linux-next: manual merge of the kvm tree with the powerpc tree

Hi all, Today's linux-next merge of the kvm tree got a conflict in: arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile between commit: 27d114966735 ("powerpc/32: Remove RELOCATABLE_PPC32") from the powerpc tree and commit: fd7bacbca47a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix TB corruption in guest exit path on HMI

[PATCH v3] powerpc: Merge 32-bit and 64-bit setup_arch()

From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt There is little enough differences now. mpe: Add a/p/k/setup.h to contain the prototypes and empty versions of functions we need, rather than using weak functions. Add a few other empty versions to avoid as many #ifdefs as possible in the

Re: [PATCH v2] powerpc: Merge 32-bit and 64-bit setup_arch()

Michael Ellerman writes: > From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt > > There is little enough differences now. > > Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt > [mpe: Add empty versions using #ifdef in setup.h rather than weak functions]

Re: [PATCH -next] wan/fsl_ucc_hdlc: remove .owner field for driver

From: Wei Yongjun Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 11:25:03 + > From: Wei Yongjun > > Remove .owner field if calls are used which set it automatically. > > Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/platform_no_drv_owner.cocci > > Signed-off-by: Wei

Re: [PATCH -next] wan/fsl_ucc_hdlc: use module_platform_driver to simplify the code

From: Wei Yongjun Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 11:25:16 + > From: Wei Yongjun > > module_platform_driver() makes the code simpler by eliminating > boilerplate code. > > Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Applied.

[PATCH v4 10/12] s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on s390. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 + arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig index a8c259059adf..9f694311c9ed 100644 ---

Re: [PATCH v11 4/5] powerpc/fsl: move mpc85xx.h to include/linux/fsl

On Wednesday, July 20, 2016 1:31:48 PM CEST Scott Wood wrote: > On Wed, 2016-07-20 at 13:24 +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > > On Saturday, July 16, 2016 9:50:21 PM CEST Scott Wood wrote: > > > > > > From: yangbo lu > > > > > > Move mpc85xx.h to include/linux/fsl and rename it

[PATCH v4 09/12] sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on sparc. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/sparc/Kconfig | 1 + arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 14 ++ arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 11 +--

[PATCH v4 12/12] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support

Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a redzone handling fix discovered by Michael Ellerman. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Tested-by:

[PATCH v4 11/12] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support

Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the SLAB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks --- init/Kconfig | 1 +

[PATCH v4 03/12] mm: Hardened usercopy

This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.

[PATCH v4 08/12] powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on powerpc. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Michael Ellerman --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 21

[PATCH v4 07/12] ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on ia64. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 +++--- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff

[PATCH v4 06/12] arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on arm64. As done by KASAN in -next, renames the low-level functions to __arch_copy_*_user() so a static inline can do additional work before the copy. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +

[PATCH v4 05/12] ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on arm. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 +-- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git

[PATCH v4 04/12] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy

Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on x86. This is done both in copy_*_user() and __copy_*_user() because copy_*_user() actually calls down to _copy_*_user() and not __copy_*_user(). Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Valdis

[PATCH v4 01/12] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page

From: Laura Abbott Code such as hardened user copy[1] needs a way to tell if a page is CMA or not. Add is_migrate_cma_page in a similar way to is_migrate_isolate_page. [1]http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.mm/155238 Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott

[PATCH v4 00/12] mm: Hardened usercopy

Hi, [This is now in my kspp -next tree, though I'd really love to add some additional explicit Tested-bys, Reviewed-bys, or Acked-bys. If you've looked through any part of this or have done any testing, please consider sending an email with your "*-by:" line. :)] This is a start of the mainline

[PATCH v4 02/12] mm: Implement stack frame object validation

This creates per-architecture function arch_within_stack_frames() that should validate if a given object is contained by a kernel stack frame. Initial implementation is on x86. This is based on code from PaX. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/Kconfig

Re: [PATCH v11 4/5] powerpc/fsl: move mpc85xx.h to include/linux/fsl

On Wed, 2016-07-20 at 13:24 +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > On Saturday, July 16, 2016 9:50:21 PM CEST Scott Wood wrote: > > > > From: yangbo lu > > > > Move mpc85xx.h to include/linux/fsl and rename it to svr.h as a common > > header file.  This SVR numberspace is used on some

Re: [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 9:02 AM, David Laight wrote: > From: Kees Cook >> Sent: 20 July 2016 16:32 > ... >> Yup: that's exactly what it's doing: walking up the stack. :) > > Remind me to make sure all our customers run kernels with it disabled. What's your concern with

Re: [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

On Wed, 2016-07-20 at 16:02 +, David Laight wrote: > From: Kees Cook > > Sent: 20 July 2016 16:32 > ... > > Yup: that's exactly what it's doing: walking up the stack. :) > > Remind me to make sure all our customers run kernels with it > disabled. You want a single copy_from_user to write to

RE: [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

From: Kees Cook > Sent: 20 July 2016 16:32 ... > Yup: that's exactly what it's doing: walking up the stack. :) Remind me to make sure all our customers run kernels with it disabled. David ___ Linuxppc-dev mailing list

Re: [RFC 0/3] extend kexec_file_load system call

Am Mittwoch, 20 Juli 2016, 13:12:20 schrieb Arnd Bergmann: > On Wednesday, July 20, 2016 8:47:45 PM CEST Michael Ellerman wrote: > > At least for stdout-path, I can't really see how that would > > significantly help an attacker, but I'm all ears if anyone has ideas. > > That's actually an easy

Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

On 07/20/2016 03:24 AM, Balbir Singh wrote: On Tue, 2016-07-19 at 11:48 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 6:06 PM, Laura Abbott wrote: On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote: This doesn't work when copying CMA allocated memory since CMA purposely allocates

Re: [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 2:52 AM, David Laight wrote: > From: Kees Cook >> Sent: 15 July 2016 22:44 >> This is a start of the mainline port of PAX_USERCOPY[1]. > ... >> - if address range is in the current process stack, it must be within the >> current stack frame (if

Re: [PATCH] crypto: vmx - Ignore generated files

On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 10:36:26AM -0300, Paulo Flabiano Smorigo wrote: > Ignore assembly files generated by the perl script. > > Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo Patch applied. Thanks. -- Email: Herbert Xu Home Page:

Re: [PATCH] cxl: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put"

On Wed, 20 Jul 2016, SF Markus Elfring wrote: > From: Markus Elfring > Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2016 15:10:32 +0200 > > The of_node_put() function tests whether its argument is NULL > and then returns immediately. > Thus the test around the call is not needed. > > This

[PATCH] cxl: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put"

From: Markus Elfring Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2016 15:10:32 +0200 The of_node_put() function tests whether its argument is NULL and then returns immediately. Thus the test around the call is not needed. This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.

RE: [PATCH] crypto: vmx - Ignore generated files

From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo > Sent: 19 July 2016 14:36 > Ignore assembly files generated by the perl script. ... > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/vmx/.gitignore b/drivers/crypto/vmx/.gitignore > new file mode 100644 > index 000..af4a7ce > --- /dev/null > +++ b/drivers/crypto/vmx/.gitignore > @@

Re: [RFC 0/3] extend kexec_file_load system call

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 09:35:30AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote: > On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:45:42PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote: > > > IOW, if your kernel forced signature verification, you should not be > > > able to do sig_enforce=0. If you kernel did not have > > >

Re: [RFC 0/3] extend kexec_file_load system call

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:45:42PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote: > > > > Command line options are not signed. I thought idea behind secureboot > > was to execute only trusted code and command line options don't enforce > > you to execute unsigned code. > > > >> > >> You can

RE: [RFC 3/3] kexec: extend kexec_file_load system call

From: Dave Young > On 07/15/16 at 02:19pm, Mark Rutland wrote: > > On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 09:09:55AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote: > > > On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 10:42:01AM +0900, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: > > > > > > [..] > > > > -SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd, > > > >

RE: [PATCH v3 2/2] cpufreq: qoriq: Don't look at clock implementation details

PING. Regards, Yuantian > -Original Message- > From: Scott Wood [mailto:o...@buserror.net] > Sent: Saturday, July 09, 2016 5:07 AM > To: Michael Turquette ; Russell King > ; Stephen Boyd ; Viresh > Kumar

Re: [PATCH v11 4/5] powerpc/fsl: move mpc85xx.h to include/linux/fsl

On Saturday, July 16, 2016 9:50:21 PM CEST Scott Wood wrote: > From: yangbo lu > > Move mpc85xx.h to include/linux/fsl and rename it to svr.h as a common > header file. This SVR numberspace is used on some ARM chips as well as > PPC, and even to check for a PPC SVR multi-arch

Re: [RFC 0/3] extend kexec_file_load system call

On Wednesday, July 20, 2016 8:47:45 PM CEST Michael Ellerman wrote: > At least for stdout-path, I can't really see how that would significantly help > an attacker, but I'm all ears if anyone has ideas. That's actually an easy one that came up before: If an attacker controls a tty device (e.g.

Re: [RFC 0/3] extend kexec_file_load system call

Russell King - ARM Linux writes: > On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:45:42PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote: >> > IOW, if your kernel forced signature verification, you should not be >> > able to do sig_enforce=0. If you kernel did not have >> > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y, then

Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

On Tue, 2016-07-19 at 11:48 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 6:06 PM, Laura Abbott wrote: > >  > > On 07/15/2016 02:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > >  > > This doesn't work when copying CMA allocated memory since CMA purposely > > allocates larger than a page block

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM

Paolo Bonzini writes: > On 20/07/2016 07:46, Michael Ellerman wrote: >> Thanks. >> >> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman >> >> Or do you want me to merge this before Paul gets back? > > No, this should be merged through the KVM tree. Please Cc the KVM >

RE: [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

From: Kees Cook > Sent: 15 July 2016 22:44 > This is a start of the mainline port of PAX_USERCOPY[1]. ... > - if address range is in the current process stack, it must be within the > current stack frame (if such checking is possible) or at least entirely > within the current process's stack.

Re: [v2] rpaphp: fix slot registration for multiple slots under a PHB

On Mon, 2016-11-07 at 22:16:27 UTC, Tyrel Datwyler wrote: > PowerVM seems to only ever provide a single hotplug slot per PHB. > The under lying slot hotplug registration code assumed multiple slots, > but the actual implementation is broken for multiple slots. This went > unnoticed for years due

Re: [v2] powerpc/powernv: fix pci-cxl.c build when CONFIG_MODULES=n

On Tue, 2016-19-07 at 02:33:35 UTC, Ian Munsie wrote: > From: Ian Munsie > > pnv_cxl_enable_phb_kernel_api() grabs a reference to the cxl module to > prevent it from being unloaded after the PHB has been switched to CX4 mode. > This breaks the build when CONFIG_MODULES=n as

Re: [v2] cxl: remove dead Kconfig options

On Mon, 2016-18-07 at 04:52:57 UTC, Andrew Donnellan wrote: > Remove the CXL_KERNEL_API and CXL_EEH Kconfig options, as they were only > needed to coordinate the merging of the cxlflash driver. Also remove the > stub implementation of cxl_perst_reloads_same_image() in cxlflash which is > only used

Re: cxl: fix potential NULL dereference in free_adapter()

On Fri, 2016-15-07 at 07:20:36 UTC, Andrew Donnellan wrote: > If kzalloc() fails when allocating adapter->guest in > cxl_guest_init_adapter(), we call free_adapter() before erroring out. > free_adapter() in turn attempts to dereference adapter->guest, which in > this case is NULL. > > In

Re: powerpc/mm: Cleanup LPCR defines

On Fri, 2016-15-07 at 11:04:26 UTC, Michael Ellerman wrote: > From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" > > This makes it easy to verify we are not overloading the bits. > No functionality change by this patch. > > mpe: Cleanup more. Completely fixup whitespace, convert all UL

Re: [v2, 1/3] powerpc32: booke: fix the build error when CRASH_DUMP is enabled

On Wed, 2016-13-07 at 01:14:38 UTC, Kevin Hao wrote: > In the current code, the RELOCATABLE will be forcedly enabled when > enabling CRASH_DUMP. But for ppc32, the RELOCABLE also depend on > ADVANCED_OPTIONS and select NONSTATIC_KERNEL. This will cause the > following build error when CRASH_DUMP=y

Re: [1/3] powerpc/pseries: Add pseries hotplug workqueue

On Thu, 2016-07-07 at 15:00:34 UTC, John Allen wrote: > In support of PAPR changes to add a new hotplug interrupt, introduce a > hotplug workqueue to avoid processing hotplug events in interrupt context. > We will also take advantage of the queue on PowerVM to ensure hotplug > events initiated

Re: [PATCH 3/5] powerpc: tm: Always use fp_state and vr_state to store live registers

On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 11:28:30AM +1000, Cyril Bur wrote: > On Sun, 17 Jul 2016 11:25:43 +0800 > > The aim of this patch is to ensure that pt_regs, fp_state and vr_state always > hold a threads 'live' registers. So, after a recheckpoint fp_state is where > the > the state should be.

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:41:36PM +1000, Sam Bobroff wrote: > Introduce a new KVM capability, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM, that can be queried to > determine if a PowerPC KVM guest should use HTM (Hardware Transactional > Memory). > > This will be used by QEMU to populate the pa-features bits in the >

Re: [PATCH kernel] powerpc/powernv/ioda: Fix endianness when reading TCEs

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 02:26:51PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote: > The iommu_table_ops::exchange() callback writes new TCE to the table > and returns old value and permission mask. The old TCE value is > correctly converted from BE to CPU endian; however permission mask > was calculated from

[PATCH v2] powerpc: Merge 32-bit and 64-bit setup_arch()

From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt There is little enough differences now. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt [mpe: Add empty versions using #ifdef in setup.h rather than weak functions] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman ---

Re: [RFC 0/3] extend kexec_file_load system call

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:45:42PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote: > > IOW, if your kernel forced signature verification, you should not be > > able to do sig_enforce=0. If you kernel did not have > > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y, then sig_enforce should be 0 by default anyway > > and you are not making

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM

On 20/07/2016 07:46, Michael Ellerman wrote: > Thanks. > > Acked-by: Michael Ellerman > > Or do you want me to merge this before Paul gets back? No, this should be merged through the KVM tree. Please Cc the KVM maintainers before offering to apply a patch that formally

Re: [PATCH v3] of: fix memory leak related to safe_name()

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 10:38 PM, Rob Herring wrote: > On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 2:51 AM, Mathieu Malaterre > wrote: >> v3 tested here multiple times ! memleak is now gone. >> >> Tested-by: Mathieu Malaterre >> >>