Originally sent as a private reply, though I had intended it for the list.
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 12:03 PM
Subject: Re: [uf-discuss] hCard slowing adoption of microformats?
Dan,
I do know of several instances (since corrected so I won't name names)
of
Such companies are already going to far greater extents to scrape anything
resembling contact information (without really caring about false positives etc
since as your quotes point out quantity is their game) from text, HTML etc on
the web using text entity recognizers etc.
As long as you only
How's this...?
Using gmail, I happened to spy a list of supported links, here's one of them:
Custom Web Scraping
Data Extraction & Mining Service
Buy up to 20,000 Records for $75.00
RightHandMarketingManagement.com
This reinforces the seriousness of the issue in my mind. If hCards
are used as i
I'm thinking about how a mechanism that will enforce the integrity of
the "friendship chain" on something like FOAF could be implemented.
Obviously it happens that someone whom you thought to be a friend
turns out to exploit the friend network. It seems to pose a new spin
on the issue of trust and
Elegant.
On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 9:44 AM, André Luís <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Samuel,
>
> Yes, it's a recurring concern, however, microformats don't deal with
> authorization. That's stuff for other protocols (openid, oauth). What
> they do is markup existing data, stuff that you're already pu
Dude, you are giving me a headache.
On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 9:55 AM, David Janes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 9:09 AM, Samuel Richter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> It seems to me that both hAtom and hDOAP present limitations of a sort
>> when it comes to providing feeds for
