> Yes you are right to point out the vagueness in the PKI spec draft I > sent you. Mixnets like Tor require a PKI that clients can query to
Of course I'm not saying that mixnets and Tor are the same... whereas
Tor does no mixing. Although the similarities are useful when
discussing the PKI because they both have similar needs.
Ania also coauthored another recent paper about mixnets that has some
interesting uses for their PKI to help prevent byzantine or n-1 attacks:
[MIRANDA] Leibowitz, H., Piotrowska, A., Danezis, G., Herzberg, A., 2017,
"No right to ramain silent: Isolating Malicious Mixes"
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1000.pdf>.
> gain a view of the network so that path selection is possible. Like
> Tor's Directory Authority system we need to store various bits of
> information about each mix in say, a "mix descriptor".
>
> By "same view" I mean each client (just like in Tor) should receive
> the same network consensus document. The client uses this for path
> selection.
>
> To be clear, we are totally punting on the load balancing problem because
> it's hard.
> However, the new Peer Flow paper looks promising:
>
> [PEERFLOW] Johnson, A., Jansen, R., Segal, A., Syverson, P.,
> "PeerFlow: Secure Load Balancing in Tor",
> Preceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, July 2017,
>
> <https://petsymposium.org/2017/papers/issue2/paper12-2017-2-source.pdf>.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
_______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list Messaging@moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
