In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Apr 2020: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Apr 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2020-04-30 5384 EMIRATES-INTERNET 2017-02-17 2020-04-23 15802 DU-AS1 2018-09-22 2020-04-27 50597 ScopeSky 2018-10-09 2020-04-24 200697 Dijla-ISP 2020-04-08 2020-04-25 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list Menog@lists.menog.org http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
