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From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-rev...@lists.h-net.org>
Date: Tue, Jul 7, 2020 at 10:30 AM
Subject: H-Net Review [H-Poland]: Biskupska on Forczyk, 'Case White: The
Invasion of Poland 1939'
To: <h-rev...@lists.h-net.org>
Cc: H-Net Staff <revh...@mail.h-net.org>


Robert Forczyk.  Case White: The Invasion of Poland 1939.  Oxford
Osprey Publishing, 2019.  Illustrations. 416 pp.  $30.00 (cloth),
ISBN 978-1-4728-3495-9.

Reviewed by Jadwiga Biskupska (Sam Houston State University)
Published on H-Poland (July, 2020)
Commissioned by Anna Muller

The popularity of the recent BBC/PBS documentary series World on Fire
and its sentimental portrait of Polish soldiers contesting Germans
"on bicycles," as Helen Hunt's character repeatedly insists,
demonstrates the need for a work like Robert Forczyk's Case White:
The Invasion of Poland, 1939. It promises an updated analysis of the
military campaign that began the Second World War. Forczyk is the
author of numerous specialized campaign studies and his Case White is
deliberately revisionist, dismissing much of the Western scholarship
on the Polish campaign as "lazy" and dominated by the German
perspective (p. 10). Even more ambitiously, Forczyk asserts that the
1939 co-invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
constituted "the greatest criminal conspiracy of the 20th century"--a
bold claim considering the bloodiness of the century--and therefore
demands more consideration than it has gotten (p. 7). This volume is
the first book-length study in English since Steven Zaloga and Victor
Madej's illustrated The Polish Campaign 1939 (1985) and should now be
considered the definitive English-language treatment, though there is
a much-deeper Polish literature and source base. It covers the German
and Soviet attacks on Poland and considers all branches of the German
military and the combat performance of the SS, though the police
atrocity campaign, Operation Tannenberg, is mentioned only in
passing. The study relies on an established library of secondary
sources and campaign studies, supplemented with the memoirs and
diaries of participants and some archival sources on British
decision-making. The maps interspersed throughout are especially
useful for visualizing the campaign as a series of regional
conflicts.

Though the heart of the book investigates the fighting itself, the
treatment begins with a brief overview of Polish military history,
"Poland Is Not Lost," followed by a very interesting chapter on how
the new Polish Second Republic built an army and a
military-industrial complex, and the political and economic
difficulties that stunted these efforts, a chapter that should have
wide interest. The central thesis in this discussion is that the
Polish Army was on a successful modernization path by the late 1930s,
but that this late date and limited financial means meant that
reforms were incomplete at the time of the German invasion--a story
of a state caught mid-reform that was not unique during the longer
war. Chapters 3 and 4 consider the military and diplomatic buildup to
war, outlining interwar German and Soviet military developments and
the wrangling of alliances. Forczyk blames Polish military
unpreparedness on Józef Piłsudski's narrowmindedness and financial
limitations, but he sees the country's political isolation as largely
the result of some combination of British indifference and hostility.
Of note here is his reminder that the Germans, Poles, and Soviets all
undertook politically motivated purges of their militaries during the
1930s and that these purges had far-reaching consequences.

The book then provides a detailed story of the five-week war,
breaking it down into its major engagements region by region, and
opening with naval and air warfare but focusing primarily on the land
campaigns. Though military historians now begrudge the term, it is
therefore an examination of Nazi Germany's first stab at
_Blitzkrieg_. The heart of the book (chapters 5 and 6) is a campaign
history analyzing how the Polish Army and Wehrmacht maneuvered and
fought, how good their commanders' decisions were, and how well they
used the weapons they possessed. Forczyk is dismissive of Gerd von
Rundstedt and thinks Heinz Guderian competent if overpraised; he
considers the Polish commander in chief Edward Smigły-Rydz so
bad--"disastrous" and "disgraceful"--that his men were often better
off when he lost contact with them (pp. 255, 261). Chapter 7,
"Apotheosis," sandwiches a brief discussion of the Soviet invasion of
eastern Poland between a two-part discussion of the siege and defense
of Warsaw. Though the detail in these chapters will likely overwhelm
the nonspecialist, particular attention should be paid to the
sections on aerial bombardment, the Battle of the Bzura, and the
fight for Warsaw. Chapter 8, "Occupation," is not primarily about
occupation but about how the fighting ended, and its opening campaign
analysis should be widely useful.

Forczyk passes harsh judgment on German and Polish command decisions,
and also on French and British hesitation after their declarations of
war. His goal is not primarily to overturn the conventional
understanding of the campaign, which was that it was a decisive
German victory, but to complicate that portrait by explaining that
the victory was more difficult than it is generally taken to have
been and that German use of air power and armor was less effective
than it later became. The Polish defensive plan, which was to delay
the German advance and then launch a substantial counterattack, was
foiled in both aspects primarily by poor coordination among Polish
units as they retreated. As a general matter, Forczyk asserts that
Polish behavior--and especially the decisions of lower-level
commanders--should not be dismissed outright and that some Polish
actions were effective in delaying the German advance, maintaining
soldiers' morale, and creating precedents upon which later military
resistance depended. Those with an interest in wartime resistance
will encounter some of its major players--Kazimierz Sosnkowski,
Stefan Rowecki, Tadeusz Komorowski--in their 1939 exploits.

Though politics are bracketed once the fighting begins in this study,
it provides context for the behavior of Polish ethnic minorities,
antisemitic atrocities, and the (mis)treatment of prisoners.
Wehrmacht and SS atrocities against Polish soldiers and civilians,
which Forczyk details at Wieluń, Gdańsk, Bydgoszcz, Parzymiechy,
Zimnowo, Bolesławiec, Częstochowa, Milejów, Ciepielów, and
Modlin, are a particular theme.

This volume will allow historians of the war to understand how the
campaign in Poland was conducted and how later German campaigns
emerged out of solutions to the mistakes of 1939. Its narrative and
detailed maps, images, and appendices should be an asset to those
interested in the Polish wartime experience, and a complement to the
literature on antisemitic violence and police and Wehrmacht
brutalization. Forczyk's study of the collapse of Poland and the
start of the Second World War is the only account available in
English that considers all three opponents in the campaign. It
demonstrates clearly that the Wehrmacht in 1939 was not already an
institution capable of defeating France or invading the Soviet Union
but that it developed from its experiences in Poland--and that it had
to do so.

Citation: Jadwiga Biskupska. Review of Forczyk, Robert, _Case White:
The Invasion of Poland 1939_. H-Poland, H-Net Reviews. July, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55304

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.




-- 
Best regards,

Andrew Stewart
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