Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Hey Andre, A brief hiatus and here I am, On Fri, Sep 24, 2010 at 8:09 AM, Andre Broersen wrote: > John to Andre: > > > You don't see how Quality could be construed as an absolute ideal? > > Andre: > Yes, but I think this is mistaken. Experience comes first then comes the > slicing up, > the conceptualizations, the ideas etc, etc. And IF we are going to talk > about 'absolutes' > (which I would not prefer) then I would place experience in that category. > > John: I guess the problem I have is that experience isn't experienced till it's sliced up or conceptualized in some way. If there is no category or perceived differentiation (categorical conceptualization) then you can't have any experience. > John: > > As far as your, "experience arranged > within an evolutionary relationship." > > isn't that just a fancy way of saying, life itself? > > Andre: > Not quite, I meant experience at all four levels, not just at the organic > (biological) level. > Unless I misunderstand what you mean by 'life'. > > John: What I meant by "life" was "life, the universe and everything". In other words - experience. Life is experience and experience is life. Hope yours is going well, John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
John to Andre: You don't see how Quality could be construed as an absolute ideal? Andre: Yes, but I think this is mistaken. Experience comes first then comes the slicing up, the conceptualizations, the ideas etc, etc. And IF we are going to talk about 'absolutes' (which I would not prefer) then I would place experience in that category. John: As far as your, "experience arranged within an evolutionary relationship." isn't that just a fancy way of saying, life itself? Andre: Not quite, I meant experience at all four levels, not just at the organic (biological) level. Unless I misunderstand what you mean by 'life'. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
> > > John: > > Or more pithily, we can just post Krimel's Axiom along with John's > Corollary > - Shit happens, and that's a GOOD thing. > > Andre: > So long as you keep in mind that this is a response to quality and does not > refer to quality itself. > > John: I'd say anything that uses "good" refers to Quality, Andre. I'm not sure what you mean.A response to Quality can be good or bad, right? You can harmonize, or be out of tune. There is choice. I think this is a point of contention with Arlo, in a recent dialogue, which I meant to reply to but got lost somehow in the shuffle. Good can exist with freedom, because choice is as fundamental as value. If there is no choice, there is no good. Which is a point I used to see Ham argue a lot and it seems he has converted me. Him and his Dr. Bob (lanza, that is). > John: > > Logically equivalent to "Existence as a whole as fundamentally valuable" - > the essential heart of the MoQ - and connects with my position that the > MoQ > is a species of Absolute Idealism. > > Andre: > Absolute Idealism has little to do with Quality or with the MOQ. The MOQ > stands for experience arranged > within an evolutionary relationship. Experience is the starting point. > > John: You don't see how Quality could be construed as an absolute ideal? Because it seems that way to me. And as I've often reminded, RMP himself has a eureka moment as the conclusion to the Copleston Annotations, which illustrate he himself was struck with the harmony and congruence with the MoQ. Two mountain climbers, arriving at the same view from differing trails - neither diminishes the value of the climb of the other, rather they confirm it. As far as your, "experience arranged within an evolutionary relationship." isn't that just a fancy way of saying, life itself? as far as your "Experience is the starting point" I'd say it's also the end. So it's everything, right? Experience is all. I agree completely. That's a good thing, right Andre? And that's what I'd call, Absolutely, Idealistic. John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
John to Andre: more than a year after I originally asked how the ambiguity of Quality is reconciled, somebody finally gives me an answer. And a pretty darn good one, at that. Andre: Glad that Mr. Pirsig has been of some service to you John. John: Or more pithily, we can just post Krimel's Axiom along with John's Corollary - Shit happens, and that's a GOOD thing. Andre: So long as you keep in mind that this is a response to quality and does not refer to quality itself. John: Logically equivalent to "Existence as a whole as fundamentally valuable" - the essential heart of the MoQ - and connects with my position that the MoQ is a species of Absolute Idealism. Andre: Absolute Idealism has little to do with Quality or with the MOQ. The MOQ stands for experience arranged within an evolutionary relationship. Experience is the starting point. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
In my reading Aristotle believed the universe is eternal, rather the multi-verse instead of the Big Bang. Gareth. This was a big deal at the time because all events in the universe was conceived as one long chain of causality going all the way back to the moment of creation itself, going all the way back to the first cause. The first cause is what starts the whole chain of causes and prevents an infinite regress. This is "the prime mover". It's God.* This idea goes all the way back to Aristotle,* but it had been integrated into Christianity during the age of scholasticism. So when Hume attacked causality itself as non-empirical, there were profound theological implications. No causality, no first cause. On Fri, Sep 17, 2010 at 12:01 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > Platt said: > ... I buy the scientist's assumption that for every effect there is a cause > That at the beginning of the universe cause and effect suddenly becomes > inoperative to Hawkins and some other cosmologists seems to me to be a grand > cop out. > > > > Steve replied: > I don't think that Hawkings is saying that cause and effect get suspended > at the beginning of the universe alone. The somethings coming from nothings > happen all the time on the quantum level according to my understanding of > his theoretical view. .. Believers often argue that the universe must have a > beginning because otherwise we would have an infinite regress of causes. ... > > > > dmb says: > > It's ironic that the issue of cause and effect should come up in a thread > that declares the death of philosophy. So much of philosophy centered on > that issue. Kant famously said that he was awakened from his "dogmatic > slumbers" by Hume's empiricism, specifically by Hume's attack on cause and > effect. Basically, Hume noticed that causal relations are never experienced > as such. We don't see causes so much as we add the notion to explain why one > event follows another. > > This was a big deal at the time because all events in the universe was > conceived as one long chain of causality going all the way back to the > moment of creation itself, going all the way back to the first cause. The > first cause is what starts the whole chain of causes and prevents an > infinite regress. This is "the prime mover". It's God. This idea goes all > the way back to Aristotle, but it had been integrated into Christianity > during the age of scholasticism. So when Hume attacked causality itself as > non-empirical, there were profound theological implications. No causality, > no first cause. > > > Kant's response was to say that concepts like cause and effect (as well as > time and space) are innate categories of the mind. We need these mental > categories to shape raw sense data into something intelligible. In my > undergrad days, the prof explained this in terms of raw dough (sense data) > being put through a pasta machine (innate categories of the mind). The blob > of dough is shaped when it's run through the little machine. It's given a > uniform thickness and sliced into strands of uniform width. Afterwards, you > might even trim the pasta so it's of uniform length too but that's just a > cooking tip, not an epistemological analogy. > > > Kant thought he was saving empiricism from collapsing into solipsism, he > was saving God (not sure how THAT works), and since concepts like time, > space, as well as cause and effect were categories innate to the human mind, > he was presenting a particular kind of rationality as universal. There is a > real world with pre-existing things, with things-in-themselves and this is > what causes the sense data but we can never know the world of > things-in-themselves except through the mind's categories, he thought. His > work is about the inherent structure of reason, the thought paths we must > walk, the modes of thought to which we must conform. > > > Now I think we want to look at the MOQ's radical empiricism in this > context. It's part of the same story but, of course, it pushes these ideas > in a very different direction. Since radical empiricism rejects > subject-object metaphysics, what James and Pirsig are saying is really quite > different. The radical empiricist says that subjects and objects are not the > starting points of experience, they are concepts derived from experience. > That one little line changes everything. As Kant see it, objects are the > cause of our experience, they are things-in-themselves and so exist > independently of our perceptions. As Pirsig sees it, objects are concepts. > They are what Kant would call a category of the mind, except that in the MOQ > our conceptual categories are not universal or innate. They are provisional, > they are cultural creations that have evolved and will continue to evolve. > > > And then there is that bit in the MOQ where the laws of causality are > replaced by patterns of preference. Causal relations is a useful idea, but > it's just that: an idea. But we can just as well concept
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Thanks Andre, more than a year after I originally asked how the ambiguity of Quality is reconciled, somebody finally gives me an answer. And a pretty darn good one, at that. Pirsig (2001d) > justifies this by suggesting that 'static patterned quality can be positive > or negative > the way temperature or pressure or wealth or a thousand other patterned > things can be > positive or negative' and that existence AS A WHOLE is fundamentally > valuable'. (pp 57-8) > Or more pithily, we can just post Krimel's Axiom along with John's Corollary - Shit happens, and that's a GOOD thing. Logically equivalent to "Existence as a whole as fundamentally valuable" - the essential heart of the MoQ - and connects with my position that the MoQ is a species of Absolute Idealism. Yours, John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
John to Andre: Isn't the MoQ a monism?Isn't Quality, Good? How can one say Quality is bad and good? That takes away the value of Quality. Andre: That seems to depend on the 'broadness' of one's perspective one John. Here is what Anthony's PhD suggests noting the 'ambiguities with 'Quality': 'Even when taken by itself, Pirsig's employment of 'Quality' extends its traditional understanding from a synonym of 'excellence' to a denotation of all reality (whether good or bad) producing two different applications of the term: 'Quality as everything that exists and 'Quality' as what is best. This is not ideal especially as a seemingly negative thing (such as disease) is retained as a pattern of 'Quality'. Pirsig (2001d) justifies this by suggesting that 'static patterned quality can be positive or negative the way temperature or pressure or wealth or a thousand other patterned things can be positive or negative' and that existence AS A WHOLE is fundamentally valuable'. (pp 57-8) Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Ok, Andre, it does clarify it. I'm familiar with dependent arising so I understand the underlying concept. I just didn't quite grasp yer nomenclature there. But I'm glad I got you into it, because it raises a question with my understanding of the MoQ - Thus, as my friend, who can read Chinese, said the other day, what is > written by Lao Tzu is not the > proper translation. It says directly: beauty IS ugliness, good IS evil. But > to say this to a Westerner > 'lost in our linear linguistic translation' this makes no sense. Thus, to > make it somehow palatable and > understandable it is poetically translated as: > Yes, I agree to my western "ears" that makes no sense. It's like saying there is no such thing as Quality. > > 'Therefore having and not having arise together. > Difficult and easy complement each other. > Long and short contrast each other. > High and low rest upon each other. > Voice and sound harmonize each other. > Front and back follow one another'. > > These dualisms do not 'oppose' nor 'confront' each other. They imply each > other. Complement each other > because they arise together. The one IS the other at the same time. Thus > the no-two dualism. > > What Mr. Pirsig MOQ has done in the MOQ is the same thing with regards to > the conventional idea of > subjects and objects! > Isn't the MoQ a monism?Isn't Quality, Good? How can one say Quality is bad and good? That takes away the value of Quality. > And,please remember that he wrote for a Western audience > continuing/improving mainstream American > pragmatic philosophy. > > imho. > > I hope this clarifies it for you. > > Enough so that I beg for more! John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Remarkably sharp observation, Dave, causuality is not very usefull in Quantumphysiks. Its mostly a dead end. Most of Pirsig's impressions on preferences, and patterns of preference are derived from the work of David Bohm. It was very difficult for Bohm to make his case , he was haunted like Charles Darwin when he broke the field open. Still many of it remains unproven , but the theorethical evidence to support it is rapidly increasing. Nobody these days makes jokes about Bohm's work anymore. causuality, yes in QP, there is not much use for it , its like saying, hitting a mosquito with the pyramid of Cheops to kill the bugger. for an example, bacteria -human/infection, the causuality to get infected says nothing about the intensity of the contamination or the consequenses, or interaction with previous contaminations. causuality itself is one of the most difficult branches of science. Everything you wrote here is solid and straight, condensed , but straight, i see no gaps. Greetzz, Adrie 2010/9/21 david buchanan > > Ian said to John, Andre, DMB: > Increasing value is a better empirical view than causation, but this isn't > any easier to explain (eg to a MoQish judge) > > > > dmb says: > > Huh? > > I'm going to assume you're talking about the way the MOQ replaces "cause" > with "preference". > > As Pirsig points out, "preference" is an empirically meaningful term and it > is more appropriate to quantum physics because of the way it fits the actual > observations. Causality makes more sense in a mechanistic, law-like > Newtonian universe where causal relations are imagined in terms of > substances bumping into substances like so many billiard balls. But down in > the subatomic realm particles can interact at a distance and you can > interfere with way events unfold even after they've taken place. > > "The only difference between causation and value is that the word 'cause' > implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of 'value' is one of > preference. In classical science it was supposed that the world always works > in terms of absolute certainty and that 'cause' is the more appropriate word > to describe it. But in modern quantum physics all that is changed. Particles > 'prefer' to do what they do. An individual particle is not absolutely > committed to one predictable behavior. What appears to be an absolute cause > is just a very consistent pattern of preferences. Therefore, when you strike > 'cause' from the language and substitute 'value' you are not only replacing > an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a term > that is more appropriate to actual observation." (Lila, page 104) > > > But there is more to it than that. Usually, causation is projected upward > so that you get various kinds of determinism with respect to human behavior. > In this view, all of reality is one long chain of causality from top to > bottom and there is no such thing as free will, as if we can do nothing > except obey the laws of cause and effect. By contrast, preferences are > projected from the top down. We know what it's like to jump off a hot stove, > to like peas rather than carrots, to read a clear and concise explanation as > opposed to a confusing and long-winded one and when we observe other animals > and life forms - even down to single-celled organisms - it certainly appears > that they have preferences too. It fits our experience as it is lived and > felt and it fits our experience in terms of scientific observation. > > And of course he wants to push preferences all the way down because that > means quality goes all the way down. In other words, "preferences" are not > just more appropriate way to describe the data in physics, it has a unifying > power within the MOQ. It gives says that the ability to respond to Quality > is completely ubiquitous throughout reality. Doesn't that make you feel at > home? Go ahead, pull up a chair. Put up your feet. > > > You like carrots and I like peas.You like parrots and I like keys. > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > -- parser Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Ian said to John, Andre, DMB: Increasing value is a better empirical view than causation, but this isn't any easier to explain (eg to a MoQish judge) dmb says: Huh? I'm going to assume you're talking about the way the MOQ replaces "cause" with "preference". As Pirsig points out, "preference" is an empirically meaningful term and it is more appropriate to quantum physics because of the way it fits the actual observations. Causality makes more sense in a mechanistic, law-like Newtonian universe where causal relations are imagined in terms of substances bumping into substances like so many billiard balls. But down in the subatomic realm particles can interact at a distance and you can interfere with way events unfold even after they've taken place. "The only difference between causation and value is that the word 'cause' implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of 'value' is one of preference. In classical science it was supposed that the world always works in terms of absolute certainty and that 'cause' is the more appropriate word to describe it. But in modern quantum physics all that is changed. Particles 'prefer' to do what they do. An individual particle is not absolutely committed to one predictable behavior. What appears to be an absolute cause is just a very consistent pattern of preferences. Therefore, when you strike 'cause' from the language and substitute 'value' you are not only replacing an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a term that is more appropriate to actual observation." (Lila, page 104) But there is more to it than that. Usually, causation is projected upward so that you get various kinds of determinism with respect to human behavior. In this view, all of reality is one long chain of causality from top to bottom and there is no such thing as free will, as if we can do nothing except obey the laws of cause and effect. By contrast, preferences are projected from the top down. We know what it's like to jump off a hot stove, to like peas rather than carrots, to read a clear and concise explanation as opposed to a confusing and long-winded one and when we observe other animals and life forms - even down to single-celled organisms - it certainly appears that they have preferences too. It fits our experience as it is lived and felt and it fits our experience in terms of scientific observation. And of course he wants to push preferences all the way down because that means quality goes all the way down. In other words, "preferences" are not just more appropriate way to describe the data in physics, it has a unifying power within the MOQ. It gives says that the ability to respond to Quality is completely ubiquitous throughout reality. Doesn't that make you feel at home? Go ahead, pull up a chair. Put up your feet. You like carrots and I like peas.You like parrots and I like keys. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Andre to Ian previously: Andre: Yeah, Paul is a clever young man. A nice place to start is the second verse of the Tao Te Ching. One line I'd like to take out as it nicely ties in with dmb's response to John about'the Giant': "Therefore having and not having arise together'. It is a no-two dualism. To which John replies: Now there I'm a little confused. Would you mind explaining a "no-two dualism"? Andre: It's a matter of dependent arising John; the first line of the second verse goes: 'Under heaven [so here we are in the static conventional world] all can see beauty as beauty only because there is ugliness'. For me the key word is 'only', because, to have a conception at all of one, will, of necessity, imply a conception of its counterpart. In fact, it invokes it. 'All can know good as good only because there is evil'. How can one speak of good if that is all there is? That won't make any sense. To be able to speak of good invokes/implies (the existence of)evil. Thus, as my friend, who can read Chinese, said the other day, what is written by Lao Tzu is not the proper translation. It says directly: beauty IS ugliness, good IS evil. But to say this to a Westerner 'lost in our linear linguistic translation' this makes no sense. Thus, to make it somehow palatable and understandable it is poetically translated as: 'Therefore having and not having arise together. Difficult and easy complement each other. Long and short contrast each other. High and low rest upon each other. Voice and sound harmonize each other. Front and back follow one another'. These dualisms do not 'oppose' nor 'confront' each other. They imply each other. Complement each other because they arise together. The one IS the other at the same time. Thus the no-two dualism. What Mr. Pirsig MOQ has done in the MOQ is the same thing with regards to the conventional idea of subjects and objects! And,please remember that he wrote for a Western audience continuing/improving mainstream American pragmatic philosophy. imho. I hope this clarifies it for you. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Ian to John, Andre, DMB: Increasing value is a better empirical view than causation, but this isn't any easier to explain (eg to a MoQish judge) Andre: No, you're right Ian, it doesn't make it any easier. But I do think that it makes us a little more careful before passing judgement.As Mr. Pirsig keeps saying, there is a lot more going on than a conventional subject-object analysis would suggest. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
In fact a corollary. Causation is the easiest explanation for anything, unfortunately it's a fallacy - so it's not a very high quality explanation. (Great to get back to the real issues on MD.) Ian On Tue, Sep 21, 2010 at 5:03 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: > John, Andre, DMB, > > You say you are convinced where I said I wasn't John, but this is just > word play. > > I agree with you. Causation isn't better explained. It's better > dropped as being "a fallacy". > > Increasing value is a better empirical view than causation, but this > isn't any easier to explain (eg to a MoQish judge) > > Ian > > On Mon, Sep 20, 2010 at 8:43 PM, John Carl wrote: >> Ian and Andre, I am convinced. >> >> On Fri, Sep 17, 2010 at 10:09 PM, Andre Broersen >> wrote: >> >>> Ian to dmb: >>> >>> I'm not convinced that Pirsig's replacement of causation between >>> objects with patterns of preference involving conceptual patterns >>> actually makes the explanation of causation any easier. >>> >>> >> I came across this problem my freshman year of high school. I wrote about >> it as a subject for an English class, and sort of expected some interest or >> intrigue from my teacher over what I termed "the fallacy of cause and >> effect". All he wrote on the top of my paper was that my "Hume-ian stance >> wouldn't get me very far if I was ever brought up before a judge for >> "causing" an accident. >> >> > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
John, Andre, DMB, You say you are convinced where I said I wasn't John, but this is just word play. I agree with you. Causation isn't better explained. It's better dropped as being "a fallacy". Increasing value is a better empirical view than causation, but this isn't any easier to explain (eg to a MoQish judge) Ian On Mon, Sep 20, 2010 at 8:43 PM, John Carl wrote: > Ian and Andre, I am convinced. > > On Fri, Sep 17, 2010 at 10:09 PM, Andre Broersen > wrote: > >> Ian to dmb: >> >> I'm not convinced that Pirsig's replacement of causation between >> objects with patterns of preference involving conceptual patterns >> actually makes the explanation of causation any easier. >> >> > I came across this problem my freshman year of high school. I wrote about > it as a subject for an English class, and sort of expected some interest or > intrigue from my teacher over what I termed "the fallacy of cause and > effect". All he wrote on the top of my paper was that my "Hume-ian stance > wouldn't get me very far if I was ever brought up before a judge for > "causing" an accident. > > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Ian and Andre, I am convinced. On Fri, Sep 17, 2010 at 10:09 PM, Andre Broersen wrote: > Ian to dmb: > > I'm not convinced that Pirsig's replacement of causation between > objects with patterns of preference involving conceptual patterns > actually makes the explanation of causation any easier. > > I came across this problem my freshman year of high school. I wrote about it as a subject for an English class, and sort of expected some interest or intrigue from my teacher over what I termed "the fallacy of cause and effect". All he wrote on the top of my paper was that my "Hume-ian stance wouldn't get me very far if I was ever brought up before a judge for "causing" an accident. Damn pragmatists. I'd never even heard of David Hume yet. But basically, any deemed effect has an infinite number of causes. For any given effect, we can postulate all of cosmic history as a cause. Our intuition tells us the most important aspect of a cause to assign, but there's no reasonable way to rigorously define what is in fact, a Quality judgement. It was only when I encountered Pirsig's thinking that I saw a way out of this logical conundrum, and felt somewhat proud that I'd stumbled across the same problem he did with his infinite regress of hypothesis. For what is a hypothesis but a theoretical cause? All this to say that I am satisfied that the MoQ solves this problem in broad outline, but for a rigorous metaphysical solution I think we need to add Peirce and Royce's philosophy of a triadic interpretation. > Andre: > This is interesting Ian. Now you are trying to use the MOQ's 'patterns > of preference' to keep on explaining causation. Pirsig suggested to 'strike > 'cause' from the language and substitute 'value'[then] you are not only > replacing > an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one;you are using a term > that is more appropriate to actual observation'(LILA,p107) > > Mr. Pirsig is exactly addressing that which you are unclear about. As you > state in > your next paragraph when you keep on saying 'that causation isn't itself > very clear'. > It seems that you are unclear about it because you 'never experience it in > any way'. > (LILA,p106). > > I agree Andre. > Ian: > Paul Turner wrote some good stuff on this from a Buddhist perspective - > causation as > dependent arising. I must dig it up. > > Andre: > Yeah, Paul is a clever young man. A nice place to start is the second verse > of the Tao > Te Ching. > > One line I'd like to take out as it nicely ties in with dmb's response to > John about > 'the Giant': "Therefore having and not having arise together'. It is a > no-two dualism. > > Now there I'm a little confused. Would you mind explaining a "no-two dualism"? John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
- Original Message From: david buchanan To: [email protected] Sent: Fri, September 17, 2010 12:01:44 PM Subject: Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly Platt said: ... I buy the scientist's assumption that for every effect there is a cause That at the beginning of the universe cause and effect suddenly becomes inoperative to Hawkins and some other cosmologists seems to me to be a grand cop out. Steve replied: I don't think that Hawkings is saying that cause and effect get suspended at the beginning of the universe alone. The somethings coming from nothings happen all the time on the quantum level according to my understanding of his theoretical view. .. Believers often argue that the universe must have a beginning because otherwise we would have an infinite regress of causes. ... dmb says: It's ironic that the issue of cause and effect should come up in a thread that declares the death of philosophy. So much of philosophy centered on that issue. Kant famously said that he was awakened from his "dogmatic slumbers" by Hume's empiricism, specifically by Hume's attack on cause and effect. Basically, Hume noticed that causal relations are never experienced as such. We don't see causes so much as we add the notion to explain why one event follows another. This was a big deal at the time because all events in the universe was conceived as one long chain of causality going all the way back to the moment of creation itself, going all the way back to the first cause. The first cause is what starts the whole chain of causes and prevents an infinite regress. This is "the prime mover". It's God. This idea goes all the way back to Aristotle, but it had been integrated into Christianity during the age of scholasticism. So when Hume attacked causality itself as non-empirical, there were profound theological implications. No causality, no first cause. Ron: In Lambda he expresses "analogically" that the principle of a "prime mover" is an explanation for the most general terms which seeks to take in a totality of experience. He stated sources of change are always composed of particulars. (Another angle on the what he considered to be the most primary of ideas, the one and the many, ) Of the general and the specific. The basis of all explanation. Therefore we can only speak analogically about such things. The idea of the "prime mover" explored before Aristotle by Democritus, Empedocles Anximander to name but a few, forwarded, contrarity, Love, the indefinable. But Aristotle posited something a bit different. The act of being aware: " Now such a mover must impart movement as do the desireable and intelligable, which impel movement without themselves undegoing movement. But what is primary of desire and for intelligibility is the same; for what is desired apears to be good and the primary object of rational choice is what is good. Certainly and end is desired because it seems good; it does not seem good because it is desired. So the starting point is the activity of knowing. Moreover intelligence is moved by the intelligible." "knowing, by it's intrinsic nature, concerns what is inherently best; and knowing in the truest sense concerns what is best in the truest sense. So intellect finds its fulfillment in being aware of the intelligible" "Hence the possession of knowledge rather than the capacity for knowledge is the divine aspect of mind, and it is the activity of intellectual vision that is most pleasent and best." "it is in this better state, that the divine has its being and its life." Ron: I thought this bore some relavence to the topic. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
dmb said: And then there is that bit in the MOQ where the laws of causality are replaced by patterns of preference. Causal relations is a useful idea, but it's just that: an idea. But we can just as well conceptualize the same experience and the same laboratory data in terms of preferences. Andre supplied a page number for that bit: Pirsig suggested to 'strike 'cause' from the language and substitute 'value' [then] you are not only replacing an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a term that is more appropriate to actual observation'. (LILA, p. 107) dmb says: Thanks, Andre, I was looking for that passage. (It's on page 104 in my edition.) Here's the full paragraph: "The only difference between causation and value is that the word 'cause' implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of 'value' is one of preference. In classical science it was supposed that the world always works in terms of absolute certainty and that 'cause' is the more appropriate word to describe it. But in modern quantum physics all that is changed. Particles 'prefer' to do what they do. An individual particle is not absolutely committed to one predictable behavior. What appears to be an absolute cause is just a very consistent pattern of preferences. Therefore, when you strike 'cause' from the language and substitute 'value' you are not only replacing an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a term that is more appropriate to actual observation." Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Ian to dmb: I'm not convinced that Pirsig's replacement of causation between objects with patterns of preference involving conceptual patterns actually makes the explanation of causation any easier. Andre: This is interesting Ian. Now you are trying to use the MOQ's 'patterns of preference' to keep on explaining causation. Pirsig suggested to 'strike 'cause' from the language and substitute 'value'[then] you are not only replacing an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one;you are using a term that is more appropriate to actual observation'(LILA,p107) Mr. Pirsig is exactly addressing that which you are unclear about. As you state in your next paragraph when you keep on saying 'that causation isn't itself very clear'. It seems that you are unclear about it because you 'never experience it in any way'. (LILA,p106). Ian: Paul Turner wrote some good stuff on this from a Buddhist perspective - causation as dependent arising. I must dig it up. Andre: Yeah, Paul is a clever young man. A nice place to start is the second verse of the Tao Te Ching. One line I'd like to take out as it nicely ties in with dmb's response to John about 'the Giant': "Therefore having and not having arise together'. It is a no-two dualism. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Platt says. Thanks for a high quality historical perspective on the philosophy of cause and effect. I conclude that philosophy is still involved with that issue with Pirsig perhaps giving it the latest "twist" by introducing static patterns of preference. That Hawkins doesn't see his thoughts in any way connected to philosophy means to me that he doesn't recognize the underlying assumptions of science much less those underlying his own ideas. (Or maybe he does but I haven't read where he revealed or explained them, like why physical laws are mathematical. ) Anyway, thanks for a "keeper" post for my science folder.. On 17 Sep 2010 at 10:01, david buchanan wrote: Platt said: ... I buy the scientist's assumption that for every effect there is a cause That at the beginning of the universe cause and effect suddenly becomes inoperative to Hawkins and some other cosmologists seems to me to be a grand cop out. Steve replied: I don't think that Hawkings is saying that cause and effect get suspended at the beginning of the universe alone. The somethings coming from nothings happen all the time on the quantum level according to my understanding of his theoretical view. .. Believers often argue that the universe must have a beginning because otherwise we would have an infinite regress of causes. ... dmb says: It's ironic that the issue of cause and effect should come up in a thread that declares the death of philosophy. So much of philosophy centered on that issue. Kant famously said that he was awakened from his "dogmatic slumbers" by Hume's empiricism, specifically by Hume's attack on cause and effect. Basically, Hume noticed that causal relations are never experienced as such. We don't see causes so much as we add the notion to explain why one event follows another. This was a big deal at the time because all events in the universe was conceived as one long chain of causality going all the way back to the moment of creation itself, going all the way back to the first cause. The first cause is what starts the whole chain of causes and prevents an infinite regress. This is "the prime mover". It's God. This idea goes all the way back to Aristotle, but it had been integrated into Christianity during the age of scholasticism. So when Hume attacked causality itself as non-empirical, there were profound theological implications. No causality, no first cause. Kant's response was to say that concepts like cause and effect (as well as time and space) are innate categories of the mind. We need these mental categories to shape raw sense data into something intelligible. In my undergrad days, the prof explained this in terms of raw dough (sense data) being put through a pasta machine (innate categories of the mind). The blob of dough is shaped when it's run through the little machine. It's given a uniform thickness and sliced into strands of uniform width. Afterwards, you might even trim the pasta so it's of uniform length too but that's just a cooking tip, not an epistemological analogy. Kant thought he was saving empiricism from collapsing into solipsism, he was saving God (not sure how THAT works), and since concepts like time, space, as well as cause and effect were categories innate to the human mind, he was presenting a particular kind of rationality as universal. There is a real world with pre-existing things, with things-in-themselves and this is what causes the sense data but we can never know the world of things-in-themselves except through the mind's categories, he thought. His work is about the inherent structure of reason, the thought paths we must walk, the modes of thought to which we must conform. Now I think we want to look at the MOQ's radical empiricism in this context. It's part of the same story but, of course, it pushes these ideas in a very different direction. Since radical empiricism rejects subject-object metaphysics, what James and Pirsig are saying is really quite different. The radical empiricist says that subjects and objects are not the starting points of experience, they are concepts derived from experience. That one little line changes everything. As Kant see it, objects are the cause of our experience, they are things-in-themselves and so exist independently of our perceptions. As Pirsig sees it, objects are concepts. They are what Kant would call a category of the mind, except that in the MOQ our conceptual categories are not universal or innate. They are provisional, they are cultural creations that have evolved and will continue to evolve. And then there is that bit in the MOQ where the laws of causality are replaced by patterns of preference. Causal relations is a useful idea, but it's just that: an idea. But we can just as well conceptualize the same experience and the same laboratory data in terms of preferences. It's interesting that Hawking is saying we don't need to invoke God in order to explain physic
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Hi DMB, You say a lot in there that is solid MoQism ... objects being more like evolving concepts ... experience interpreted through radical empiricism. I'm good with that. You start of with the irony of the difficulty in explaining causation in a thread that was about the death of philosophy. I buy that too. I'm not convinced that Pirsig's replacement of causation between objects with patterns of preference involving conceptual patterns actually makes the explanation of causation any easier. What it does make clearer is that causation isn't itself very clear, and confirms the fact that causation is itself another conceptualization of experience. Any innateness in objects and causation is just the current evolved state of our interpretation of the world, rather than anything absolute. We explain things "as if" causation passed between objects, but we know that it is just an evolving rationalization of events. It works for the most part, except where we find effects that are emergent across multiple levels, then either need to invent objects - to stand for the patterns - or we get overly reductionist - so that simple causal models still look like they work. I'm pretty sure that the weirdness of explaining causation is tangled up with having only a vague conceptualization of what time itself is. Paul Turner wrote some good stuff on this from a Buddhist perspective - causation as dependent arising. I must dig it up. Ian On Fri, Sep 17, 2010 at 5:01 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > Platt said: > ... I buy the scientist's assumption that for every effect there is a cause > That at the beginning of the universe cause and effect suddenly becomes > inoperative to Hawkins and some other cosmologists seems to me to be a grand > cop out. > > > > Steve replied: > I don't think that Hawkings is saying that cause and effect get suspended at > the beginning of the universe alone. The somethings coming from nothings > happen all the time on the quantum level according to my understanding of his > theoretical view. .. Believers often argue that the universe must have a > beginning because otherwise we would have an infinite regress of causes. ... > > > > dmb says: > > It's ironic that the issue of cause and effect should come up in a thread > that declares the death of philosophy. So much of philosophy centered on that > issue. Kant famously said that he was awakened from his "dogmatic slumbers" > by Hume's empiricism, specifically by Hume's attack on cause and effect. > Basically, Hume noticed that causal relations are never experienced as such. > We don't see causes so much as we add the notion to explain why one event > follows another. > > This was a big deal at the time because all events in the universe was > conceived as one long chain of causality going all the way back to the moment > of creation itself, going all the way back to the first cause. The first > cause is what starts the whole chain of causes and prevents an infinite > regress. This is "the prime mover". It's God. This idea goes all the way back > to Aristotle, but it had been integrated into Christianity during the age of > scholasticism. So when Hume attacked causality itself as non-empirical, there > were profound theological implications. No causality, no first cause. > > > Kant's response was to say that concepts like cause and effect (as well as > time and space) are innate categories of the mind. We need these mental > categories to shape raw sense data into something intelligible. In my > undergrad days, the prof explained this in terms of raw dough (sense data) > being put through a pasta machine (innate categories of the mind). The blob > of dough is shaped when it's run through the little machine. It's given a > uniform thickness and sliced into strands of uniform width. Afterwards, you > might even trim the pasta so it's of uniform length too but that's just a > cooking tip, not an epistemological analogy. > > > Kant thought he was saving empiricism from collapsing into solipsism, he was > saving God (not sure how THAT works), and since concepts like time, space, as > well as cause and effect were categories innate to the human mind, he was > presenting a particular kind of rationality as universal. There is a real > world with pre-existing things, with things-in-themselves and this is what > causes the sense data but we can never know the world of things-in-themselves > except through the mind's categories, he thought. His work is about the > inherent structure of reason, the thought paths we must walk, the modes of > thought to which we must conform. > > > Now I think we want to look at the MOQ's radical empiricism in this context. > It's part of the same story but, of course, it pushes these ideas in a very > different direction. Since radical empiricism rejects subject-object > metaphysics, what James and Pirsig are saying is really quite different. The > radical empiricist says that subjects
Re: [MD] Philosophy is deadly
Platt said: ... I buy the scientist's assumption that for every effect there is a cause That at the beginning of the universe cause and effect suddenly becomes inoperative to Hawkins and some other cosmologists seems to me to be a grand cop out. Steve replied: I don't think that Hawkings is saying that cause and effect get suspended at the beginning of the universe alone. The somethings coming from nothings happen all the time on the quantum level according to my understanding of his theoretical view. .. Believers often argue that the universe must have a beginning because otherwise we would have an infinite regress of causes. ... dmb says: It's ironic that the issue of cause and effect should come up in a thread that declares the death of philosophy. So much of philosophy centered on that issue. Kant famously said that he was awakened from his "dogmatic slumbers" by Hume's empiricism, specifically by Hume's attack on cause and effect. Basically, Hume noticed that causal relations are never experienced as such. We don't see causes so much as we add the notion to explain why one event follows another. This was a big deal at the time because all events in the universe was conceived as one long chain of causality going all the way back to the moment of creation itself, going all the way back to the first cause. The first cause is what starts the whole chain of causes and prevents an infinite regress. This is "the prime mover". It's God. This idea goes all the way back to Aristotle, but it had been integrated into Christianity during the age of scholasticism. So when Hume attacked causality itself as non-empirical, there were profound theological implications. No causality, no first cause. Kant's response was to say that concepts like cause and effect (as well as time and space) are innate categories of the mind. We need these mental categories to shape raw sense data into something intelligible. In my undergrad days, the prof explained this in terms of raw dough (sense data) being put through a pasta machine (innate categories of the mind). The blob of dough is shaped when it's run through the little machine. It's given a uniform thickness and sliced into strands of uniform width. Afterwards, you might even trim the pasta so it's of uniform length too but that's just a cooking tip, not an epistemological analogy. Kant thought he was saving empiricism from collapsing into solipsism, he was saving God (not sure how THAT works), and since concepts like time, space, as well as cause and effect were categories innate to the human mind, he was presenting a particular kind of rationality as universal. There is a real world with pre-existing things, with things-in-themselves and this is what causes the sense data but we can never know the world of things-in-themselves except through the mind's categories, he thought. His work is about the inherent structure of reason, the thought paths we must walk, the modes of thought to which we must conform. Now I think we want to look at the MOQ's radical empiricism in this context. It's part of the same story but, of course, it pushes these ideas in a very different direction. Since radical empiricism rejects subject-object metaphysics, what James and Pirsig are saying is really quite different. The radical empiricist says that subjects and objects are not the starting points of experience, they are concepts derived from experience. That one little line changes everything. As Kant see it, objects are the cause of our experience, they are things-in-themselves and so exist independently of our perceptions. As Pirsig sees it, objects are concepts. They are what Kant would call a category of the mind, except that in the MOQ our conceptual categories are not universal or innate. They are provisional, they are cultural creations that have evolved and will continue to evolve. And then there is that bit in the MOQ where the laws of causality are replaced by patterns of preference. Causal relations is a useful idea, but it's just that: an idea. But we can just as well conceptualize the same experience and the same laboratory data in terms of preferences. It's interesting that Hawking is saying we don't need to invoke God in order to explain physical reality and Dawkins is saying we don't need to invoke God in order to explain biological reality and the Pope is in the UK issuing warnings about "aggressive secularism" and "atheist extremism". (Echoes of "militant secularism", eh Steve?) It looks like the war between science and religion is still very much with us. I think the MOQ gives a better answer than either side in that debate. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
