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Best regards, Andrew Stewart - - - Subscribe to the Washington Babylon newsletter via https://washingtonbabylon.com/newsletter/ Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-rev...@lists.h-net.org> > Date: March 30, 2020 at 9:02:45 AM EDT > To: h-rev...@lists.h-net.org > Cc: H-Net Staff <revh...@mail.h-net.org> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-CivWar]: Cowsert on Hewitt and Schott, > 'Confederate Generals in the Trans-Mississippi: Volume 3: Essays on America's > Civil War' > Reply-To: h-rev...@lists.h-net.org > > Lawrence L. Hewitt, Thomas Edwin Schott, eds. Confederate Generals > in the Trans-Mississippi: Volume 3: Essays on America's Civil War. > Knoxville University of Tennessee Press, 2019. 374 pp. $64.95 > (cloth), ISBN 978-1-62190-454-0. > > Reviewed by Zac Cowsert (West Virginia University) > Published on H-CivWar (March, 2020) > Commissioned by G. David Schieffler > > _Confederate Generals in the Trans-Mississippi, Volume 3_ constitutes > the final volume in a series that has shed tremendous light on > Confederate leadership, strategy, and politics west of the > Mississippi River. In their preface, editors Lawrence Hewitt and > Thomas Schott dispel the notion that the Trans-Mississippi served as > "a dumping ground for generals who failed east of the river or whom > President Davis want to shield from controversy" (p. xv). Likewise, > in his forward, Daniel Sutherland argues that these commanders > "acquitted [themselves] as well as most generals on either side. It > is also clear that these men were not the ones responsible for the > collapse of the Confederacy" (p. xiii). Instead, Sutherland contends > that factors unique to the Trans-Mississippi posed difficult problems > for Rebel leaders: the distance and apathy from Richmond, the early > territorial gains by the United States, and the primacy of guerrilla > warfare. > > The two essays on Trans-Mississippi department commanders illustrate > these problems best. The sheer size and numerous strategic objectives > within the theater could easily lead Rebel commanders astray. Joseph > Dawson III's essay on Earl Van Dorn depicts a mediocre commander > promoted far above his talents, in part due to the patronage of > Jefferson Davis. Allured by the desire to bring Missouri into the > Confederacy, Van Dorn instead blundered into disastrous defeat at Pea > Ridge, "the most important and consequential battle in the > Trans-Mississippi" (p. 17). Further defeat at Corinth only verified > Van Dorn's "ineptness as an independent field commander" (p. 25). > > Echoing Steven Woodworth's argument in _Jefferson Davis and His > Generals_ (1990), Dawson contends the Confederate president was > partially to blame for Confederate military failures, positing that > "Davis too often chose or reappointed high-ranking officers from a > limited pool of generals unsuited or unfit for their assignments," > citing Earl Van Dorn and Theophilus Holmes as examples (p. 24). > > Though faring better than Van Dorn, Edmund Kirby Smith likewise > struggled with the military, political, and administrative headaches > of department command. Jeffery Prushankin depicts a general pulled in > different directions by strategic and political needs during his > first year in command. Richmond wanted Smith to prioritize the > defense of Louisiana and the Mississippi River Valley, yet Smith felt > local political pressure to defend Arkansas and liberate Missouri. As > Prushankin shows, Kirby Smith attempted to accomplish both objectives > by adopting a conservative defensive strategy that prioritized > interior lines of defense and the ability to project force either > north to Arkansas or south to Louisiana as necessity dictated. Such a > strategy created a paradox: "To achieve his military goal of > concentration, Kirby Smith had to surrender territory, but his > political imperative required holding territory and thus dispersing > his forces. It was an impossible dilemma" (p. 115). Feeling pressure > to keep a strong Confederate presence everywhere, the result was > Kirby Smith's inability to unleash a coordinated Confederate > offensive anywhere. Complementing this view of Kirby Smith is Richard > Holloway's essay on Smith's chief of staff, William R. Boggs. Boggs > proved a competent, if opinionated, staff officer whose experiences > offer a window into the administrative and personnel headaches within > the department. > > Holloway's examination of Hamilton Bee suggests that capable > administrators do not always make capable field commanders. > Successful, if not always popular or scrupulous, at managing the > local and international politics of command in southern Texas, Bee > flunked on the battlefield in 1864 Louisiana. At Yellow Bayou, the > overly anxious Bee squandered a rare Confederate opportunity to > capture or severely damage a Union army at Yellow Bayou, and "with it > the fate of the relevance of the war in the Trans-Mississippi" (p. > 52). > > If departmental commanders struggled, several essays reveal the > Trans-Mississippi Confederacy benefited from several competent, > aggressive division commanders. One such commander was James Fagan, > who perhaps proved too aggressive at times. Fagan's troopers always > seemed in the thick of the fray, and Fagan himself was involved in > the controversial engagements at Helena, Marks' Mills, Pilot Knob, > and elsewhere. "Neither flashy nor particularly dynamic," Stuart > Sanders concludes, "Fagan exhibited a constancy that paid dividends > for the Confederacy across the Trans-Mississippi" (p. 61). Curtis > Milbourn explores the rise of Louisiana cavalier Tom Green, whose > strong battlefield performances in western Louisiana in 1863 "began > his ascension to a prominent role as [Richard] Taylor's most trusted > combat commander" (p. 174). Despite his status as a political > general, Paul R. Scott determines that General John Austin Wharton > "demonstrated tactical savvy, leadership, and managerial abilities" > on both Western and Trans-Mississippi battlefields (p. 183). > > In the volume's final essay, Holloway compares the reality of Richard > Taylor's final year of the war with his famous memoirs, _Destruction > and Reconstruction _(1879). Holloway documents Taylor's "Herculean > effort to bring troops across the Mississippi River" in a desperate, > failed attempt to alter the calculus of the war (pp. 262-3). He > likewise sheds light on the bitter feud between Taylor and Kirby > Smith, highlighting Taylor's repeated insubordination in dealing with > his commanding officer. Unsurprisingly, these incidents failed to > make it into Taylor's postwar writings. Holloway argues that Taylor's > skewed mudslinging in 1879 does not reflect the reality of 1864, and > indeed, suggests that Taylor became too embroiled in the Kirby Smith > feud in his memoirs, to the detriment of his recollection of the Red > River Campaign and the strategic situation within the > Trans-Mississippi Confederacy. > > Bookending the entire series is the inclusion of an invaluable > appendix that charts the numerous, byzantine, and ever-changing > departments and districts of the Trans-Mississippi, as well as the > various men who held those commands. This appendix should be of > tremendous assistance to Civil War scholars. > > When returning to the overarching arguments of the volume, it seems > clear Trans-Mississippi Confederates did indeed face unique > obstacles. And while these men are likely not the reason the > Confederacy lost the war, perhaps it is better to ask whether they > constituted a real asset to the Confederacy's bid for independence. > Neither Van Dorn nor Kirby Smith succeeded in developing or executing > a successful strategic vision for defending the Trans-Mississippi > Confederacy (an admittedly difficult task). As in the Western > Theater, political infighting (particularly among Kirby Smith and > Taylor) proved to be an issue. Many of the brightest commanders > discussed in this volume--Green, Fagan, and Wharton--generally > operated at a brigade or divisional level; thus, they were rarely > positioned to independently influence the war's overall course. And > while perhaps Richard Taylor was the best Confederate general west of > the Mississippi, his subordination (and insubordination) to Kirby > Smith limited his impact. In short, Confederate leadership in the > Trans-Mississippi proved a mixed lot. > > Moreover, one wonders how Trans-Mississippi Confederate generals > might compare to their Federal counterparts, who are (or were, prior > to this series) as equally understudied as Rebel commanders. Future > scholarship on Union leadership west of the river might help > determine whether Union or Confederate generalship, or inherent > theater factors, were more important in shaping the war in the > Trans-Mississippi. Room also exists for further examination of > Confederate generals in Indian Territory, such as Stand Watie, > Douglas Cooper, William Steele, and others, who faced unique > diplomatic, political, and racial problems yet are largely missing > from the series. > > However we might categorize Trans-Mississippi Confederate leadership, > our knowledge of it is greatly bolstered by the essays in this > volume. They shine light on overlooked commanders, advance intriguing > new perspectives on western generalship, and represent a significant > and much-needed contribution to Trans-Mississippi Civil War > scholarship. > > Citation: Zac Cowsert. Review of Hewitt, Lawrence L.; Schott, Thomas > Edwin, eds., _Confederate Generals in the Trans-Mississippi: Volume > 3: Essays on America's Civil War_. H-CivWar, H-Net Reviews. March, > 2020. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54194 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: https://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
