Hi team!
Sorry for interruption, but why not just switch to 4096? So no problems for
future...
I expect that there will be something more then just it uses more cpu time
to operate the same... please fix/explane me.
Thank you.
Have a nice $day_time ;)
Ruslanas
On Thu, 28 May 2015 12:16 Pablo MÃ
Thanks for the update Mike, greatly appreciated.
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 9:02 PM, Mike Belopuhov wrote:
> On 25 May 2015 at 14:33, Pablo Méndez Hernández
wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Any statement for iked?
> >
>
> iked implements IKEv2 which doesn't use SSL/TLS. So this
> attack doesn't directly
On 25 May 2015 at 14:33, Pablo Méndez Hernández wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Any statement for iked?
>
iked implements IKEv2 which doesn't use SSL/TLS. So this
attack doesn't directly apply to IKEv2. However we would
accept MODP 1024 and better by default. Perhaps we
should bump it to 2048 minimum.
Hi,
Any statement for iked?
On Thu, May 21, 2015 at 12:51 AM, Gilles Chehade wrote:
> On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 11:55:42PM +0200, L.R. D.S. wrote:
> > Anyone write today on @misc and @tech about this, so I'll ask just to
> make sure:
> > is OpenIKED and/or OpenSMTPD vulnerable to this new "Logjam
On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 11:55:42PM +0200, L.R. D.S. wrote:
> Anyone write today on @misc and @tech about this, so I'll ask just to make
> sure:
> is OpenIKED and/or OpenSMTPD vulnerable to this new "Logjam Attack"?
> This vulnerability allow "a man-in-the-middle attacker to downgrade
> vulnerabl
Anyone write today on @misc and @tech about this, so I'll ask just to make
sure:
is OpenIKED and/or OpenSMTPD vulnerable to this new "Logjam Attack"?
This vulnerability allow "a man-in-the-middle attacker to downgrade vulnerable
TLS
connections to 512-bit export-grade cryptography" and "[Since]
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