On 5/8/20 3:16 PM, Martin wrote:
> Which 'quantum' resistant algorithms can be used right now to prevent data
> decryption in future by 'quantum' computers (when they can do this) of
> currently collected data flows?
this is so dumb.
worry about this when there are computers which can actuall
On 2020-05-09 07:41, Martin wrote:
> This one
> https://www.tomshardware.com/news/d-wave-5000-qubit-first-sale,40470.html
> is the most powerful 5000qbits quantum computer sells nowadays.
>
> Moreother, D-Wave opened online service to access 5000qbit remotely for
> solving 'special' tasks which
On 2020-05-09 07:41, Martin wrote:
> This one
> https://www.tomshardware.com/news/d-wave-5000-qubit-first-sale,40470.html
> is the most powerful 5000qbits quantum computer sells nowadays.
D-waves definition of qubit is different and their machines will never be
capable of breaking public key cryp
On 2020-05-08, openbsdli...@uninformativ.de
wrote:
> It only fails with gnutls, so I first reported it there:
>
> https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/984
>
> However, Daiki Ueno said it looks like an issue with LibreSSL. Quoting
> in full:
>
>> This looks like an issue in the server side (L
Has been fixed in LibreSSL. Thank you!
This one
https://www.tomshardware.com/news/d-wave-5000-qubit-first-sale,40470.html
is the most powerful 5000qbits quantum computer sells nowadays.
Moreother, D-Wave opened online service to access 5000qbit remotely for solving
'special' tasks which can be accelerated using quantum architecture.
OpenSSH allows to use hybrid mode with many private keys of different type and
even stored on different hardware like Nitrokey, Rutoken, etc. at the same time
for a single session.
E.g. 4 different private keys are required (say Nitrokey, Rutoken ECP2,
Curve25519 and Postquantum one):
Authenic
D-waves has too uncoupled qubits if I understand it correctly, it is nothing to
do about qubits quantity as we used to think about it. Like a "cluster" of
completely isolated hosts (which is already not a cluster or course).
On 2020-05-09 14:31, i...@aulix.com wrote:
> guessed by quantum provided session symmetric cipher is strong enough?
Quantum does not break any in use today and AES-256 symmetric is expected to be
quantum resistant in any case.
I personally prefer AES-256 ctr over the more complex GCM. I am not a
On 2020-05-09 14:34, i...@aulix.com wrote:
> D-waves has too uncoupled qubits if I understand it correctly, it is nothing
> to do about qubits quantity as we used to think about it. Like a "cluster" of
> completely isolated hosts (which is already not a cluster or course).
I don't care for the d
Hello misc@,
Starting today, reposync is running out of memory for me. Happened 3
times in a row already, in different stages. It looks like this when it
happens:
>f.st.. ports/net/megatools/pkg/PLIST,v
ERROR: out of memory in flist_expand [receiver]
rsync error: error allocating core memory
Though I am a very noob in understanding crypto from a mathematical point of
view (not just as an user of some ready program) IMHO following message can
contain some truth about insecurity and intentional flaws of hardware crypto in
X86 CPUs:
https://support.nitrokey.com/t/spectre-or-meltdown-v
On 2020-05-09, Lucas wrote:
> Hello misc@,
>
> Starting today, reposync is running out of memory for me. Happened 3
> times in a row already, in different stages. It looks like this when it
> happens:
>
>>f.st.. ports/net/megatools/pkg/PLIST,v
> ERROR: out of memory in flist_expand [receiver]
On 2020-05-09 16:25, i...@aulix.com wrote:
> Note: Since these MS / U.S. government keys are deeply sticking in Intel XEON
> processor hardware, it doesn’t play a role, what other OS you install or boot
> afterwards: Debian/UBUNTU Linux, OpenBSD, … If your software uses Intel
> AES-NI hardware e
Hello Stephen,
> My basic idea for the client is:
>
> - load a db of self-signed certs.
> - connect to host
> - if host cert is self signed
> - if not in db, prompt user and add to db
> - if in db, check fingerprint and warn user if they don't match.
>
> Browsing the manuals/source code, the
Stuart Henderson wrote:
> I can add something to the readme after the ports tree has unlocked.
>
> I think you're seeing this now due to the churn because every file in
> the repositories was touched when the tree was tagged with OPENBSD_6_7.
> I haven't seen it on the 2 machines I have running r
Hi there!
Does anybody on this list manage @OpenBSD_CVS? Would be nice to lift the
message truncation from the old 140char limit to the new 280char limit. Super
annoying when I can't read an interesting commit message that is just a little
longer :)
--
TN
On Sat, May 09, 2020 at 06:18:50PM +, Lucas wrote:
> Hello Stephen,
>
> > My basic idea for the client is:
> >
> > - load a db of self-signed certs.
> > - connect to host
> > - if host cert is self signed
> > - if not in db, prompt user and add to db
> > - if in db, check fingerprint an
On Sat, May 9, 2020 at 1:05 PM Kevin Chadwick wrote:
> Careful of what sources you trust! If a processor was storing the keys used,
> non
> volatile then people would have found out. Software encryption wouldn't save
> you
> either. If there is a back door it won't have anything to do with AES-N
Some time ago Google bought 2000qbit version from D-wave and confirmed it is a
quantum computer bla bla bla... but cluster consists of eight qbit blocks to
build advertised capacity if I understand googles papers right.
My question was about decrypting currently generated and accumulated encrypt
On 2020-05-09, Bob Beck wrote:
> > oolong$ man -k Xr=tls_peer_cert_hash
> > nc(1) - arbitrary TCP and UDP connections and listens
> >
> > That's far from ideal IMO, but I don't know where, of the many tls_*
> > manpages, would I reference it.
>
> man tls_peer_cert_hash
>
> happily brings up th
I am currently implementing a simple C client for the gemini
protocol[1]. All transactions are protected using TLS, with a catch:
> Clients can validate TLS connections however they like (including not
> at all) but the strongly RECOMMENDED approach is to implement a
> lightweight "TOFU" certifica
We had a VPS customer ask for help on full disk encryption, and since
following the instructions on
https://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq14.html#softraidFDE
did not work with a serial console, we published a blog post on it:
https://prgmr.com/blog/openbsd/2020/05/08/openbsd-encrypted-root.html
I don't
At risk of responding without having read through the entire website, it seems
to mostly be about OpenBSD's exploit mitigations, and nothing else. But OpenBSD
does a lot of other things well, like doing lots of code reviews, having a
culture of writing code with an eye toward security in the fir
Hello,
Le 07/05/2020 à 16:00, i...@aulix.com a écrit :
Can you please comment negative appraisal from the following website:
https://isopenbsdsecu.re/quotes/
I did not want to hurt anyone, just looking for a secure OS and OpenBSD looked
very nice to me before I have found this website.
Th
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