Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]

2008-01-14 Thread David Howells
Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Yes, and I would recommend doing so to avoid permission races. > You're going to have to deal with the case where step (2) fails > even if you have step (1), so the "test and set" mindset seems > prudent to me. Looking at SELinux, that doesn't get rid

Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]

2008-01-14 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > avc_has_perm(daemon_tsec->sid, nominated_sid, > > >SECCLASS_CACHE, CACHE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, NULL); > > > > > > And I assume this doesn't care if one, the other or both of the tw

Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]

2008-01-14 Thread David Howells
David Howells <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Okay... It looks like I want four security operations/hooks for cachefiles: FYI, I added the following vectors: # kernel services that need to override task security class kernel_service { use_as_override

Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]

2008-01-14 Thread David Howells
Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > avc_has_perm(daemon_tsec->sid, nominated_sid, > > SECCLASS_CACHE, CACHE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, NULL); > > > > And I assume this doesn't care if one, the other or both of the two SIDs > > mentioned are of SECCLASS_PROCESS rather than