On Mon 2016-05-16 13:12:50, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Mon, May 09, 2016 at 02:23:03PM +0200, Petr Mladek wrote:
> > On Fri 2016-05-06 07:38:55, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 05, 2016 at 01:57:01PM +0200, Petr Mladek wrote:
> > > > I have missed that the two commands are called with
On Mon, May 09, 2016 at 02:23:03PM +0200, Petr Mladek wrote:
> On Fri 2016-05-06 07:38:55, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Thu, May 05, 2016 at 01:57:01PM +0200, Petr Mladek wrote:
> > > I have missed that the two commands are called with preemption
> > > disabled. So, I had the following crazy
On Fri 2016-05-06 07:38:55, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Thu, May 05, 2016 at 01:57:01PM +0200, Petr Mladek wrote:
> > I have missed that the two commands are called with preemption
> > disabled. So, I had the following crazy scenario in mind:
> >
> >
> > CPU0CPU1
>
On Thu, May 05, 2016 at 01:57:01PM +0200, Petr Mladek wrote:
> I have missed that the two commands are called with preemption
> disabled. So, I had the following crazy scenario in mind:
>
>
> CPU0 CPU1
>
> klp_enable_patch()
>
> klp_target_state = KLP_PATCHED;
>
>
On Wed 2016-05-04 12:57:00, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 04:48:54PM +0200, Petr Mladek wrote:
> > On Thu 2016-04-28 15:44:48, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the
> > > foundation which will eventually enable us to
On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 04:48:54PM +0200, Petr Mladek wrote:
> On Thu 2016-04-28 15:44:48, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the
> > foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of
> > security patches which change
On Wed, 4 May 2016, Petr Mladek wrote:
> > +
> > + if (unlikely(klp_patch_pending(current)))
> > + klp_patch_task(current);
> > }
>
> Some more ideas from the world of crazy races. I was shaking my head
> if this was safe or not.
>
> The problem might be if the
On Thu 2016-04-28 15:44:48, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the
> foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of
> security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the
> biggest remaining piece needed
