Re: [Lsr] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode-08: (with COMMENT)

2022-10-04 Thread Ketan Talaulikar
Hi Roman,

The changes discussed are reflected in the updated version posted:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode-09

Thanks,
Ketan


On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 1:56 PM Ketan Talaulikar 
wrote:

> Hi Roman,
>
> Thanks for your review and please check inline below for responses.
>
> The changes as discussed below will reflect in the next update of the
> draft.
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 11:27 PM Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <
> nore...@ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
>> draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode-08: No Objection
>>
>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>
>>
>> Please refer to
>> https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/
>> for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>
>>
>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode/
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> COMMENT:
>> --
>>
>> Thank you to Wes Hardaker for the SECDIR review.
>>
>> ** Section 1.  Typo. s/adjaceny/adjacency/
>>
>> ** Section 1.  Typo. s/establishement/establishment/
>>
>
> KT> Ack for both
>
>
>>
>> ** Section 8.
>>If
>>authentication is being used in the OSPF routing domain
>>[RFC5709][RFC7474], then the Cryptographic Authentication TLV
>>[RFC5613] SHOULD also be used to protect the contents of the LLS
>>block.
>>
>> Since strict-mode BFD functionality is not going to be present in legacy
>> implementations, could it be mandatory to protect the LLS block (i.e.,
>> use of
>> the Cryptographic Authentication TLV is a MUST)?
>>
>
> KT> Ack - will change to MUST since this is in line with RFC5613 Sec 2.5.
>
> Thanks,
> Ketan
>
>
___
Lsr mailing list
Lsr@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lsr


Re: [Lsr] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode-08: (with COMMENT)

2022-10-04 Thread Ketan Talaulikar
Hi Roman,

Thanks for your review and please check inline below for responses.

The changes as discussed below will reflect in the next update of the draft.


On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 11:27 PM Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <
nore...@ietf.org> wrote:

> Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode-08: No Objection
>
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>
>
> Please refer to
> https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/
> for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>
>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode/
>
>
>
> --
> COMMENT:
> --
>
> Thank you to Wes Hardaker for the SECDIR review.
>
> ** Section 1.  Typo. s/adjaceny/adjacency/
>
> ** Section 1.  Typo. s/establishement/establishment/
>

KT> Ack for both


>
> ** Section 8.
>If
>authentication is being used in the OSPF routing domain
>[RFC5709][RFC7474], then the Cryptographic Authentication TLV
>[RFC5613] SHOULD also be used to protect the contents of the LLS
>block.
>
> Since strict-mode BFD functionality is not going to be present in legacy
> implementations, could it be mandatory to protect the LLS block (i.e., use
> of
> the Cryptographic Authentication TLV is a MUST)?
>

KT> Ack - will change to MUST since this is in line with RFC5613 Sec 2.5.

Thanks,
Ketan
___
Lsr mailing list
Lsr@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lsr


[Lsr] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode-08: (with COMMENT)

2022-10-03 Thread Roman Danyliw via Datatracker
Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode-08: No Objection

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)


Please refer to 
https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ 
for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode/



--
COMMENT:
--

Thank you to Wes Hardaker for the SECDIR review.

** Section 1.  Typo. s/adjaceny/adjacency/

** Section 1.  Typo. s/establishement/establishment/

** Section 8.
   If
   authentication is being used in the OSPF routing domain
   [RFC5709][RFC7474], then the Cryptographic Authentication TLV
   [RFC5613] SHOULD also be used to protect the contents of the LLS
   block.

Since strict-mode BFD functionality is not going to be present in legacy
implementations, could it be mandatory to protect the LLS block (i.e., use of
the Cryptographic Authentication TLV is a MUST)?



___
Lsr mailing list
Lsr@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lsr