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http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/majdian140211.html
A Glorified Military Coup in Egypt:
An Aborted Revolution or the Genesis of a Genuine Revolution?
by Behzad Majdian
Millions of people in Egypt and all over the Middle East erupted
in joy as Omar Suleiman announced on Friday that Hosni Mubarak had
resigned.
The Egyptian military decided to oust a widely-resented dictator
as it witnessed the growing threat of a potential revolution being
born in Egyptian streets. Had it been allowed to continue for a
few more days, the uprising could have grown into a full-fledged
revolution which potentially could smash the Egyptian state. To
save the state, the military took charge and overthrew the
stubborn dictator. The dictator was thrown overboard in order to
save the dictatorship.
But how can one explain the jubilation of Egyptian people if what
took place in Egypt was in essence a military coup d'état? One
straightforward answer seems to be that the majority of Egyptians
think of the army as a national institution and a force for good.
Perhaps they still see it as the army of Gamal Abdel Nasser.
However, there is another possible explanation for equating a
military coup with a revolution: Egyptians had lowered their
expectation of what a genuine revolution could achieve to the mere
act of ousting Mubarak. This in turn could be explained by thirty
years of brutal rule that had destroyed organizational structures
of opposition groups, jailing and eliminating potential leaders.
The eighteen-day uprising in Egypt suffered from the absence of a
strong and charismatic leadership. It also failed to produce one
in the course of the events. The uprising also lacked broad and
effective organizational forms.
By all indications, what took place seems to be a spontaneous
uprising of those who felt they could not accept the injustice and
oppression of the regime any longer. The uprising in Tunisia
provided the spark. And disillusioned urban youth took the flame
and rapidly spread it to most other segments of Egyptian society.
Thirty years of pent-up anger began to erupt. It was all over
the streets for the whole world to see.
The elation of Egyptians will go on for a while as they continue
to celebrate their victory. In the meantime, the Egyptian army
and its strategic partners (Egypt's economic elites, the U.S., and
Israel) will take a sigh of relief and congratulate themselves for
successfully managing the "crisis." A cursory examination of the
reaction of the Western media makes it abundantly clear that the
Western powers and Israel feel that they have weathered the first
wave of what could potentially be a devastating Tsunami. Their
leaders even allow themselves to put on a celebratory act, sharing
their joy with the Egyptians over their "historic revolution" in
which the apparatus of dictatorship was spared and the "transfer
of power" took place in a "peaceful" manner.
In his speech on Friday, President Obama tried to cajole Egyptians
by implying that the U.S. had always wanted a "genuine democracy"
in Egypt and he was glad that Egyptians are finally getting it.
He threw his full support behind the military coup by praising the
"moral force of non-violence" in transferring political power in
Egypt. Moreover, using the metaphor of the fall of the Berlin
Wall, he gave the uprising a wild spin by attempting to establish
a parallel between the Egyptian uprising and the colorful
"revolutions" in Eastern Europe that produced pro-U.S. and
pro-capitalist regimes. Actually, a better parallel here would be
the European revolutions of 1848, which had displayed democratic
and egalitarian aspirations.
Now what? What will happen next depends on two things. The first
has to do with the way the Egyptian army and its strategic
partners will conduct themselves in trying to harness the
unleashed democratic energy of the Egyptian masses -- especially
the revolutionary fervor of the youth who seem to be radicalizing
rapidly. The second is the manner in which the revolutionary
youth and Islamist-nationalist forces will react to the military's
efforts to disperse the crowds and re-establish the state of
business as usual.
The ideal scenario for the army and its allies would be to quickly
return things to "normal," make some cosmetic changes in the
structure of power, lift parts of the state of emergency laws, and
plan elections within a year or so in which the "moderates" will
end up being the winners. If all goes well, the economic power
will continue to remain in the hands of Egypt's transnational
elites, and the army will continue to monitor political power from
behind the scene. If the plan works, the U.S. will continue to
fund the regime and exert influence over it, and Israel will
return to the state of feeling safe again. For this scenario to
work, it is essential that the Egyptian people act compliantly.
Based on what we have seen on Egyptian streets in recent days, one
can say with certainty that the people will resist the army. This
scenario seems to be nothing more than a pipe dream.
The actual scenario could be one of the following three.
First scenario. In returning things to normal, and preparing for
the promised reforms and elections, the army will act in
accordance with its own interests. It will strive to protect its
political power and its entrenched economic interests that are
interlocked with those of Egypt's super-rich. The army will thus
act in accordance with what it essentially is: an organization
whose top echelons of leadership are corrupted by Egyptian
transnational elites and by dollars that comes from the American
military-industrial complex and Washington.
Given the nature of the army, it seems highly unlikely that the
Egyptians will get the democratic reforms they have been promised.
Nor will they get fair and free elections, simply because the
army, economic elites, and their American and Israeli partners
fear that "radical elements" would sweep free and fair elections.
To prevent this nightmare from coming true, American political
strategists will share their expertise with the Egyptian political
class, army, and security forces. They will all endeavor to
design and conduct upcoming elections in ways that they will both
appear free and fair and produce "moderate" winners. Care will be
taken to make sure that the plan is executed with just the right
amount of repression and without much bloodshed.
But will it work? Egypt's economic problems are vast and
structural. Crony capitalism and corruption are deeply entrenched
in the economy. Contrary to what the Western media have gotten us
to believe, the main grievance of the overwhelming majority of
Egyptians is not the political dictatorship or the violation of
human rights, but primarily the tyranny of economic injustice and
poverty. To this, one should also add the sympathy of the largest
segments of the Egyptian population with the cause of Palestinians
and their anger at the Egyptian government for its cozy and
puppet-like relations with the U.S. and Israel. In fair and free
elections, candidates running on agendas of Egypt's transnational
elites and their U.S. and Israeli allies will lose to those who
will promise economic justice and political independence, and will
advocate Arab nationalism, Islamic identity, and pro-Palestinian
sentiments.
In this scenario, the Egyptian people will resist the army and
whatever civilian form of provisional government that it might try
to put together during the period of "transition." If pushed too
aggressively, this scenario could spark a second uprising, which
could lead either to a brutal dictatorship (perhaps more brutal
than Mubarak's) or to a genuine revolution that could possibly
overthrow the system. And if this materializes, there is a good
chance that the revolution could follow in a path similar to the
1979 Iranian Revolution, which would eventually take Egypt out of
the American-Israeli bloc in the Middle East. Probably the first
response of Israel to such a development would be to ambush
Egypt's army in order to destroy its air force and re-occupy the
Sinai Peninsula (1967 all over again). The U.S. might also join
Israel in the attack on Egypt.
Now the second scenario. A new script will come from Washington,
which will include a new strategy of divide and conquer that the
State Department and the American "democracy industry" have
developed from lessons they have learned in Eastern Europe and
Iraq and also in their dealings with the Palestinian Authority.
Money will be distributed among certain elements of the opposition
in the guise of supporting democracy. This will include the usual
tricks in the business: offering to train democracy activists,
providing campaign expertise, campaign strategies, and leadership
workshops to various political groups and parties, etc. These
"well-intentioned" services will be supplied by organizations such
as the National Endowment for Democracy and Freedom House, which
are well-known names in the democracy industry and have proven
track records in helping produce U.S.-friendly "revolutions" and
election results. (There are indications that Freedom House is
already at work in Egypt.)
Money will be also distributed covertly (bribes) to various
elements in the opposition and in society writ large. The goal
will be to turn opposition candidates into "moderates," and to
create divisions, infighting, and mistrust among opposition
groups, and within the Egyptian population in general. All of
that would help corrupt opposition groups and candidates. This
can also be used to call into question the legitimacy of elections
if they happen to produce results that would be unacceptable to
the U.S.
The money could be brought into the country either under programs
with catchy names such as "Egypt Democracy Project" or "Help Egypt
Build Democracy," or disguised as an "economic aid" package
intended to help the Egyptian economy recover. It is also
possible that Egypt would get both a "democracy" package and an
"economic aid" program. The aim of the (perhaps substantial)
economic package will be to make a quick though temporary impact
on the lives of the people. Its possible forms include direct
investments in the economy and small loans to average Egyptians.
The hope would be that the aid would bear fruit within a year or
so -- in time to improve the image of the U.S. and its Egyptian
allies, and help "moderates" win the elections. The Saudis might
be required to foot some or most of the bill.
If this script is followed, it might succeed to some extent for a
while. It will not give the U.S. and Israel what they really
desire: a stable and reliable strategic puppet in Egypt.
Nonetheless, in their eye, it will still be preferable to a
genuine democracy in Egypt that will definitely be a grave danger
to the strategic and hegemonic interests of the U.S. in the Middle
East. If the script ends up working, it means that the Egyptian
revolution has been aborted. The end result will be an Egypt that
will look less like Turkey, which some Egyptians like to imagine,
and more like Iraq.
Finally the third scenario. The army and its partners will
implement strategies planned for the first two scenarios
simultaneously in order to maximize chances for success.
Repression, democratic trickery, and money will join forces to
save Egyptian dictatorship.
Egyptians must be congratulated for overthrowing a brutal
puppet-dictator. What they have accomplished is truly monumental.
Yet, it is not enough. The real challenge lies ahead. They
need to be vigilant as they will be tested soon. Their revolution
has just begun. They will have to choose between playing the game
that the U.S. and Israel have in mind for them, on the one hand,
and smashing the machinery of Egyptian dictatorship and replacing
it by a genuinely democratic system, on the other hand. They will
need to choose between an aborted revolution, on the one hand, and
a democratic revolution that would let them keep their restored
dignity and bring them political empowerment, economic equality,
and social development, on the other hand. As Egyptians are
looking at their choices at this historic juncture, the U.S. and
Israel are facing their biggest challenge in the region in recent
decades. The whole Middle East could blow up in their faces as
America's puppet-dictators -- the so-called "moderates" -- are
bracing for revolts and possibly revolutions.
Behzad Majdian may be contacted at <behza...@gmail.com>. See,
also, Behzad Majdian, "Obama, Iran, and Israel" (MRZine, 2 March
2009).
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