I am pleased to announce the release of Mailman 2.1.39.
This is a bug fix release. It fixes
https://bugs.launchpad.net/mailman/+bug/1954694
This addresses two issues.
The fix for CVE-2021-42097 was case sensitive and should not be.
The fix for CVE-2021-44227 introduced a potential NameError
Bill Cole writes:
> > So this is potentially very complicated.
>
> Case-squashing domain parts? Not complicated. Simple.
This is true if you are talking about following the Internet's rules.
I wasn't; I was talking about equivalencing identity tokens that
happen to look like email addresses.
On 12/13/21 10:36 AM, Bill Cole wrote:
Also simple: NEVER try to interpret or canonicalize local-parts that
exist in someone else's domain. You cannot programmatically determine
whether 2 different local-parts are equivalent unless you run the
delivery system for them.
This is correct and
On 2021-12-13 at 13:02:22 UTC-0500 (Tue, 14 Dec 2021 03:02:22 +0900)
Stephen J. Turnbull
is rumored to have said:
Mailman-admin writes:
Am 13.12.21 um 12:09 schrieb Sebastian Hagedorn:
Nov 24 19:33:24 2021 (117276) Form for user x...@smail.uni-koeln.de
submitted with CSRF token issued for
On 12/13/21 10:02 AM, Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
On the other hand, whether they should be equivalent for CSRF
validation is another question. Since the CSRF validation is supposed
to be entirely transparent to the user, I would (naively) expect that
the strings representing the same address
Mailman-admin writes:
> Am 13.12.21 um 12:09 schrieb Sebastian Hagedorn:
> > Nov 24 19:33:24 2021 (117276) Form for user x...@smail.uni-koeln.de
> > submitted with CSRF token issued for x...@smail.uni-koeln.de.
> >
> > The only difference is in the case of the email address. I’m no expert
Hello
Am 13.12.21 um 12:09 schrieb Sebastian Hagedorn:
> Hi,
>
> thanks for the recent security fixes regarding potential CSRF attacks! I
> checked our mischief logs for relevant messages today and the only one I
> found was this:
>
> Nov 24 19:33:24 2021 (117276) Form for user
Hi,
thanks for the recent security fixes regarding potential CSRF attacks! I
checked our mischief logs for relevant messages today and the only one I
found was this:
Nov 24 19:33:24 2021 (117276) Form for user x...@smail.uni-koeln.de
submitted with CSRF token issued for
