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Best regards, Andrew Stewart Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-rev...@lists.h-net.org> > Date: February 10, 2019 at 6:50:44 PM EST > To: h-rev...@lists.h-net.org > Cc: H-Net Staff <revh...@mail.h-net.org> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-Asia]: Sidhu on Paliwal, 'My Enemy's Enemy: India > in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal' > Reply-To: h-rev...@lists.h-net.org > > Avinash Paliwal. My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the > Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal. Oxford Oxford University > Press, 2017. 400 pp. $45.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-19-068582-9. > > Reviewed by Waheguru Sidhu (New York University) > Published on H-Asia (February, 2019) > Commissioned by Sumit Guha > > Sidhu on Paliwal, _India and Afghanistan_ > > The revealed limitations of the explicatory and predictive capacities > of traditional international relations theories and research tools > have spawned a host of innovative approaches to address their > lacunae. Among them is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), > propounded by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith in the late 1980s, > to enhance theoretical and methodological tools to study the process > of policy formulation: "The ACF has three principal theoretical > domains: advocacy coalitions, policy subsystems, and policy change. > The ACF posits that advocacy coalitions and policy subsystems are the > most efficient way to organize actors interested in the policy > process for empirical research."[1] ACF is premised on the notion > that belief systems are the primary drivers for those engaged in > policymaking. The belief system itself has three tiers: core beliefs > (which are fundamental, broad, and--derived from social conditioning > that determines values--difficult to change); policy core beliefs > (which are more specific and--refer to the application of core > beliefs to the policy realm--are also difficult to change); and > secondary beliefs (which are related to the minutiae of policy > implementation and--based on learning--are subject to change). Thus, > advocacy coalitions are collections of individuals who share a common > belief system. In turn, these coalitions compete with each other to > determine policy in official and bureaucratic subsystems. It is this > contestation among coalitions, coupled with external events, that > prompts policy change over a long period.[2] > > Using the ACF crutch unquestioningly and superficially, journalist > turned scholar Avinash Paliwal examines one of the most understudied > aspects of India's foreign policy: the "kaleidoscopic quality" of its > approach towards Afghanistan from the time the Soviets marched into > the graveyard of empires in December 1979 until the US decision to > march out of it nearly four decades later. It was in Afghanistan that > India's determination to keep the Cold War out of the region failed > spectacularly when the Soviets arrived on South Asia's doorstep; yet > New Delhi not only acquiesced to the Soviet presence but dutifully > supported the various Moscow-backed puppet regimes in Kabul. It was > the Soviet presence in Afghanistan that cemented the US-Pakistan > strategic alliance, gave cover for Islamabad's covert nuclear weapon > capability, and changed India's security scenario for the worse. It > was in Afghanistan that India, despite being then led by a hard-line > nationalist coalition, had to surrender humiliatingly to the > hijackers of Indian Airlines IC-814 in 1999. And, following the > events of 9/11, it was in Afghanistan that India welcomed the > continued presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led > International Security Assistance Force, despite its avowed aversion > to military alliances operating in its neighborhood. By delving into > detail of these and other complex developments Paliwal's book makes a > valiant effort to provide a coherent narrative of Indian > policymaking, even when it was not discernable to most Afghans and > other external observers. > > With a perfunctory nod to the ACF framework Paliwal identifies two > advocacy coalitions seeking to dominate India's Afghan policy. The > "partisans" are policymakers whose approach to Afghanistan is > centered on "necessarily treating Pakistan as an enemy, or is not > accommodative of Pakistani interests in Afghanistan" (p. 19). This > group considers all Afghan factions opposed to Islamabad as "natural > allies," while it promotes a "'containment' policy vis-a-vis > pro-Pakistan factions" (p.12). > > In contrast, "conciliators" are policymakers who "gravitate towards > the 'engage-with-all' axiom, however difficult it may be to open and > sustain dialogue with pro-Pakistan factions in Afghanistan." Their > approach is to "focus on whoever comes to power in Kabul without fear > or favour" and is marked by "political pragmatism." These coalitions > "cut across the bureaucratic, diplomatic and political spectrum" (p. > 12). The book does not question or explore why there are only binary > advocacy coalitions and what prevented the formation of other > coalitions. > > The book does, however, note that sometimes "these seemingly > disparate advocacies generates dynamics that impart nuance (but also > confusion) to the way India behaves in Afghanistan" (p. 13). To add > to the confusion, the author admits that in some instances "the same > official adopts different approaches--conciliatory or partisan--at > different times depending on context" (p. 19). This candid > confession, which challenges the very theoretical framework that the > book espouses, reflects either a discomfiture with the ACF framework > or the inability of this framework to explain the obvious > contradictions in India's approach to Afghanistan. > > These foibles notwithstanding, the book astutely identifies three > principal drivers that determine India's Afghanistan policy debates. > First, all Indian approaches have sought to "strike a balance between > Afghanistan and Pakistan" and New Delhi's approach to Kabul has been > predicated on the desire to either cooperate or compete with > Pakistan. Second, given the limited capacity of India to support > Afghanistan all by itself, the role of external actors in Afghanistan > (particularly the Soviet Union, Pakistan, or the United States) over > which India has little or no influence has also forced India's policy > to be primarily reactive rather than proactive. Third, like most > external actors, New Delhi has also struggled to work the > ever-changing mosaic of domestic Afghan politics to its advantage; > India has not been able to translate the general goodwill it enjoys > among the Afghan populace into political advantage (p. 14). > > These three drivers in turn underline several characteristics of > India's Afghanistan policy. First, it is evident that India does not > have an Afghanistan alone policy and both the partisans and the > conciliators look at Afghanistan through the prism of Pakistan. The > book does not contest why this is the case and what prevents the > development of an Afghan policy, minus Pakistan. Second, in the > absence of its own Afghanistan-specific policy India has often > scarified its interests in that country to its own detriment and to > the advantage of other external actors. For instance, following > Moscow's invasion the "real debate was around India's relationship > with the Soviet Union and not Afghanistan. Kabul was simply a > sideshow as India's Afghanistan policy became more closely aligned to > that of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union" (p. 60). Third, the > absence of an Afghan-specific policy also made India and its > intentions suspect in the eyes of the Afghan leadership. For example, > Afghan president Hamid Karzai lamented, not unreasonably, that > during his tenure Afghanistan had become a victim of India-Pakistan > rivalry. > > Paliwal argues that the absence of an Afghan-centered policy until > recently might be on account of India's limited economic capacity and > the geographical disconnect. While these are relevant factors, they > alone do not explain this lack of policy, especially given the > "Neighborhood First" priority of the present government. Another > equally crucial factor might be the lack of expertise among the > foreign and security establishment on Afghanistan. For instance, a > recent report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the > Indian parliament revealed a shocking lack of relevant Afghan > language skills among India's diplomats: there were no proficient > Dari speakers and a mere two had a knowledge of Pushtu.[3] The same > is likely to be the case with other agencies and organizations > working on Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly then, this deficiency in > India's basic capabilities has also limited its ability to understand > and engage with all factions in Afghanistan or to develop policies > that focus solely on Afghanistan. > > The book also delves into the failure of India to pursue an > "internationalist strategy" toward Afghanistan either through the > so-called "six plus two" process or the United Nations. India did not > even manage to be included in the former informal forum comprised of > six (China, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) > and two (the United States and Russia) that ran from 1997 until 2001 > and sought a political settlement to accommodate the various warring > factions in Afghanistan. This was despite the strengthening of > Indo-US relations, India's unwavering support of Russian interests in > Afghanistan, and the overwhelming anti-Taliban sentiment in the > group, which also mirrored India's position. India's exclusion might > partly be explained on account of an Afghan policy that was closely > tied to its concerns over Pakistan. > > Similarly, apart from supporting a slew of UN resolutions on > Afghanistan, India was unable to leverage the world body to further > its interests, especially between the crucial period of the > withdrawal of Soviet troops and the Taliban coming to power. While > India (and the author) conveniently blame the UN team for failing to > resolve the political quagmire in Afghanistan and prevent the rise of > the Taliban, they ponder on why India was did not take a more > proactive role in the process. While the UN does deserve some blame, > India's timidity to lead the UN process in Afghanistan is in contrast > to the role it sought to play later in Myanmar, where Vijay Nambiar > (a former Indian diplomat who was ambassador in Kabul during the > crucial period just after the Soviet withdrawal) served as a special > advisor to the UN secretary general. India's timorous behavior may > partly be related to the weak bench of diplomats, who were not deft > at playing in the multilateral arena, and partly to New Delhi's > inherent preference for bilateral approaches and aversion to the > unpredictability of the multilateral process. The shadow of Kashmir > (which remains on the UN agenda and was bound to be raised by > Pakistan) also loomed large in India's reluctance to lead the UN > process in Afghanistan. > > The book, which when shorn of its theoretical trappings reads like a > first-rate spy thriller complete with graphic details of tradecraft > that compares with the best of the old masters, is particularly > engaging and insightful on how the "conciliators" gained the upper > hand in the post-2010 phase of the Afghan war. They were able to > ensure both US engagement and the post-2001 consensus against the > Taliban and Pakistan. > > The book concludes that despite the divergent belief systems of the > "partisans" and the "conciliators," the ultimate objective of both > advocacy coalitions is "to ensure balance between its two neighbors > wherein neither of them has an overbearing influence on the domestic > polity of the other" (p. 286). Yet, this evenhanded notion is > repudiated a few lines later when the author argues that "India > advocates a strong, stable, inclusive, and sovereign Afghanistan that > is not dependent on Pakistan for its economic and political survival" > and that "addressing ... this structural imbalance ... lies at the > heart of India's current policy approach to Kabul" (p. 286). > > This volume's singular contribution is the author's exhaustive > research and extensive interviews, primarily with key interlocutors > in India's intelligence community, on a subject that needs to be > examined threadbare. In doing so, the book offers a rare peep into > the black box of India's enigmatic policymaking. What we discern in > this brief glimpse is neither reassuring nor cogent. Nonetheless, it > helps to advance our understanding of the challenges India faces in > seeking to address complex problems posed by countries, like > Afghanistan, in its neighborhood. That is a commendable achievement, > even though the volume does little to advance the ACF as an > analytical tool. > > Notes > > [1]. Paul A. Sabatier, "Policy Change and Policy-Oriented Learning: > Exploring an Advocacy Coalition Framework," _Policy Sciences _21, > nos. 2/3, (1988): 129-68. > > [2]. Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, eds., _Policy Change > and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach_ (Boulder, CO: Westview, > 1993). > > [3]. Standing Committee on External Affairs (2015-16), _Recruitment, > Structure and Capacity-Building of IFS Cadre, Including Need for a > Separate UPSC Examination for Cadre, Mid-Career Entry and In-Service > Training and Orientation_, Twelfth Report, August 2016, 76, available > at > http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/External%20Affairs/16_External_Affairs_12.pdf. > > > Citation: Waheguru Sidhu. Review of Paliwal, Avinash, _My Enemy's > Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US > Withdrawal_. H-Asia, H-Net Reviews. February, 2019. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=51492 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: https://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
