On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 04:46:46AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>
> > On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
> >
> > > >> + /*
> > > >> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid
> > > >> open-coding.
> > > >> +
On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 04:46:46AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>
> > On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
> >
> > > >> + /*
> > > >> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid
> > > >> open-coding.
> > > >> +
* Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
>
> > >> +/*
> > >> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid
> > >> open-coding.
> > >> + */
> > >> +ptep = get_locked_pte(poking_mm, poking_addr, );
> >
* Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
>
> > >> +/*
> > >> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid
> > >> open-coding.
> > >> + */
> > >> +ptep = get_locked_pte(poking_mm, poking_addr, );
> >
On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 12:09:32AM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
> > On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
> >
> +/*
> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid
> open-coding.
> + */
> +ptep =
On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 12:09:32AM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
> > On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
> >
> +/*
> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid
> open-coding.
> + */
> +ptep =
On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 12:52:20AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
>
> > >> +/*
> > >> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid
> > >> open-coding.
> > >> + */
> > >> +ptep =
On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 12:52:20AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
>
> > >> +/*
> > >> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid
> > >> open-coding.
> > >> + */
> > >> +ptep =
From: Peter Zijlstra
Sent: November 11, 2018 at 11:52:20 PM GMT
> To: Nadav Amit
> Cc: Ingo Molnar , LKML , X86
> ML , H. Peter Anvin , Thomas Gleixner
> , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen
> , Andy Lutomirski , Kees Cook
> , Dave Hansen , Masami
> Hiramatsu
> Subject:
From: Peter Zijlstra
Sent: November 11, 2018 at 11:52:20 PM GMT
> To: Nadav Amit
> Cc: Ingo Molnar , LKML , X86
> ML , H. Peter Anvin , Thomas Gleixner
> , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen
> , Andy Lutomirski , Kees Cook
> , Dave Hansen , Masami
> Hiramatsu
> Subject:
On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
> >> + /*
> >> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid open-coding.
> >> + */
> >> + ptep = get_locked_pte(poking_mm, poking_addr, );
> >> +
> >> + /*
> >> + * If we failed to allocate a PTE, fail. This
On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:53:07PM +, Nadav Amit wrote:
> >> + /*
> >> + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid open-coding.
> >> + */
> >> + ptep = get_locked_pte(poking_mm, poking_addr, );
> >> +
> >> + /*
> >> + * If we failed to allocate a PTE, fail. This
asami
> Hiramatsu
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 06/10] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text
> poking
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 03:17:28PM -0800, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> @@ -683,43 +684,108 @@ __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
>>
>> static int
asami
> Hiramatsu
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 06/10] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text
> poking
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 03:17:28PM -0800, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> @@ -683,43 +684,108 @@ __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
>>
>> static int
r Zijlstra , Dave Hansen
> , Masami Hiramatsu
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 06/10] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text
> poking
>
>
> On Sa, 10. Nov 15:17, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> text_poke() can potentially compromise the security as it sets temporary
>> PTEs in the fixma
r Zijlstra , Dave Hansen
> , Masami Hiramatsu
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 06/10] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text
> poking
>
>
> On Sa, 10. Nov 15:17, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> text_poke() can potentially compromise the security as it sets temporary
>> PTEs in the fixma
On Sa, 10. Nov 15:17, Nadav Amit wrote:
> text_poke() can potentially compromise the security as it sets temporary
> PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code
> from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the
> ability to write onto kernel
On Sa, 10. Nov 15:17, Nadav Amit wrote:
> text_poke() can potentially compromise the security as it sets temporary
> PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code
> from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the
> ability to write onto kernel
On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 03:17:28PM -0800, Nadav Amit wrote:
> @@ -683,43 +684,108 @@ __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
>
> static int __text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
> {
> + bool cross_page_boundary = offset_in_page(addr) + len > PAGE_SIZE;
> +
On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 03:17:28PM -0800, Nadav Amit wrote:
> @@ -683,43 +684,108 @@ __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
>
> static int __text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
> {
> + bool cross_page_boundary = offset_in_page(addr) + len > PAGE_SIZE;
> +
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