In Defense of Washington and Wall Street
Robert Fitch
 

1. The Crisis of 2007-2008
THE VERY ELDERLY ARE PRONE TO FALL. And 
unlike infants who also tumble frequently, each time seniors stumble, they risk 
a disabling or even a fatal injury. 
On August 9th 2007, after an unparalleled quarter century long expansion, which 
had been checked in the developed 
countries only mildly and briefly, capitalism finally tripped and lost its 
balance with predictable results: banks tottered, while credit and commercial 
paper markets writhed in paralysis.

After about a month, though, notwithstanding 
the failure of the markets to unfreeze, the crisis was declared over. The 
palsied patient was deemed well enough to 
resume normal activity -- a diagnosis apparently confirmed when two months 
later, on October 9th, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average reached 14,164, an all time high.

The March 2008 meltdown of two hedge funds 
belonging to Bear, Stearns suggested otherwise. A pillar of the "shadow banking 
system" that had emerged over the 
last two decades, Bear was forced into liquidation, sold to J.P. Morgan for 
$256 million. Scarcely more than a year
 earlier it was said to be worth $68.7 billion. Yet this stunning write-down 
barely moved Wall Street's needle. 
The market continued to move choppily until September 14th 2008, when Mr. FIRE 
(as in finance, insurance and real 
estate) fell again, with even more dire consequences. That Sunday, Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Later in 
the day, Merrill, Lynch announced its liquidation. Just two days later, AIG, 
the world's largest insurance company, 
was taken over by the government. This time, Wall Street had suffered the 
equivalent of a broken neck.

Even in the immediate aftermath of the 
1929 Crash, the biggest Wall Street banks didn't fail. They continued to lend. 
(The wave of failures by thousands 
of heartland banks came later.) But in 2008, it was precisely the big banks 
which formed the leading vector of 
the collapse. Within a period of 200 days, the five biggest U.S. investment 
banking houses -- the institutions 
that since the Reagan era had given Wall Street its swagger and identity -- had 
either gone bankrupt, or forced to find 
a merger partner or re-organized themselves as bank holding companies.

Whenever the spinal cord is severed at the
 top two vertebrae, i.e., at the neck, the greatest immediate peril is that the 
victim stops breathing. The September 
2008 crisis was marked by increasingly desperate measures to keep big FIRE from 
asphyxiation. The measures taken included 
flooding the system with liquidity -- almost unlimited loans and loan 
guarantees. The Bush Administration came up 
with a $700 billion plan to deleverage the banks (i.e., raise their dangerously 
low ratio of equity to debt) by
 buying their bad mortgage-backed securities. And when that didn't work, passed 
legislation which amounted to a 
semi-nationalization of the remaining big banks -- the equivalent of cutting a 
hole in the patient's trachea.

By October's end FIRE was breathing, albeit
 with a tube provided by the U.S. guarantee of inter bank loans. But breathing 
is not walking. A financial system 
in which banks lend only to other banks refusing to act as intermediaries to 
the non-financial sector-- is still non-functional.


In the midst of the anarchy, the headline 
"Capitalism in Convulsion" appeared not in The Militant or The People's World, 
but in the August, salmon colored pages 
of The Financial Times.1 Unlike the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis 
or the dot.com bust which were more or 
less confined to the G-7 countries, or the Asian, Mexican, Argentinean crises 
-- which remained localized within the 
Third World -- the crisis of 2007-8 was truly global. It spread from America to 
Europe to Latin America to Asia 
and even to remote Iceland which was all but officially bankrupt and forced to 
await rescue from the IMF. Nor was 
the crisis confined to capitalism's financial sub-system. Production was 
shrinking, consumption was off. Even foreign 
trade, the main driver of the world economy, was contracting. "There is a real 
possibility of a real, deep, international 
depression," said one senior monetary official at a G20 meeting in Dubai who 
spoke on the condition of anonymity, calling 
the crisis "the worst in 100 years."2

2. The Meaning of the Meltdown
IN 1989, THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL was widely
 interpreted as a failure of the Communist system. But not by its supporters. 
They favored minimalist interpretations.
 Liberal Stalinists saw it as a reaction to certain overzealous GDR officials 
in the security apparatus; conservatives
 as the failure of those same officials to contain the illegal exodus. Still 
others blamed Soviet Premier Gorbachev's 
blundering efforts to deregulate the Soviet system, which they insisted was 
still fundamentally sound.

Similarly, the present crisis can be interpreted 
in various ways. Not as the result of inherent, structural, repeated, and 
irredeemable tendencies within the capitalist 
system. But as altogether something more surmountable. Democrats have pointed 
to a failure of capitalism's financial 
sub-system, i.e., of Wall Street -- where greed ran amok -- and in Washington 
where officials refused to rein in 
the Street's wildest propensities. By repealing the depression era 
Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, the argument runs, 
Congress demolished the pillar of the old regulatory architecture. And it 
declared off limits any supervision of the new,
 escalating trade in opaque forms of over-the-counter derivatives.3

Republicans, while not immune to the widely 
popular "greedy" banker trope, tended mostly to blame capitalism's regulators 
-- above all blundering by Fed 
Chairman Alan Greenspan, who allegedly, in the aftermath of the 2001 dot.com 
collapse, held interest rates "too low,
 too long." He should have kept his hands off the monetary joystick.

The implosion interrupted what might be called
 "The Big Sleep of the American Left": our failure to exert a detectible 
influence on working class institutions or on 
American political life as a whole. The sleepy time coincides roughly with the 
quarter century long boom which began in 
1983 with the recovery from the stagflation crisis of the seventies. Throughout 
the period, as the global economy
 continued its unparalleled dizzying ascent, 19th century supply side economics 
experienced a revival. Not just the 
napkin version preached by Arthur Laffer, who argued that if you want to 
increase tax revenues, cut tax rates. But an 
over-arching argument about the nature of capitalism and its powers of 
adjustment.

The 19th century classic writers -- James Mill, 
J.B. Say, David Ricardo -- taught that market failures or "gluts" were 
impossible. Temporary over-supply in this or 
that market for shoes or hats or handkerchiefs, yes. A generalized over-supply, 
of shoes, hats and handkerchiefs all 
at the same time, no.4 So absent meddling by government authorities, 
depressions were not a possibility. Markets 
would always self-adjust because market agents -- suppliers of labor and 
capital -- would behave rationally. Workers,
 seeing that they had priced themselves out of the market, would work harder 
and lower their wages. Holders of capital
 would lower interest rates, which would reduce saving and spur investment.

Acceptance of the simple supply side formula, 
"supply creates its own demand" bred confidence among the believers. The 
concerns of Keynes, who worried about "effective
 demand," and the notions of Marx, who argued that the scramble for profits 
created its own barrier, could be dismissed 
as groundless. And as America's ruined central cities sprang back to life from 
the arson and abandonment of the seventies
 and the stores filled up with cheap Asian goods and American designed 
microchips powered a global technoboom, with 
unemployment falling to record lows, a lite version of supply side economics 
quietly permeated the Left -- in the 
assumption that "post-industrial" capitalism was more or less impregnable in 
its First World stronghold.

Perhaps understandably, sections of the Left 
began to lose interest in the struggles going on in the material world around 
them, re-grouping around the priority 
of culture wars and even for some science wars. And while economic radicalism 
didn't disappear, the burden of its 
critique lay in the idea of an unequal exchange between first and third world 
countries, which prevented less developed 
raw material producing nations from industrializing. The idea of class wars 
within nations gave way to the notion of 
"proletarian nations."5 Socialism became strictly a Third World option. The 
Left could try to assist the special victims
 of First World capitalism -- blacks, women, minorities, immigrants. But not 
American workers. As Michael Kazin observed, 
very few American leftists invoked the link between labor and the creation of 
wealth and capital and the appropriation of 
that wealth which had been at the core of American radicalism from the 19th 
century to the 1940s.6 Speculation about 
transforming first world capitalist institutions became about as respectable as 
spoon bending.


One consequence of the 2007-8 economic tsumani
 is to wash away the foundations of the intellectual world of the sensible 
center.7 But much of the Left's outlook rested 
tacitly on those same foundations. As well as its secret sense that it had no 
genuine vocation for politics except on the 
margins of American life.

Perhaps the collapse of financial markets hasn't 
yet produced a mass market for ideas about democratic control of the economy. 
Yet there appears at least to be a 
niche. Are markets always wiser than majorities? Would the majority of 
Americans have voted in a plebiscite for 
deindustrialization? At a minimum, now that a Republican administration has 
ordered a semi-nationalization of banks 
and insurance companies, the supply side era is over, creating the potential 
for a Left socialist revival. But 
not without challenging the minimalist interpretations of the great meltdown 
put forward by the two mainstream political parties.


3. Three Things I Learned About Crises From Marx
THE DEPTH AND SCOPE OF THE MELTDOWN have
 made Marx fashionable once again at least in Europe, the BBC reports.8 But 
acquiring the intellectual resources 
for the challenge is not simply a matter of mining Marxian texts. If there is a 
Marxian road to understanding the crisis,
 it's a cloverleaf highway - with many ways to get on and get off, and each 
turn-off resulting in a different political
 direction. There are many Marxist schools. And each explains crises in 
different ways - as the result of underconsumption;
 of overproduction; in terms of the falling rate of profit; or as a consequence 
of the disproportionality between 
growth rates in consumer and producer good sectors.9

Notwithstanding the impossibility of establishing
 a true Marxist interpretation of the crisis, his powerful, suggestive, but 
mostly undeveloped crisis analysis contains
 three contentious insights which provide a scaffold for grasping the present 
events. The first might be called the
 "universal dynamism" thesis. Supply-siders accept it but most modern Marxists 
don't. Marx portrayed capitalism as an
 inexorable accumulation machine whose dynamism is fed by the behavior of 
multiple competitive capitalists all forced 
to consume productively rather than personally, all relentlessly recycling 
their profits back into the enterprise. All 
searching for a way to reduce costs. This feature turned capitalism into a 
uniquely dynamic and expansive system: one 
whose dynamism could not be confined to its Western countries of origin. The 
spread of English commerce, he argued, 
albeit restricted at first to opium, would "lay the material foundations of 
Western society in Asia."10

At the same time -- and here's where supply siders 
get off the bus and neo- Marxists get back on -- Marx recognized capitalist 
development traced no smooth, upward, 
untroubled arc. Growth was achieved only through system shattering crises -- 
"business cycles" -- which proved comprehensively 
destructive.11 In the abrupt swing from world prosperity to world depression, 
tens of millions were doomed to 
unemployment and the dole; economic upheaval would shatter normal trade 
relations, freeze immigration and promote economic
 nationalism and political dynamite -- in the form of left/right polarization 
leading to dictatorship, fascism and war.

Finally, there's the least accepted Marxian 
argument about crises: his claim that they have their origin in the "real" 
sector of the economy - where commodities were 
produced -- not in the financial sector where the crisis almost invariably 
breaks out. "At first glance," Marx writes, 
"the whole crisis seems to be merely a credit and money crisis." But look 
again, he advises, and you see that the unsaleable
 securities represent unsaleable commodities. Or in our own immediate case the 
oversupply of mortgage backed securities 
represents the oversupply of houses, and ultimately an oversupply of capital in 
general. In this way, the crisis 
expresses in a violent way capitalism's fundamental conflict: Capitalism 
develops awesomely large productive forces 
whose limits are checked by the requirement that production be profitable.12 To 
avoid depressing the profit rate, productive capital saves instead of 
investing, transferring its 
saving from the productive sphere, seeking shelter in the financial system 
where productive capital is turned into credit 
or financial capital. Indeed, too much. "But credit," Marx wrote, only 
"accelerates the violent outbreaks of the crisis."13 To accelerate something is 
not to cause it.14


4. Explaining The Meltdown

THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 2007-8 CRISIS was 
the imploding of what Yale Professor Robert Shiller called the greatest real 
estate bubble in U.S. history or possibly 
even world history. Between 1996 and 2005, house prices nationwide increased 
about 90 percent. In the five years 
between 2000 to 2005 alone, house prices increased by roughly 60 percent.15 
That hadn't happened even in the 
real estate boom of the 1920s, whose premonitory bust in 1926 gestured wildly 
but vainly at the still greater 
collapse to come in 1929. While the inner mechanics of the individual parts 
that make up the self-destructive bubble 
apparatus are famously complex -- the SPVs SIVs, the CDOs, CDSs and other 
"financial dark matter" -- the mechanics
 of the collapse itself are fairly straightforward.

It's not necessary to understand quantum 
mechanics to grasp why an apple falls to the ground. Newtonian mechanics will 
suffice. Nor do we need to study the 
structure of DNA to know why old people fall -- they take slower and shorter 
steps. Similarly, by concentrating 
on the intricacies of frenzied finance on Wall Street and faulty regulatory 
mechanisms in DC, we lose perspective 
on the ultimate as opposed to the proximate causes of the world crisis.

The ultimate cause of the 2007-8 crisis was 
not the pricking of the real estate bubble in the United States, but the 
implosion of the greatest and longest global 
expansion in the history of capitalism going back to the first industrial 
revolution (1760-1830). The rapid transformation, 
particularly of the Chinese and Indian economies, produced a super boom that 
blew away all norms for economic 
expansion.16 World GDP rates rose to unprecedented levels - peaking at 6 
percent in 2007, six times higher than the rate 
during the first industrial revolution.

And what drove the boom? Notwithstanding the 
core claim of the sensible center that the nature of the period was defined by 
the rise of post-industrialism 
and the fall of the blue collar worker who would go the way of the peasant, the 
boom was shaped by record rates
of manufacturing growth and even higher rates of growth in manufacturing trade. 
The increase in manufacturing itself 
was fed by a world-reshaping, mass migration of manufacturing capital from the 
more developed to the less developed countries.
 Capital was attracted by appalling, but ultimately ravishingly high rates of 
labor exploitation -- to India, which was 
emerging as the world's back office, but above all to China, which became the 
world's workshop, employing 109 million 
manufacturing workers. (Versus 53 million in the G7 countries.)17 In the United 
States, median hourly manufacturing 
wage was $17.85 an hour.18 In China, manufacturing workers in the coastal 
provinces earned 91 cents an hour at productivity 
rates increasingly converging with those in the United States19 (inland workers 
earned 57 cents an hour.)20

The long boom that began in 1983 saw astonishing
 reversals of economic structure -- particularly in the United States where the 
FIRE industry displaced manufacturing 
and all others -- as the leading industry by GDP share. In 1983, at the 
beginning of the boom, manufacturing was still 
larger than FIRE. By 2007, the FIRE sector had become 1.8 times the size of the 
manufacturing sector.21 There were equally
 bizarre reversals of economic fortune, as the United States once the world's 
prime creditor nation, became its greatest
 debtor nation, with poor nations -- most prominently China -- among its 
largest creditors.

Yet despite these startling novelties, the 
present boom has ended in overproduction and over-consumption just like the 
classic booms of the past. Consider the 
world depressions that began in 1837, 1873 and 1929. For these crises, like the 
implosion of 2007-08, the following 
seven stage sequence can serve as a model:


A fall in the rate of accumulation, or at least 
a fall in the rate of acceleration; actual profit rates may even rise just 
before the collapse; but the high rates are 
sustained by a slowing down of accumulation rates.

Formation of surplus capital hoards. Unable to 
return "home" for productive re-investment, the surplus seeks to preserve 
itself by moving into financial channels.

Capital over-supply forces down interest rates,
 clearing the way for asset inflation and financial excess. First because low 
interest rates automatically increase the 
value of fictitious capital in land and in securities; and second because low 
interest rates cause risk premiums to fall, 
promoting riskier behavior as rentiers chase yield.

Asset bubbles form as speculators are attracted
 by the seemingly inexorable rise in asset prices. Prices accelerate further 
because of rampant bubble psychology.

The chain letter snaps. Housing prices burst 
the bounds of household incomes. Stock prices soar far beyond historic 
price/earnings ratio. Prices collapse. A local 
financial crisis breaks out among the most vulnerable borrowers, who can no 
longer re-finance, leaving the most recent 
round of developers and mortgage holders unable to pay off their loans, and/or 
stock speculators can't cover margin 
calls from their brokers. Asset prices collapse, taking down credit suppliers.

A spreading of the financial ripples outward 
from their point of origin, as asset deflation produces a global panic. And 
finally -- but not yet of course in 2007-08:

Protracted economic stagnation; widespread 
double-digit unemployment rates; falling wages and commodity prices; growing 
economic nationalism and a tendency 
towards "organized capitalism."


There are two main differences between this 
seven step scenario and the mainstream accounts. Regulatory and monetary 
explanations see the problem as U.S. centered. 
Obviously the United States can't be ignored -- the meltdown began here. But 
the emphasis must be on global imbalances. 
True, the United States is over-consuming. But the rest of the world is 
over-producing. The second difference is the 
emphasis on how excesses in the real sector -- the capital glut and the 
resulting low interest rates -- produce wilding 
in the FIRE sector. By contrast, mainstream models 
reverse the causal arrow so that financial and real estate excess bring down an 
essentially healthy real sector.

Except for the wrongheadedness of Greenspan or 
the antics of a comparative handful of hedge fund operators, mainstreamers then 
see no reason why the expansion should not 
go on indefinitely. They don't look at a twenty-five year expansion as being 
the equivalent of a twenty-five year old 
dog. The bubble simply erupted. But whence? Either exogenously -- outside the 
system -- by dodgy regulators who disrupted
 the economy's natural path towards self-correction -- in the Republican 
version; or in the Democratic version the bubble 
is produced endogenously -- in the FIRE sector -- aided by dodgy regulators who 
look the other way at speculative excess.

The Democrats cite a whole host of regulatory 
failures. There's the problem of fragmented regulation -the Fed regulates 
banks; the SEC stocks; the states insurance 
companies. They point to de-regulatory measures like the repeal of 
Glass-Steagall. Then there's the embarrassment of 
private regulation -- ceding securities rating to the conflict-of-interest 
laden private rating agencies. Even more serious
 perhaps is the absence of new regulation for new institutions -- e.g., failure 
to bring Over -the-Counter derivative 
trading under control; ditto the emergence of a shadow banking system, which 
created "a de facto assembly line for purchasing, packaging, and selling 
unregistered, high- risk securities."22

The Republicans -- along with their economic
 mentors in academia -- supply-siders, monetarists, Austrians and Chicagoans -- 
often talk about too stringent 
regulation -- like the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1978. The 
Democratic Administration, they allege, 
allowed community groups like ACORN to coerce giant banks into making hundreds 
of billions of dollars in loans to 
unqualified minority borrowers. But mostly they focus on the interest rate 
activism of Alan Greenspan. The "too low too
 long" mantra -- the fed funds rate, they point out, remained below two percent 
from 2002-2004.

One problem with the explanation is that the
 bubble didn't start in 2002. It was already underway in 1996. As Robert 
Shiller points out, it lasted three times 
longer than the period of monetary laxity. Bubble growth continued to 
accelerate even in 1999 when the Fed was 
tightening. Moreover, 30 year mortgage rates were mostly unresponsive to Fed 
moves at the short term end of the interest curve.23

What's more, if the U.S. bubble was simply 
the result of a Fed policy error -- why did real estate bubbles form all around 
the world? Bubbles in Spain, Ireland,
 U.K. and perhaps the mother of all bubbles in Shanghai, where 1 million 
apartments were built in a single year -- as
 opposed to 2 million in the peak year for the entire United States. And the 
average apartment was $300,000 in a city
 where the median household income is $2,000.24 By comparison, the median 
household income in Queens is $42,000. If the
 same income to housing price ratio obtained in Queens, the average housing 
price would be $6.3 million.

Perhaps even more challenging to the Greenspan 
as the Grinch Who Stole Prosperity model is the comparable behavior of German 
bank regulators. Roughly speaking between 
2002-4, overnight interest rates charged by German banks were only about a 
percent higher than the federal funds rate. 
German rates were kept low for longer than in the United States. Yet there was 
no German real estate bubble. The same 
could be said for Switzerland and Austria: very low interest rates, no real 
estate bubble.

What German banks, along with their Swiss,
 Austrian and west European counterparts, do have instead is an emerging market 
nations bubble: $4.7 trillion in 
cross-border bank loans to Eastern Europe, Latin America and emerging Asia 
extended during the global credit boom. 
It's a sum, according to a Bank for International Settlements reckoning, that 
"vastly exceeds the scale of both the 
U. S. sub- prime and Alt-A debacles."25

There are many ways to build a bubble.
 Different countries have different architectural styles. America, with the 
most advanced entreprenurial culture, 
has the most complex: a financial engineering industry -- the United States 
invented such financial gimmicks as 
securitization, the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), and the Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDOs).
 But the central European method, while more traditional, works just as well. 
Austrian bankers simply lend huge 
amounts to their favorite clients, the Hungarians. Lending money to Hungarians 
who can't pay them back is an 
Austrian tradition that goes back to the early 19th century when the Rothschild 
Creditanstalt no sooner financed 
the Hungarian railway system when it abruptly failed. Hungarian loans were a 
major factor in the collapse of Creditanstalt
 again in 1931 which took down an estimated 60- 80 percent of Austrian industry 
triggering the European great 
depression.26 This time Austrian banks have lent 85 percent of their GDP to 
Hungarians, who have an external debt worth 
about 100 percent of their GDP.

Ideally, strict, comprehensive, incorruptible 
regulation could have stopped all this over-lending to under- qualified 
borrowers dead in its tracks. But in what world 
do regulatory bureaucrats, barking and snapping like Welsh corgis herding 
cattle, determine the moves of bankers? Certainly
 not in ours, where the relevant laws that create the framework for regulation 
are passed by legislatures influenced 
not by concerns for macro-economic stability, but by the strength of relevant 
lobbies. In our world, the FIRE lobby is 
the largest by far.27

Even if the regulators had more power, and there 
were a lot more of them, it's not clear how they could be so effective as to 
prevent another Long Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) from happening. LTCM showed that one renegade hedge fund, is all it 
takes to ignite a crisis when the fields of 
capital are very dry. What regulator would second guess a team of Nobel Prize 
winners or fathom their formulas for risk
 or even decipher their complex trades?28 And even if legislators and 
regulators somehow summoned up the political 
will and financial sophistication to tame rogue genius lenders, why wouldn't 
the traders who like to discount risk 
simply de-camp for some less regulated place? As Chairman Bernanke observed in 
the immediate aftermath of the
 Bear Stearns collapse: "The oversight of these firms must recognize the 
distinctive features of investment banking 
and take care neither to unduly inhibit efficiency and innovation nor to induce 
a migration of risk-taking activities 
to institutions that are less regulated or beyond our borders."29

Historically, the influence of regulators is
 pro-cyclical, least evident when it's most needed. Regulations are strictest 
in the aftermath of a collapse, 
weakest during the manias. Glass Steagall, comprehensive legislation taming the 
securities behavior of big banks, 
passed in 1933; it was repealed in 1999 at the height of the dot.com boom.

Evidently, what chiefly regulates bankers' 
behavior is not regulators but conditions in the money market. What the great 
depressions of 1837, 1873, and 1929 
share with the present crisis is a huge inflow of surplus capital into 
financial centers which drives down interest 
rates and alters banking standards and norms.

That such a surplus formed prior to the 2007-8 
crisis there is little doubt. A big policy debate broke out in 2005 involving 
Bernanke, and critics of U.S. 
monetary policy over its provenance and meaning.30 Both pointed to the U.S. 
current account deficit as proof of the
 surplus. But Fed critics called it a "liquidity glut." The hundreds of 
billions flowing uphill each year from poor 
Asian countries to wealthy America were driven by the hydraulics of U.S. 
monetary policies. Overly stimulative U.S. 
policies enabled the U..S. to over consume and over borrow. Martin Wolf, editor 
of the Financial Times, noted that the 
United States had absorbed 70 per cent of the rest of the world's surplus 
capital, while its consumption accounted for 
91 percent of the increase in gross domestic product in this decade.31

Bernanke, who in 2005 was just a Fed governor, 
defended U.S. posture and policies. He took note of the bizarre role reversal 
-- Scrooge borrowing from Tiny Tim --
 but argued that the surplus took the form of a "savings glut." And the Chinese 
were its agents. The United States was 
just reacting to the Chinese decision to save so great a portion of their 
income. Well over a trillion was now mostly 
invested in U.S. Treasuries and government sponsored enterprises. China's 
savings rate -- managed by the state -- had 
reached a staggering 50 percent. Even Chinese households on their comparatively 
tiny incomes saved 30 percent. 
The U.S. private households, which at the beginning of the superboom were 
saving nearly 10 percent, now have negative 
savings. But Americans were making the best of a situation not of their making, 
acting as Stakhanovite consumers in 
order to promote the continuation of global expansion. U.S. borrowing was 
necessary to protect the world from imminent collapse.

A striking feature of Bernanke's account -- 
as well as that of his adversaries who assert the liquidity thesis -- is that 
neither think trade has anything to do 
with the trade deficit. Explains Bernanke, "The U.S. trade balance is the tail 
of the dog; for the most part, it has 
been passively determined by foreign and domestic 
incomes, asset prices, interest rates, and exchange rates, which are themselves 
the products of more fundamental driving forces."

For the economists, the financial markets 
determine the markets for commodities. Any nation could have a giant trade 
surplus; it's ultimately just a policy choice 
about savings behavior. The country with the giant surplus just happened to be 
China. Utterly ignored is the fact that
 trade surplus/ capital glut could never have formed without staggeringly high 
rates of labor exploitation in the strict 
Marxian sense: the ratio of value added by labor divided by wages.32 As far as 
what drove the boom and what caused the 
bust, it's the rate of exploitation that's the dog. The savings rate is the 
tail.

Conclusion
MARX TALKS FREQUENTLY about the capitalist's 
"wolfish hunger" for profit and his ravenous appetite for capital accumulation. 
It's no small irony that the most 
wolfish and ravenous capitalists in history should turn out to be Chinese 
Communist Party officials trained to revere Marx. But that doesn't detract from 
the serviceability of Marxian premises about
 capitalist dynamics. Whose fault is the crisis? Chinese over-exporting or 
American over-importing? "It should be noted in 
regard to imports and exports," Marx observes, "that one after another, all 
countries become involved in a crisis and 
that it then becomes evident that all of them with few exceptions, have 
exported and imported too much. So that they all
 have an unfavorable balance of payments."33

Marx wouldn't have been surprised at the failure 
of the once highly touted $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program. "The 
entire artificial system of forced expansion of 
the reproduction process cannot, of course, be remedied by having some bank, 
like the Bank of England, give to all the 
swindlers the deficient capital by means of its paper and having it buy up all 
the depreciated commodities at their old 
nominal values."34 Making the swindlers whole does nothing to restore 
profitability in the real sector.

The global rupture that's taken place over the
 last 15 months suggests a pattern of growth -- a global division of labor -- 
that has grown not just increasingly 
unwieldy, but probably unsustainable. How can the "imbalances" be fixed unless 
the United States becomes a producer as
 well as a consumer of commodities? But how can the United States become a 
producer on the world market given the vast 
disparity in rates of exploitation? Only in a post-industrial world which never 
existed. How can the United States 
continue to consume Chinese products without Chinese credit -- which is 
dependent on unsustainable American consumption?
 No doubt adjustments can be made -- both China and the United States can 
de-globalize. But such necessarily wrenching 
transformations take time, more like decades than years.

No doubt there is something comforting about the 
world of the sensible center where greedy bankers, bad regulators or too much 
regulation brings doom and disaster. At 
least we remain masters of our fate. At least the virtues still count -- if we 
can only renew our commitment to them. 
In the capitalist world as described by Marx -- and this is perhaps the insight 
most in need of refurbishing -- we 
think we're actors but we're not. Capitalism is the form of society that must 
ruthlessly develop the productive forces, 
but it develops them in a form that turns their agents into passive victims of 
the process.

The reassuring side of Marx's view of capital 
expansion and collapse is the opportunity it offers for a revival of the spirit 
of resistance among the working people:

"Without the great alternative phases of dullness, 
prosperity, over-excitement, crisis, and distress, which modern industry 
traverses in periodically recurring cycles…with
 the up and down of wages resulting from them …the working class… would be a 
heart-broken, a weak- minded worn-out 
unresisting mass whose self-emancipation would prove as impossible as that of 
the slaves of ancient Greece and Rome."35

Class struggle is the best stimulus package.

Notes

John Plender,"Capitalism in Convulsion,"
 Financial Times, September 18, 2008. return

Thomas Atkins, "Depression overshadows G20 summit," Reuters, November 10, 2008. 
return

See for example Joseph Stiglitz. return

See Capital, III, 251-2 for Marx's definition 
of "absolute overproduction" and its cause. return

A core notion of Mussolini and various fascist intellectuals like Corradini, 
re-cycled by Mao and filtering down 
to the Third Worldist Left in the 70's. return

The Populist Persuasion, (New York: Basic Books, 
1995). 273 return

A self-referential term used by such as The
 Brookings Institution, the Democratic Leadership Council and Colin Powell. 
return

BBC, "Marx popular amid credit crunch," Oct.
 20, 2008. return

Michael Bleaney, Underconsumption Theories 
(New York: International Publishers, 1976), esp. ch.6. return

"Future Results of British Rule in India,"
 Portable Marx, 337; see also Capital, III, 333-334. return

Mainstream economics -- particularly "supply side" economics which flourished 
during the Long Boom -- was able to grasp #1 but not #2. While acknowledging 
problem of inequality, they 
maintained that people were still better off than before; And insisted that 
true system-shattering crises were 
impossible. Economists influential on the American Left rejected both #1, and 
#2. They saw capitalism sunk in protracted
 stagnation; and argued, just like the Russian 19th century populists that the 
only way to develop productive forces in 
third world was some form of de-linkage. return

Capital, Vol III (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1966), p.490. return

Vol. III, Ch.27, p. 441. return

A point made by an anonymous blogger who 
insists that Marx is obsolete because he fails to realize that the crisis 
really is caused by machinations of the 
financial sector. return

Ben S. Bernanke, "Remarks on the economic o
utlook," At the International Monetary Conference, Barcelona, Spain (via 
satellite), June 3, 2008. return

A genuine boom, marked by unprecedented growth
 in productivity, and not a super-bubble, as George Soros argues. See The New 
Paradigm for Financial Markets (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2008) esp. ch.5 "The Super-Bubble Hypothesis" return

Judith Bannister, "Manufacturing Employment 
in China," BLS, Monthly Review, July, 2005. return

BLS, "Earnings." return

RIETI, "Benchmarking Industrial Competitiveness
 by International Comparison of Productivity," Dec. 26, 2006. return

Judith Banister, "Manufacturing Earnings and 
compensation in China," BLS Monthly Labor Review, November 2005. return

BEA, Gross Domestic Product by Industry Accounts,
 1947-2007. Between 1983 and 2007 financial profits rose from 17 percent to 
nearly 40 percent of all corporate profits ERP, 
Table B-91, 2008. return

Christopher Whalen, "Expanding Fed's Power is
 Wrong Plan," American Banker, April 4, 2008. return

The Subprime Solution, 49. return

Don Lee, "A Home Boom Busts," Los Angeles Times, 
Jan. 8, 2006. return

"Alt -A" stands for Alternative A. It's a euphemism 
for mortgages slightly less dodgy than sub-prime mortgages. See here. return

Niall Fergusson, The House of Rothschild 
1849- 1999. 465. return

Opensecrets.org credits FIRE with approximately 
$2.76 in lobbying expenditures between 1996 and 2008. return

Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed,
 (New York: Random House, 2000), 187. return

Ben S. Bernanke, "Financial Regulation and Financial Stability, July 8, 2008. 
return

For savings glut thesis see here. For the 
liquidity glut view see StanleyRoach. return

Martin Wolf, "Villains and victims of global 
capital flows," Financial Times June 12 2007 return

In Marxian terminology, the ratio of surplus 
value(s) over variable capital (v) or s/v., 
which is also the ratio of paid to unpaid labor. return

Vol. III, ch. 30, p. 491. return

Vol III, ch.30. p. 490. return

New York Daily Tribune, July 14, 1853, cited
 in Lezek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, (New York: W.W.Norton, 2005), 
248 return


 

BOB FITCH studied economic history at Berkeley 
in the 1960s where he also co-founded the Vietnam Day Committee with Jerry 
Rubin. His latest book is Solidarity For Sale 
(Public Affairs, 2006). 
 


 

Contents of No. 46

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