Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()

2022-11-09 Thread Catalin Marinas
On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 10:32:08PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > The RNG always mixes in the Linux version extremely early in boot. It > also always includes a cycle counter, not only during early boot, but > each and every time it is invoked prior to being fully initialized. > Together, this

Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()

2022-10-23 Thread Guo Ren
On Mon, Oct 24, 2022 at 4:32 AM Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > > The RNG always mixes in the Linux version extremely early in boot. It > also always includes a cycle counter, not only during early boot, but > each and every time it is invoked prior to being fully initialized. > Together, this means

[PATCH v1 2/2] stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()

2022-10-23 Thread Jason A. Donenfeld
The RNG always mixes in the Linux version extremely early in boot. It also always includes a cycle counter, not only during early boot, but each and every time it is invoked prior to being fully initialized. Together, this means that the use of additional xors inside of the various