Dňa 27. apríla 2023 18:23:10 UTC používateľ John Levine via mailop
napísal:
>It appears that postfix--- via mailop said:
>>Did the German government not require a switch to ed25519?
>
>Not that I'm aware of. If they did, their mail would stop working
>since essentially nobody validates ed25519
Florian Vierke via mailop wrote on 2023-04-27 10:01:
I had the same question and the quoted sentence still doesn't explain the why
for me. The key rotation explains, that it is possible to publish the keys
without a harm for you, but I don't see a benefit for anybody in publishing the
old priv
It appears that postfix--- via mailop said:
>Did the German government not require a switch to ed25519?
Not that I'm aware of. If they did, their mail would stop working
since essentially nobody validates ed25519 signatures yet.
>And would ed25519 not be better than any RSA?
Sure, but at this
Did the German government not require a switch to ed25519? just a brain
bug that started itching when reading this otherwise mildly interesting
thread.
And would ed25519 not be better than any RSA? I mean efficiency in
calculations, transmission, storage, and by no means security /
non-repud
On Thu 27/Apr/2023 01:21:14 +0200 Matt Palmer via mailop wrote:
the Wikipedia page
for DKIM even lists "non-repudiability" under the heading "Advantages"
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail#Advantages).
Fixed.
Best
Ale
--
___
evine via mailop
Sent: Donnerstag, 27. April 2023 00:23
To: mailop@mailop.org
Cc: oliver.gell...@dm.de
Subject: Re: [mailop] DKIM with 3072-bit or 4096-bit RSA signatures
This email has reached Mapp via an external source
It appears that Gellner, Oliver via mailop said:
>
>> On 26.04.2023
e interested in your opinion 😊
Thanks, Florian
-Original Message-
From: mailop On Behalf Of John Levine via mailop
Sent: Donnerstag, 27. April 2023 00:23
To: mailop@mailop.org
Cc: oliver.gell...@dm.de
Subject: Re: [mailop] DKIM with 3072-bit or 4096-bit RSA signatures
This email has reac
On 2023-04-26 at 19:59:08 UTC-0400 (Thu, 27 Apr 2023 09:59:08 +1000)
Matt Palmer via mailop
is rumored to have said:
[...]
I can see how what I said *could* be misinterpreted as being in
support of
using DKIM for non-repudiability, but I can assure you that wasn't my
intent. It was an acknowl
On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 10:24:09PM -0400, John Levine wrote:
> It appears that Matt Palmer via mailop said:
> >DKIM doesn't encrypt, it signs, and since people are using DKIM for
> >non-repudiation long after the e-mail has been delivered, I'd argue that
> >DKIM *does* need to be cryptographically
Dnia 27.04.2023 o godz. 09:21:14 Matt Palmer via mailop pisze:
>
> That something isn't "for this" doesn't mean it won't get used for that, and
> there is very little that a passive observer can do to change the state of
> affairs.
>
> I happen to agree with you that DKIM *shouldn't* be used for
On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 01:48:12PM +0200, Jaroslaw Rafa via mailop wrote:
> Dnia 26.04.2023 o godz. 09:35:25 Matt Palmer via mailop pisze:
> >
> > DKIM doesn't encrypt, it signs, and since people are using DKIM for
> > non-repudiation long after the e-mail has been delivered, I'd argue that
> > DK
It appears that Gellner, Oliver via mailop said:
>
>> On 26.04.2023 at 04:30 John Levine via mailop wrote:
>>
>> I rotate my keys every month, and publish the old public keys on a web
>> site 10 days after the end of the month so anyone can fake an old
>> signature from me. There's a pointer to th
> On 26.04.2023 at 04:30 John Levine via mailop wrote:
>
> I rotate my keys every month, and publish the old public keys on a web
> site 10 days after the end of the month so anyone can fake an old
> signature from me. There's a pointer to the web server in the DNS key
> records.
Hello John,
is
Dnia 26.04.2023 o godz. 15:23:19 Taavi Eomäe via mailop pisze:
> On 26/04/2023 14:48, Jaroslaw Rafa via mailop wrote:
> >If you want to make an e-mail message non-repudiable, you should use end-to
> >-end content signing using either S/MIME or PGP/MIME. Then the content is
> >signed either with a c
On 26/04/2023 14:48, Jaroslaw Rafa via mailop wrote:
If you want to make an e-mail message non-repudiable, you should use end-to
-end content signing using either S/MIME or PGP/MIME. Then the content is
signed either with a certificate issued by publicly recognized CA (in case
of S/MIME), or with
Dnia 26.04.2023 o godz. 09:35:25 Matt Palmer via mailop pisze:
>
> DKIM doesn't encrypt, it signs, and since people are using DKIM for
> non-repudiation long after the e-mail has been delivered, I'd argue that
> DKIM *does* need to be cryptographically resistant for a long time.
No, DKIM is not f
It appears that Matt Palmer via mailop said:
>DKIM doesn't encrypt, it signs, and since people are using DKIM for
>non-repudiation long after the e-mail has been delivered, I'd argue that
>DKIM *does* need to be cryptographically resistant for a long time.
That is soecifically not what DKIM was d
On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 08:55:30PM +0200, Patrick Ben Koetter via mailop wrote:
> * John Levine via mailop :
> > It appears that Matthäus Wander via mailop said:
> > >Hello everyone,
> > >
> > >what's the experience with DKIM signatures with RSA keylengths larger
> > >than 2048 bits? Is it suppor
* John Levine via mailop :
> It appears that Matthäus Wander via mailop said:
> >Hello everyone,
> >
> >what's the experience with DKIM signatures with RSA keylengths larger
> >than 2048 bits? Is it supported by verifiers? Any known incompatibilities?
>
> All the verifiers I know pass the signat
Matthäus Wander via mailop wrote on 2023-04-20 10:55:
Hello everyone,
what's the experience with DKIM signatures with RSA keylengths larger
than 2048 bits? Is it supported by verifiers? Any known incompatibilities?
The Cisco Secure Email Gateway (formerly Cisco ESA) and their
cloud-based ser
Dňa 20. apríla 2023 16:43:45 UTC používateľ John Levine via mailop
napísal:
>As far as I know nobody has implemented the elliptic signatures in RFC 8463
>other
>than for testing. Same reason.
Are you sure that nobody?
I do dual sign for about 2 years already. I start to log DKIM signature
ty
It appears that Matthäus Wander via mailop said:
>Hello everyone,
>
>what's the experience with DKIM signatures with RSA keylengths larger
>than 2048 bits? Is it supported by verifiers? Any known incompatibilities?
All the verifiers I know pass the signatures to openssl or gnutls for
verificati
Hello everyone,
what's the experience with DKIM signatures with RSA keylengths larger
than 2048 bits? Is it supported by verifiers? Any known incompatibilities?
RFC 6376 requires verifiers to validate 512 to 2048-bit RSA signatures.
RFC 8301 changes this requirement to 1024 to 4096 bits. I'm
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