Re: [V2] powerpc/ptrace: Mitigate potential Spectre v1

2019-02-08 Thread Michael Ellerman
On Wed, 2019-01-30 at 12:46:00 UTC, Breno Leitao wrote: > 'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential > exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > On PTRACE_SETREGS and PTRACE_GETREGS requests, user space passes the > register number that would be read

Re: [PATCH V2] powerpc/ptrace: Mitigate potential Spectre v1

2019-01-30 Thread Gustavo A. R. Silva
On 1/30/19 6:46 AM, Breno Leitao wrote: > 'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential > exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > On PTRACE_SETREGS and PTRACE_GETREGS requests, user space passes the > register number that would be read or written.

[PATCH V2] powerpc/ptrace: Mitigate potential Spectre v1

2019-01-30 Thread Breno Leitao
'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. On PTRACE_SETREGS and PTRACE_GETREGS requests, user space passes the register number that would be read or written. This register number is called 'regno' which is part