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correct link: http://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2014/06/25/iraq-and-syria-the-struggle-against-the-multi-sided-counterrevolution/ The one you provided takes you to the Edit Blog page. On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 12:05 PM, Michael Karadjis via Marxism < marxism@lists.csbs.utah.edu> wrote: > ====================================================================== > Rule #1: YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message. > ====================================================================== > > > Iraq and Syria: The struggle against the multi-sided counterrevolution > > https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/wp-admin/post.php?post= > 151&action=edit&message=6&postpost=v2 > > As a coalition of Sunni-based forces, including the Islamic State of Iraq > and Sham (ISIS), took the major northern Iraqi city of Mosul and then most > of the Sunni heartland in the north and west of Iraq, regional and western > capitals went into crisis mode: the entire post-US occupation stabilisation > had collapsed in a heap. > > And the coalition leading this revolt consists of none other than the same > forces which led the Iraqi resistance to US occupation throughout the > middle years of the last decade. Yes, once again the arch-reactionary ISIS > itself has revealed its brutality, with reported mass killing of captured > soldiers, a crime against humanity; in the same way that monstrous acts, > such as bombing work queues and Shiite mosques, were carried out during the > anti-US resistance by al-Qaida in Iraq (ie, what became ISIS); horrific > repression is partly to blame for breeding horrific reactions. In both > cases however, this most violent and irrational element does not define the > movement, still less explain its strength. > > These events involve both Syria and Iraq, with their long, relatively > open, border occupied on both sides by ISIS. The rise of ISIS can be > connected to two momentous events: the American Guernica on Iraq 2003-2008, > and the vast multi-sided Iraqi resistance to that invasion and occupation; > and the vast popular revolution in Syria, and the Assad regime’s Guernica > to suppress it over 2011-2014. In both cases, the victims have been > overwhelmingly Iraqi and Syrian Sunni Arabs – the vast Sunni majority in > Syria, and the significant Sunni minority in Iraq. > > It is in the context of this overwhelming disaster faced by the Sunni > masses of Syria and Iraq, and mass resistance to it, that ISIS has been > able to grow, representing the most extreme and most sectarian reaction to > this dual blitzkrieg. > > Iraq and Syria: the forces ranged against both regimes and ISIS > > It is important to understand, however, that in neither Syria nor Iraq is > ISIS the only opposition, among the disenfranchised Sunni masses, and the > popular masses more generally, to the sectarian-based capitalist regimes in > power. While the media focus has been about “regime(s) versus ISIS,” in > reality, in both countries, there are three main forces in contention: > > 1. The Bashar al-Assad and Nuri al-Maliki regimes. Both are > sectarian-based regimes: the Assad regime is a “secular” totalitarian > regime heavily based among the elite of the Alawite religious minority; the > Maliki regime is a sectarian, semi-theocratic, Shiite regime closely > aligned with both the former US occupier, that facilitated its rise to > power, and with the Shiite theocracy in neighbouring Iran. > > 2. The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), the most extreme Sunni > sectarian and theocratic movement in the region, which has set up its own > semi-state over parts of Syria and Iraq. A descendant of al-Qaida in Iraq, > ISIS was disowned by al-Qaida last year for being unnecessarily and > embarrassingly barbaric (though in fact the disagreement went back as far > as 2005). It represents an “opposing counterrevolution,” formed partially > from within the ranks of the uprisings. > > 3. In between, a vast opposition to the regimes which is also distinct > from ISIS, in open war with it in Syria, and on and off at war with it in > Iraq: > > In Iraq, this consists of a range of “Sunni tribes” and other Sunni > militias which have, over the last year or so, alternatively been fighting > the regime alongside ISIS, or fighting against ISIS. This includes Sunni > militia that were part of the Iraqi resistance to US occupation, whether > pro-Saddam Baathist, Islamist or otherwise nationalist; and Sunni groups > that were mobilised by the US and Saudi Arabia into the “Sawha” (Awakening) > movement that helped defeat al-Qaida in 2007-8, but have since become > disenchanted with the Shiite sectarian regime they had been drawn into > propping up. > > In Syria, this consists of all the armed manifestations of the Syrian > revolution, from the secular Free Syrian Army (FSA, based heavily among the > Sunni but not entirely, including some Alawite and Christian brigades and > officers), moderate Islamist groups like the Mujahideen Army in the north > and the al-Ajnad Union in the south, the Islamic Front, a loose coalition > ranging from moderate to hard-line Islamists, and Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN), > the official wing of al-Qaida in Syria, which however is markedly less > hard-line than ISIS since their split in May 2013. While a favourite > western media discourse is “rebel in-fighting,” in reality this does not > exist at all; rather, all these forces act in unison in their war against > both the Assad regime and ISIS; it is the war of all of them against ISIS > that wrongly gets labelled this way. > > These two struggles are related but different. The Syrian struggle began > as a multi—sect democratic uprising which however has tended to become more > Sunni in composition largely due to the class realities in Syrian society; > the Iraqi struggle is explicitly Sunni against an explicitly > Shiite-sectarian regime, and evolved out of a nationalist resistance to US > occupation. The more advanced sectors of the Syrian revolution still hope > to win non-Sunni support for a rising against then regime, no matter how > unlikely that may now be; by contrast, the Iraqi revolt only aims to > liberate Sunni regions – the ISIS-led attempt to conquer Shiite-dominated > Baghdad or any other Shiite region would by definition by a reactionary and > sectarian action. > > What accounts for strength of ISIS? > > What then accounts for the particular strength of ISIS, given that most > accounts do not credit ISIS with superior numbers of troops to other > resistance movements (indeed in Syria at least ISIS is vastly outnumbered, > perhaps 10 to 1, yet in the second half of 2013 had taken control over much > rebel-held territory before being expelled in January 2014)? > > Full: https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/wp-admin/post.php?post= > 151&action=edit&message=6&postpost=v2 > ________________________________________________ > Send list submissions to: Marxism@lists.csbs.utah.edu > Set your options at: http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/ > options/marxism/acpollack2%40gmail.com > ________________________________________________ Send list submissions to: Marxism@lists.csbs.utah.edu Set your options at: http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
