On Tue, 2019-09-10 at 13:34 +0800, Jason Yan wrote:
> Hi Scott,
>
> On 2019/8/28 12:05, Scott Wood wrote:
> > On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote:
> > > This series implements KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32, as a security
> > > feature that deters exploit attempts relying on
Hi Scott,
On 2019/8/28 12:05, Scott Wood wrote:
On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote:
This series implements KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32, as a security
feature that deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location
of kernel internals.
Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has
On 2019/8/28 12:59, Scott Wood wrote:
On Tue, 2019-08-27 at 23:05 -0500, Scott Wood wrote:
On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote:
Freescale Book-E
parts expect lowmem to be mapped by fixed TLB entries(TLB1). The TLB1
entries are not suitable to map the kernel directly in a
On 2019/8/28 12:05, Scott Wood wrote:
On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote:
This series implements KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32, as a security
feature that deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location
of kernel internals.
Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has already
Scott Wood writes:
> On Tue, 2019-08-27 at 11:33 +1000, Michael Ellerman wrote:
>> Jason Yan writes:
>> > A polite ping :)
>> >
>> > What else should I do now?
>>
>> That's a good question.
>>
>> Scott, are you still maintaining FSL bits,
>
> Sort of... now that it's become very low volume,
On Tue, 2019-08-27 at 11:33 +1000, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Jason Yan writes:
> > A polite ping :)
> >
> > What else should I do now?
>
> That's a good question.
>
> Scott, are you still maintaining FSL bits,
Sort of... now that it's become very low volume, it's easy to forget when
On Tue, 2019-08-27 at 23:05 -0500, Scott Wood wrote:
> On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote:
> > Freescale Book-E
> > parts expect lowmem to be mapped by fixed TLB entries(TLB1). The TLB1
> > entries are not suitable to map the kernel directly in a randomized
> > region, so we chose
On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote:
> This series implements KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32, as a security
> feature that deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location
> of kernel internals.
>
> Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has already supported, what we need to do is
>
Jason Yan writes:
> A polite ping :)
>
> What else should I do now?
That's a good question.
Scott, are you still maintaining FSL bits, and if so any comments? Or
should I take this.
cheers
> On 2019/8/19 14:12, Jason Yan wrote:
>> Hi Michael,
>>
>> Is there anything more I should do to get
A polite ping :)
What else should I do now?
Thanks
On 2019/8/19 14:12, Jason Yan wrote:
Hi Michael,
Is there anything more I should do to get this feature meeting the
requirements of the mainline?
Thanks,
Jason
On 2019/8/9 18:07, Jason Yan wrote:
This series implements KASLR for
Hi Michael,
Is there anything more I should do to get this feature meeting the
requirements of the mainline?
Thanks,
Jason
On 2019/8/9 18:07, Jason Yan wrote:
This series implements KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32, as a security
feature that deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of
This series implements KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32, as a security
feature that deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location
of kernel internals.
Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has already supported, what we need to do is
map or copy kernel to a proper place and relocate. Freescale
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