On Wed, Jul 06, 2022 at 02:32:25AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it
> should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two
> mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and
> "nordrand", a
On Wed, Jul 06, 2022 at 02:32:25AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it
> should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two
> mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and
> "nordrand", a
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it
should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two
mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and
"nordrand", a boot-time switch.
Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG
