On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 17:00 -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
> Em Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 12:16:47PM -0400, Daniel Micay escreveu:
> > On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:54 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > This Changelog is completely devoid of information. _WHY_ are you
> > > doing this?
>
> >
On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 17:00 -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
> Em Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 12:16:47PM -0400, Daniel Micay escreveu:
> > On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:54 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > This Changelog is completely devoid of information. _WHY_ are you
> > > doing this?
>
> >
Em Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 12:16:47PM -0400, Daniel Micay escreveu:
> On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:54 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > This Changelog is completely devoid of information. _WHY_ are you
> > doing this?
> Attack surface reduction. It's possible to use seccomp-bpf for some
> limited cases,
Em Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 12:16:47PM -0400, Daniel Micay escreveu:
> On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:54 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > This Changelog is completely devoid of information. _WHY_ are you
> > doing this?
> Attack surface reduction. It's possible to use seccomp-bpf for some
> limited cases,
On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:54 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 03:27:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Hi guys,
> >
> > This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now).
> > Would
> > you consider taking this into the perf tree?
>
> No.
>
> > It's been in
On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:54 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 03:27:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Hi guys,
> >
> > This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now).
> > Would
> > you consider taking this into the perf tree?
>
> No.
>
> > It's been in
On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 03:27:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Hi guys,
>
> This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now). Would
> you consider taking this into the perf tree?
No.
> It's been in active use
> in both Debian and Android for a while now.
Very nice of you all to
On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 03:27:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Hi guys,
>
> This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now). Would
> you consider taking this into the perf tree?
No.
> It's been in active use
> in both Debian and Android for a while now.
Very nice of you all to
Hi guys,
This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now). Would
you consider taking this into the perf tree? It's been in active use
in both Debian and Android for a while now.
(If need be, I can resend it.)
Thanks!
-Kees
On Sat, Jun 4, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Jeffrey Vander Stoep
Hi guys,
This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now). Would
you consider taking this into the perf tree? It's been in active use
in both Debian and Android for a while now.
(If need be, I can resend it.)
Thanks!
-Kees
On Sat, Jun 4, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Jeffrey Vander Stoep
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep
In addition to Debian, this patch has been merged into AOSP and is a
requirement for Android:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/q/topic:CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 9:12 AM, Kees Cook
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep
In addition to Debian, this patch has been merged into AOSP and is a
requirement for Android:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/q/topic:CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 9:12 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 7:23 AM,
On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 7:23 AM, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
> access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
> makes this value the
On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 7:23 AM, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
> access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
> makes this value the default.
>
> This is
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