Re: TCP/IP security considerations

2001-04-23 Thread Robert Brenstein
>I certainly wouldn't rule out building or using MetaCard server >software, even for protocols for which well-known (if buggy) open >source software is widely available. While I don't see any big >advantage to writing an FTP server in MetaCard, an HTTP server that >executes CGI scripts is a diffe

Re: TCP/IP security considerations

2001-04-13 Thread Scott Raney
Robin-David Hammond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > in any case MC hasnt been rigorously analysed for buffer-overrun > attacks afaik. Not only should you be cautious about using it for > sensitive data, but also on any virtual file system with sensative > or mission critical data, unless you are ve

Re: TCP/IP security considerations

2001-04-12 Thread michael kann
--- Richard Gaskin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> inquired about peer-to-peer security a la Metacard: Any business peer-to-peer program will be compared to Ray Ozzie's Groove, found at www.groove.net, because he has a PR machine that just won't quit. Security is fundamental to their efforts, so it might be

Re: TCP/IP security considerations

2001-04-12 Thread David Bovill
too complex (ie above) use PGP (or equivalent) signed packets of data, and a public key encryption scheme. > From: Richard Gaskin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2001 00:31:54 -0700 > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: TCP/IP security consider

TCP/IP security considerations

2001-04-12 Thread Richard Gaskin
What are the security considerations in the following scenario?: Suppose I have two MC apps running on different machines, and they communicate with each other showing a listing of files each machine has designated specifically for sharing (much like Napster, GNUtella clients, etc.). In this sce