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Thanks and sorry for inconvenience,
Dino
> On Sep 21, 2016, at 2:12 PM, Dino Farinacci wrote:
>
> Hello folks. In draft-padma-ideas-problem-statement-00.txt, we have a section
> on mapping system requirements for map-n-encap and translation based loc/id
> split protocols. Rather than having you go into the document in detail (we
> wish you would and comment though), I will provide the short list below to
> attempt a discussion on requirements.
>
> I have copied the possible WGs that may want to use the mapping system
> technology. And I have also copied the LISP working group who can shed
> expertise on the subject as well as some beta lists that have some
> operational experiences with mapping database deployment and management.
>
> The requirements below have a security and robustness twist to it but I think
> that is the best place to start and to consider security “up front”.
>
> Thanks in advance,
> Dino
>
>
>
> 6.4. Mapping System Security
>
> The secure mapping system must have the following requirements:
>
> 1. The components of the mapping system need to be robust against
> direct and indirect attacks. If any component is attacked, the
> rest of the system should act with integrity and scale and only
> the information associated with the compromised component is made
> unavailable.
>
> 2. The addition and removal of components of the mapping system must
> be performed in a secure matter so as to not violate the
> integrity and operation of the system and service it provides.
>
> 3. The information returned by components of the mapping system
> needs to be authenticated as to detect spoofing from
> masqueraders.
>
> 4. Information registered (by publishers) to the mapping system must
> be authenticated so the registering entity or the information is
> not spoofed.
>
> 5. The mapping system must allow request access (for subscribers) to
> be open and public. However, it is optional to provide
> confidentiality and authentication of the requesters and the
> information they are requesting.
>
> 6. Any information provided by components of the mapping system must
> be cryptographically signed by the provider and verified by the
> consumer.
>
> 7. Message rate-limiting and other heuristics must be part of the
> foundational support of the mapping system to protect the system
> from invalid overloaded conditions.
>
> 8. The mapping system should support some form of provisioned
> policy. Either internal to the system or via mechanisms for
> users of the system to describe policy rules. Access control
> should not use traditional granular-based access lists since they
> do not scale and are hard to manage. By the use of token- or
> key- based authentication methods as well as deploying multiple
> instances of the mapping system will allow acceptable policy
> profiles. Machine learning techniques could automate these
> mechanisms.
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