On 31/03/15 21:14, Robert wrote:
On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 10:10:31AM -0500, Joe Crivello wrote:
I can't think of any other scenarios right now, but I'd be interested to
hear if there is something I'm not thinking of...
Let's cut this short:
To prevent (in theory) various attack vectors (e.g.,
On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 02:37:53PM +0100, Gareth Nelson wrote:
For scripts that are set executable, it works exactly the same way - for
everything else it won't work unless the interpreter is patched, it's still
an overall massive improvement in security.
This is exactly like immutable files until you go back to boot -s.
Such a pain in the ass to deal as soon as you want to play with
machines to which you don't have direct physical access.
You could set a flag which runs a script before the securelevel is
raised on the next boot but you
Before anyone says it, i'd be more than willing to work on the code for
this myself but would like feedback on the idea.
Essentially as follows:
1 - A sysctl variable stores a public key that can only be written to once
at startup
2 - All executables on the system must be signed with that public
2015-03-31 9:52 GMT+02:00 Gareth Nelson gar...@garethnelson.com:
2 - All executables on the system must be signed with that public key
3 - Any executable not signed is essentially chmod -x
How does this help with interpreted code (e.g. shell, perl, python, java)?
Best
Martin
On 31-Mar-2015, at 1:22 pm, Gareth Nelson gar...@garethnelson.com wrote:
Before anyone says it, i'd be more than willing to work on the code for
this myself but would like feedback on the idea.
Essentially as follows:
1 - A sysctl variable stores a public key that can only be written to
First off, you seem to have set forth a design without first setting forth
it's objective. I suppose in this case it's pretty clear what your implied
objectives are, though.
Traditionally, executable or code signing is used to certify who compiled
a binary, and to prove that it wasn't tampered
On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 10:10:31AM -0500, Joe Crivello wrote:
I can't think of any other scenarios right now, but I'd be interested to
hear if there is something I'm not thinking of...
Another scenario might be a non-admin user trying to run an unauthorized
program. In that case, one could put
On 31-Mar-2015, at 9:11 pm, Max Fillinger
maximilian.fillin...@uni-duesseldorf.de wrote:
On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 10:10:31AM -0500, Joe Crivello wrote:
I can't think of any other scenarios right now, but I'd be interested to
hear if there is something I'm not thinking of...
Another
To prevent (in theory) various attack vectors (e.g., physical access to
the disk while offline), you need to have the system in a trusted state.
Somebody has already thought this through, here is the result:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface#Secure_boot
Such
On Tue, 31 Mar 2015 14:37:53 +0100
Gareth Nelson wrote:
For scripts that are set executable, it works exactly the same way - for
everything else it won't work unless the interpreter is patched, it's still
an overall massive improvement in security.
Maybe on other systems (I know a linux
On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 10:10:31AM -0500, Joe Crivello wrote:
I can't think of any other scenarios right now, but I'd be interested to
hear if there is something I'm not thinking of...
Let's cut this short:
To prevent (in theory) various attack vectors (e.g., physical access to the
disk
On Tue, 31 Mar 2015, Gareth Nelson wrote:
Before anyone says it, i'd be more than willing to work on the code for
this myself but would like feedback on the idea.
Essentially as follows:
1 - A sysctl variable stores a public key that can only be written to once
at startup
2 - All
For scripts that are set executable, it works exactly the same way - for
everything else it won't work unless the interpreter is patched, it's still
an overall massive improvement in security.
---
âLanie, Iâm going to print more printers. Lots more printers. One for
everyone. Thatâs worth
It's worse than that: OpenBSD doesn't even support GPT, so there sre
dependencies in the way before UEFI can start. Last year there was a GSoC which
added kernel support but there's nothing in the userland.
On Tue Mar 31 15:14:18 2015 Joe Crivello josephcrive...@gmail.com wrote:
To prevent
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