When using a AIO read() operation on the function FS gadget driver a URB is
submitted asynchronously and on URB completion the received data is copied
to the userspace buffer associated with the read operation.
This is done from a kernel worker thread invoking copy_to_user() (through
copy_to_iter()). And while the user space process memory is made available
to the kernel thread using use_mm(), some architecture require in addition
to this that the operation runs with USER_DS set. Otherwise the userspace
memory access will fail.
For example on ARM64 with Privileged Access Never (PAN) and User Access
Override (UAO) enabled the following crash occurs.
Internal error: Accessing user space memory with fs=KERNEL_DS: 9600004f
[#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 1636 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted
4.9.0-04081-g8ab2dfb-dirty #487
Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.0 (DT)
Workqueue: events ffs_user_copy_worker
task: ffffffc87afc8080 task.stack: ffffffc87a00c000
PC is at __arch_copy_to_user+0x190/0x220
LR is at copy_to_iter+0x78/0x3c8
[...]
[<ffffff800847b790>] __arch_copy_to_user+0x190/0x220
[<ffffff80086f25d8>] ffs_user_copy_worker+0x70/0x130
[<ffffff80080b8c64>] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x460
[<ffffff80080b8f38>] worker_thread+0x50/0x4b0
[<ffffff80080bf5a0>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
[<ffffff8008083680>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Address this by placing a set_fs(USER_DS) before of the copy operation
and revert it again once the copy operation has finished.
This patch is analogous to commit d7ffde35e31a ("vhost: use USER_DS in
vhost_worker thread") which addresses the same underlying issue.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <l...@metafoo.de>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
index 038a27a13ebc..ae2b70bad111 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
@@ -758,9 +758,13 @@ static void ffs_user_copy_worker(struct work_struct *work)
bool kiocb_has_eventfd = io_data->kiocb->ki_flags & IOCB_EVENTFD;
if (io_data->read && ret > 0) {
+ mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
+
+ set_fs(USER_DS);
use_mm(io_data->mm);
ret = ffs_copy_to_iter(io_data->buf, ret, &io_data->data);
unuse_mm(io_data->mm);
+ set_fs(oldfs);
}
io_data->kiocb->ki_complete(io_data->kiocb, ret, ret);
--
2.11.0
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-usb" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
