Just for the record, more information on the ClamAv mailing lists..
http://lists.clamav.net/pipermail/clamav-users/2018-January/005722.html
--
"Catch the Magic of Linux..."
Michael Peddemors, President/CEO LinuxMagic
On 01/26/2018 04:45 PM, Vladimir Dubrovin via mailop wrote:> Actually,
SPF can not protect against (visible) spoofing, because it
> doesn't check RFC5322.From, it performs sender's server identification
> for SMTP's MAIL FROM/HELO domain only.
Just adding that “it” also protects against visible
26.01.2018 17:37, Benjamin BILLON пишет:
>
> Thanks for those details,
>
>
>
> My understanding is that SPF was primarily conceived against spoofing,
> and not for reputation purposes.
>
> It doesn't mean that spammers can't have a proper SPF. It doesn't mean
> that legitimate senders can't have
Thanks for those details,
My understanding is that SPF was primarily conceived against spoofing, and not
for reputation purposes.
It doesn't mean that spammers can't have a proper SPF. It doesn't mean that
legitimate senders can't have no SPF.
On the other hand, there could be false positives
26.01.2018 13:07, Benjamin BILLON пишет:
>
> Hi there!
>
>
>
> I have a case where one sender's message has been abused, reused by
> someone who just added a Subject: line (so now there's two), before
> sending it.
>
> Apparently the final recipient was at Gmail (given the headers I had
> access
Hi there!
I have a case where one sender's message has been abused, reused by someone who
just added a Subject: line (so now there's two), before sending it.
Apparently the final recipient was at Gmail (given the headers I had access
to), and logically:
* SPF failed: the domain name of the
On 25/01/2018 21:46, Carl Byington wrote:
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On Wed, 2018-01-24 at 09:30 -0500, Al Iverson wrote:
Smells like a Fasthosts misconfiguration from here.
If they are doing ip queries against the DBL for all connections, they
will be refusing all
