);
+
+   peer = ovpn_peer_get_by_id(ovpn, peer_id);
+   if (!peer) {
+   NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
+  "cannot find peer with id %u", 0);


peer_id?


+   return -ENOENT;
+   }
+
+   if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+ OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
+   return -EINVAL;


Move this check before ovpn_peer_get_by_id? We're leaking a reference
on the peer.


ACK





+
+   slot = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT]);
+
+   ret = ovpn_crypto_config_get(&peer->crypto, slot, &keyconf);
+   if (ret < 0) {
+   NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
+  "cannot extract key from slot %u for peer 
%u",
+  slot, peer_id);
+   goto err;
+   }
+
+   msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+   if (!msg) {
+   ret = -ENOMEM;
+   goto err;
+   }
+
+   ret = ovpn_nl_send_key(msg, info, peer->id, slot, &keyconf,
+  info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq, 0);


info->snd_portid and info->snd_seq can be extracted from info directly
in ovpn_nl_send_key since there's no other caller, and flags=0 can be
skipped as well.


I tried to keep the signature similar to send_peer, but indeed they can 
both be simplified.





+   if (ret < 0) {
+   nlmsg_free(msg);
+   goto err;
+   }
+
+   ret = genlmsg_reply(msg, info);
+err:
+   ovpn_peer_put(peer);
+   return ret;
  }




[...]

  int ovpn_nl_key_del_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
  {
-   return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+   struct nlattr *attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX + 1];
+   struct ovpn_struct *ovpn = info->user_ptr[0];
+   enum ovpn_key_slot slot;
+   struct ovpn_peer *peer;
+   u32 peer_id;
+   int ret;
+
+   if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, OVPN_A_KEYCONF))
+   return -EINVAL;
+
+   ret = nla_parse_nested(attrs, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX,
+  info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF],
+  ovpn_keyconf_nl_policy, info->extack);
+   if (ret)
+   return ret;
+
+   if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+ OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
+   return -EINVAL;
+
+   if (ret)
+   return ret;


leftover?


very likely.

Thanks a lot

Regards,





+   if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+ OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
+   return -EINVAL;




--
Antonio Quartulli
OpenVPN Inc.




Re: [PATCH net-next v11 19/23] ovpn: implement key add/get/del/swap via netlink

2024-11-05 Thread Sabrina Dubroca
2024-10-29, 11:47:32 +0100, Antonio Quartulli wrote:
> This change introduces the netlink commands needed to add, get, delete
> and swap keys for a specific peer.
> 
> Userspace is expected to use these commands to create, inspect (non
> sensible data only), destroy and rotate session keys for a specific

nit: s/sensible/sensitive/

> +int ovpn_crypto_config_get(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs,
> +enum ovpn_key_slot slot,
> +struct ovpn_key_config *keyconf)
> +{
[...]
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + ks = rcu_dereference(cs->slots[idx]);
> + if (!ks || (ks && !ovpn_crypto_key_slot_hold(ks))) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return -ENOENT;
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();

You could stay under rcu_read_lock a little bit longer and avoid
taking a reference just to release it immediately.

> + keyconf->cipher_alg = ovpn_aead_crypto_alg(ks);
> + keyconf->key_id = ks->key_id;
> +
> + ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}


[...]
>  int ovpn_nl_key_get_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
>  {
[...]
> + if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
> +   OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + peer_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID]);
> +
> + peer = ovpn_peer_get_by_id(ovpn, peer_id);
> + if (!peer) {
> + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
> +"cannot find peer with id %u", 0);

   peer_id?

> + return -ENOENT;
> + }
> +
> + if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
> +   OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
> + return -EINVAL;

Move this check before ovpn_peer_get_by_id? We're leaking a reference
on the peer.


> +
> + slot = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT]);
> +
> + ret = ovpn_crypto_config_get(&peer->crypto, slot, &keyconf);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
> +"cannot extract key from slot %u for 
> peer %u",
> +slot, peer_id);
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!msg) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + ret = ovpn_nl_send_key(msg, info, peer->id, slot, &keyconf,
> +info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq, 0);

info->snd_portid and info->snd_seq can be extracted from info directly
in ovpn_nl_send_key since there's no other caller, and flags=0 can be
skipped as well.

> + if (ret < 0) {
> + nlmsg_free(msg);
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + ret = genlmsg_reply(msg, info);
> +err:
> + ovpn_peer_put(peer);
> + return ret;
>  }



[...]
>  int ovpn_nl_key_del_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
>  {
> - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + struct nlattr *attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX + 1];
> + struct ovpn_struct *ovpn = info->user_ptr[0];
> + enum ovpn_key_slot slot;
> + struct ovpn_peer *peer;
> + u32 peer_id;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, OVPN_A_KEYCONF))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + ret = nla_parse_nested(attrs, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX,
> +info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF],
> +ovpn_keyconf_nl_policy, info->extack);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
> +   OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;

leftover?


> + if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
> +   OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
> + return -EINVAL;

-- 
Sabrina