Why not write the keyboard driver the same way how the friend did it
in his OS - using bitmasking and avoiding conditional jumps and
lookup tables? Then the security would be guaranteed and not just
hoped for.
Why not write the driver yourself?
I don't see the reason to jump and reinvent
was pressed when entering a root password
- tests and jumps, because the same would be possible with the BTB (branch
target buffer).
He said he had to write the whole driver using logical operation masking.
Does
OpenBSD also have this trick? How is the keyboard security designed in
OpenBSD
Yay ! Let's map everything uncached from now on! For great justice!
[I was tempted to write some stuff about how keyboard keycode translation
works in wscons, but it's not worth my time]
Miod
Miod Vallat [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Yay ! Let's map everything uncached from now on! For great justice!
Yay! Then we can start inlining code again for greater performance!
//art
Karel Kulhavy [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 07:05:38PM -0700, Don Scott wrote:
I think Artur Grabowski too easily dismisses the question.
I'd be interested to know if you get any informative responses that
are not also posted to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Mikulas (the
Artur Grabowski [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
And guess what. Keyboards use a serial protocol. Which means that
there will be slightly different voltage drops in the system varying
with the keys you press. ZOMG! OpenBSD provides a side channel for
attackers through the sensors framework!
And
Artur Grabowski [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
And don't forget the aps(4) sensor on Thinkpads! The accelerometer can
probably measure the acceleration caused by various key strokes and that
acceleration will be different depending on where on the keyboard you hit
(different angles) and with which
Yay ! Let's map everything uncached from now on! For great justice!
[I was tempted to write some stuff about how keyboard keycode translation
works in wscons, but it's not worth my time]
Miod
You don't have to map keyboard map uncached, just change the way code is
written --- instead of
x =
On Wed, Jun 20, 2007 at 04:00:01PM +0200, Artur Grabowski wrote:
Karel Kulhavy [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 07:05:38PM -0700, Don Scott wrote:
I think Artur Grabowski too easily dismisses the question.
I'd be interested to know if you get any informative
On Wed, Jun 20, 2007 at 06:14:07PM +0200, Karel Kulhavy wrote:
And guess what. Keyboards use a serial protocol. Which means that
there will be slightly different voltage drops in the system varying
The capacitors and regulator which are made to keep the voltage almost
constant
with a
Karel Kulhavy wrote:
This kind of security design is assuming favourable constellation of
uncontrollable environmental noises to scramble the information we are
knowingly leaking. It's basically a snake oil. We have no proof that under
every conceivable circumstances the noises will be present
On 6/20/07, Karel Kulhavy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This kind of security design is assuming favourable constellation of
uncontrollable environmental noises to scramble the information we are
knowingly leaking. It's basically a snake oil. We have no proof that under
every conceivable
On Wednesday 20 June 2007 12:28:28 Darrin Chandler wrote:
On Wed, Jun 20, 2007 at 06:14:07PM +0200, Karel Kulhavy wrote:
And guess what. Keyboards use a serial protocol. Which means that
there will be slightly different voltage drops in the system varying
The capacitors and regulator
And guess what. Keyboards use a serial protocol. Which means that
there will be slightly different voltage drops in the system varying
with the keys you press. ZOMG! OpenBSD provides a side channel for
attackers through the sensors framework!
And don't forget the aps(4) sensor on
* Bob Beck wrote:
And guess what. Keyboards use a serial protocol. Which means that
there will be slightly different voltage drops in the system varying
with the keys you press. ZOMG! OpenBSD provides a side channel for
attackers through the sensors framework!
And don't forget
someone already hacked you and sent that message -- be afraid
On 6/20/07, Marc Balmer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
* Bob Beck wrote:
And guess what. Keyboards use a serial protocol. Which means that
there will be slightly different voltage drops in the system varying
with the keys you
That's ok, you can use my wep enabled wireless keyboard!!
On 6/20/07, Marc Balmer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
* Bob Beck wrote:
And guess what. Keyboards use a serial protocol. Which means that
there will be slightly different voltage drops in the system varying
with the keys you press.
On Wed, 20 Jun 2007, Mikulas Patocka wrote:
Yay ! Let's map everything uncached from now on! For great justice!
[I was tempted to write some stuff about how keyboard keycode translation
works in wscons, but it's not worth my time]
Miod
You don't have to map keyboard map uncached,
And guess what. Keyboards use a serial protocol. Which means that
there will be slightly different voltage drops in the system varying
with the keys you press. ZOMG! OpenBSD provides a side channel for
attackers through the sensors framework!
And don't forget the aps(4) sensor on
be possible with the BTB (branch
target buffer).
He said he had to write the whole driver using logical operation masking. Does
OpenBSD also have this trick? How is the keyboard security designed in OpenBSD
to prevent these covert channels leaking the information to an unprivileged
process?
CL
password
- tests and jumps, because the same would be possible with the BTB (branch
target buffer).
He said he had to write the whole driver using logical operation
masking. Does OpenBSD also have this trick? How is the keyboard
security designed in OpenBSD to prevent these covert channels
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